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Abstract 
This qualitative study draws on and extends two important concepts of the public 
understanding of science literature: scientists' understandings of 'the public', and the 
currently popular notion of science-public 'dialogue'. Methods include interviewing, 
participant observation, and the use of audio and video transcripts, on which a detailed 
discourse analysis is based. Specifically I use techniques from the ethnography of speaking 
and critical discourse analysis. 
Using data from group interviews with scientists and engineers, I examine 'the 
understanding of the public by scientists' (Levy-Leblond 1992). 1 argue that the "deficit 
model' of the public (Irwin and Wynne 1996; Wynne 2006a) can be found in their talk, but 
that there are also more complex constructions of the public present. I also examine 
accounts of science and their interaction with accounts of publics, and discuss how such talk 
works to bound science. I conclude that there is surprising complexity and diversity in 
scientists' talk, particularly when compared to rather homogeneous accounts of this in the 
literature. 
I continue to analyse constructions of publics in a detailed case study of informal science- 
public dialogue at the Dana Centre, London. I look at the interactions which take place in 
the dialogue space, arguing that these are currently uncertain and flexible: genre of 
interaction is not fixed and event framing varies. I also examine power within the space, 
concluding that while structures of power and authority are more traditional than the 
dialogue movement's rhetoric would suggest, there is continual resistance to and 
contestation of these structures. To conclude I draw the threads of my analyses together to 
provide a theoretical reasoning of, and model for, informal dialogue processes which are 
able to utilise the sociological complexity of scientists' talk. 
-2- 
TO MY PARENTS, ALWAYS 
-3- 
WITH THANKS TO: 
Wynn Abbott 
The AHRC 
Alice Bell 
Audrey Brown, Vic Buss and Kayla Jordan 
Kevin Burchell 
The Dana Centre 
Ellen McCallie 
Felicity Mellor 
Kat Nilsson 
Nick Russell 
Elfin Simonsson 
Steph Sim 
-4- 
Thesis contents in brief 
1: Introduction 
....................................................................................... 
12 
2: Scientists' understandings of 'the public' and science-public 
dialogue: Existing literature .................................................................. 22 
3: Telling stories from data: Theoretical frameworks and 
methodologies ....................................................................................... 57 
4: Complexity and contradiction: science and the public in scientists' 
talk ......................................................................................................... 92 
5: The Rules of Engagement I: Mixed messages in event framing and 
setting ...................................................................................................... 142 
6: The Rules of Engagement II: Flexibility and uncertainty in event 
ends and genre ....................................................................................... 168 
7: The Rules of Engagement III: Power and authority in the Dana 
space ...................................................................................................... 195 
8: The Rules of Engagement IV: Two frameworks for dialogue events 234 
9: Private talk in public places: A theory and vision for informal 
dialogue 
................................................................................................ 245 
10: Conclusion ....................................................................................... 279 
Appendices 
............................................................................................. 295 
Bibliography .......................................................................................... 309 
-5- 
Thesis contents in full 
ABSTRACT 2 
1: INTRODUCTION 12 
Background to the research questions 14 
The 'deficit model' of the public 15 
A deficit model of science? 17 
Studying informal 'dialogue' 18 
Thesis structure 19 
2: SCIENTISTS' UNDERSTANDINGS OF 'THE PUBLIC' AND SCIENCE- 
PUBLIC DIALOGUE: EXISTING LITERATURE 22 
Scientists' understandings of publics 22 
Scientists on the public: survey work 25 
Scientists on the public: qualitative work 27 
Science and identity 33 
Science-public dialogue 36 
Science meeting the public: background to participatory processes 37 
The "new mood for dialogue": the move towards dialogue in the UK 41 
"Something of a mirage": analysis and critique of current dialogue and 
participation 46 
Museums and dialogue 52 
Conclusions 54 
3: TELLING STORIES FROM DATA: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND 
-6- 
METHODOLOGIES 57 
Social constructivism 58 
The acknowledgement of 'mess' 59 
Critical research 60 
The ethnographic tradition 62 
Grounded theory 63 
Harmonising diverse frameworks 64 
Methods and research process 66 
Phase I: Talking to scientists 67 
Phase II: Understanding dialogue 71 
Participant observation at a range of science-society dialogue events 71 
Participant observation at the Dana Centre 72 
Informal interviewing at the Dana Centre 76 
Ethical issues 77 
Transcription 78 
Data analysis 79 
Interpretative coding 81 
Discourse analysis 82 
A natural history of research 85 
The personal context of the research 86 
Shifting research emphases 87 
Shifting project scope 88 
Interviewing practice 89 
The messiness of the research process 90 
Consent, interpretation, and the use of data 90 
-7- 
4: COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION: SCIENCE AND THE PUBLIC IN 
SCIENTISTS' TALK 92 
Deficit and diversity: 'the public' in scientists' talk 93 
The public are impressionable/passive 94 
The public are not critical 95 
The public are ignorant 96 
The public fear/blame/mistrust science 96 
The public are differentiated 100 
The public are powerful 102 
The public as active and knowledgeable 103 
The public are/are not interested in science 106 
The public as other/the public as self 108 
Policing the boundaries of science: science in scientists' talk 111 
Science is differentiated 112 
Science is truth 113 
Bounding science: Science (and scientists) are critical, and other boundaries 114 
Access to information bounds science 115 
Process bounds science 115 
Language bounds science 116 
Communication as protecting science 117 
Bounding/permeability: disjunctions in whether science is bounded 117 
Science as subjective 120 
Constructing the media: a default discourse within scientific culture 121 
The importance of context 125 
The importance of context 1: The research group/department/discipline 126 
The importance of context 2: the interview micro-context and 'reflective 
-8- 
discussion' 130 
Discussion and conclusions 138 
Discourses of separation and identification 139 
In conclusion: the surprising complexity of scientific talk 140 
5: THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT I: MIXED MESSAGES IN EVENT FRAMING 
AND SETTING 142 
'Communicative competence' at the Dana Centre 143 
Setting: the politics of space 151 
A 'thick' description of physical layout 152 
The 'genre' of space: the implications of contextual features 158 
6: THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT II: FLEXIBILITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN 
EVENT ENDS AND GENRE 168 
Purposes and outcomes: Learning, winning, sharing, and having fun 168 
Genre as flexible and uncertain: Education, tabloid talkshows and news 
interviewing 173 
Formal education 176 
The tabloid talkshow 178 
The aggressive news interview 181 
What'goes wrong' in events: generic instability and other problems for 
participants 189 
7: THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT III: POWER AND AUTHORITY IN THE 
DANA SPACE 195 
How to be normal: Norms and rules of interaction 195 
-9- 
Norms of topic 196 
Norms of interaction 198 
The presence of rule- and norm-breaking behaviour 203 
Constructing roles: Participants in Dana Centre events 206 
Constructing the 'facilitator' 208 
Constructing invited 'speakers' 210 
Constructing the "audience': framings from event process, speakers and 
facilitators 212 
Constructing the 'audience': participants' self-positioning 217 
Constructing the 'audience': as different to 'the public' 219 
Locating power and authority in the Dana Centre space 221 
Locating authority: constructing science 225 
Locating authority: science and other authorities throughout the Dana space 227 
Patterns of domination and resistance 230 
8: THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IV: TWO FRAMEWORKS FOR DIALOGUE 
EVENTS 234 
Two frameworks for Dana Centre events 236 
Dana as struggle for the floor 236 
Dana as performance designed to entertain 241 
9: PRIVATE TALK IN PUBLIC PLACES: A THEORY AND VISION FOR 
INFORMAL DIALOGUE 245 
The critique of informal dialogue: seeking public trust without public 
accountability 246 
Reconceptualising informal dialogue: small-scale, symmetrical social 
-10- 
learning 251 
From theory to praxis 256 
Points for application from the theoretical model and empirical findings 256 
Two practical models for informal dialogue 261 
A model for informal dialogue: the meal 265 
A model for informal dialogue: the marketplace 272 
Conclusion 277 
10: CONCLUSION 279 
Returning to the research questions 279 
What discourses do scientists and engineers use in talk about the public, and 
how do these relate to the 'deficit model'? 280 
How are publics constructed within informal science-public dialogue events, 
and what other performances and meaning-makings occur within these? 281 
Discourse and dialogue: the project as coherent whole 286 
Limitations and key points of significance 288 
Group discussions and "forced' vocalisation 288 
The Dana Centre as a case study 289 
Future research and other implications 291 
APPENDICES 295 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 309 
-11- 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This study draws on and extends two important concepts of the public understanding of 
science (PUS) literature: scientists' understandings of 'the public', and the currently popular 
notion of science-public 'dialogue'. It could, however, be located within other fields than 
PUS, and might most productively be viewed as within an intersection of science and 
technology studies (STS), PUS and science communication studies. I am interested in the 
concept of 'the public' within discourse, and will be examining two key sites for this: 
scientists' talk and informal dialogue processes. I analyse discourse from group discussions 
with scientists' and dialogue events to argue, firstly, that scientists use a range of 
discourses of the public (including, but not limited to, the deficit model), and, secondly, that 
current informal dialogue is flexible and contested but ultimately dominated by scientific 
framings. These findings are particularly significant given the'new mood for dialogue' in 
science-society relations within the UK since the House of Lords Third Report on Science 
and Society (2000), and current interest in public engagement. 
1 My interest is in technoscientific cultures and includes engineers as well as scientists. I use, however, 'scientists' 
as a general term to include all working within these cultures. 
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The exact status of PUS as an academic field is contested. Gregory and Miller (1998), in 
their key text on the field, argue that it is united only by its central aim of "improving the 
relationships between science and the public" (p. x) - although they then note that this 
'improvement' means different things to different people. It is a multi-disciplinary and at 
times fragmented area of research (Bauer et al 2007; Wynne 1994), involving scholars from 
political scientists to linguists, but is perhaps most obviously grounded in STS (as in Jasanoff 
et al 2002). There have been various attempts to frame and categorise the field, both 
descriptively and normatively: Mike Michael (2002), for example, has described competing 
traditions of 'traditional' and 'critical' PUS within it, while Yearley (1999: 848) has argued that 
the field can be understood in terms of concerns about "the public interpretation of the 
institutional role of science, about scientists' understanding of the public's knowledge, and 
about the social and sociological assumptions which underlie experts' claimed 
understandings". Others have framed it chronologically. Wilsdon and Willis (2004: 17-18) 
understand it in terms of a progression from 'PUS' to 'dialogue' to "moving engagement 
upstream", while Bauer et al (2007) describe three (overlapping) 'paradigms' in research 
from the 1960s onwards. Lock (2007), while problematising the neat story of 'deficit to 
dialogue' in UK PUS practice, similarly identifies four historical phases over the 1985-2005 
period. 
However the field has been framed and understood, the notion of 'the public' has been key 
throughout. Early studies attempted to measure'public understanding of science' through 
surveys (see Durant et al 1989); later work focussed on exploring public interactions with 
science in local contexts and identifying and problematising various models of the public 
(see, for examples, Irwin and Wynne 1996). However, despite Levy-Leblond's 1992 call for 
"studies and activities on the understanding of the public by scientists" (p. 20; see also 
Wynne 1992a), until recently there has been little detailed exploration of this. This study 
adds to that literature which does exist and seeks to fill key gaps in current research: it 
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explores scientists' understandings of 'the public' and attempts to track these through 
informal dialogue processes. In the rest of this first, short chapter I will fill out further 
background on this research, and give the questions that will guide the study. As I end I will 
give a brief overview of the chapters that follow. 
Background to the research questions 
The 1985 Bodmer Report - often viewed as having kick-started interest in PUS (Miller 2001) 
- was successful in at least one of its aims: it argued that ""scientists must learn to 
communicate with the public, be willing to do so, and indeed consider it their duty to do so" 
(Royal Society 1985: 6). Since then there has indeed been an unprecedented level of 
encouragement for those working within the sciences to open up their disciplines and 
communicate with publics. As Miller (2001) has noted, the scientific community has been 
very effectively mobilised by the new emphasis on public communication. 
This mobilisation, I would argue, indicates the importance of exploring in detail how 
scientists construct and understand 'the public'. The majority of science communication 
activities funded by government or charity are not large-scale events with input from social 
scientists or PUS theorists, but ""small-scale and local" activities (Turney 2006: 87). In 
practice, then, it is individuals or small groups of technical experts who come into contact 
with publics, not science as an institution; and it is therefore the practices of individuals 
which will frame and shape the communication process. This is key, given that work which 
has examined both 'dialogue' processes (Irwin 2001; Wynne 2002; 2005) and more 
traditional science communication (Layton et al 1993; Irwin and Wynne 1996; Wynne 
1992b; 2001) is clear that, in such processes, framing is everything. Organisers or key 
participants have the power to shape the assumptions of the communication process, 
positioning audiences and publics in particular ways and imposing particular value systems. 
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In the case of the vast majority of points of contact between science and publics, it is 
individuals within science who have this power. 
Existing work on understandings of publics by scientists has so far tended to fall into two 
camps: it has examined institutional or policy discourses (making use of policy documents 
or the tools and practices of the traditional PUS movement itself; see Grove-White 2001; Hill 
and Michael 1998; Irwin 2001; Wynne 1996); alternatively, it has looked at the talk of 
scientists, but has focussed on particular controversial issues such as genetically modified 
(GM) crops (Burchell 2007a; Cook et al 2004) or the use of animals in research (Michael and 
Birke 1994a; 1994b; Michael and Brown 2000; 2005). The former has tended to highlight 
science's 'sociological naivety', the latter the context-dependence of talk about publics. 
There remains, I would argue, a need for detailed examination of scientists' talk about the 
public in a generalised- rather than controversy-focussed - context. 
The 'deficit model' of the public 
Work carried out in this area has frequently made use of the concept of the 'deficit model' 
of the public. Indeed, the term has become a key reference point within the entire PUS 
field. It has, however, undergone some development in usage since its first appearance. 
David Dickson (2000) tells us that the phrase was first used in 1988 by Brian Wynne in a 
seminar, and it appears in print for the first time in 1991. Wynne writes: 
Once we move outside a simple "cognitive deficit" model of the public understanding of 
science, we become increasingly aware of the range and variety of possible interactions 
between people's existing understandings of particular situations and those that 
emanate from science. 
(Wynne 1991: 113) 
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Wynne's use of "cognitive deficit" implies that the term refers to a deficiency in knowledge 
or mental ability. However, there is also a slightly different usage present within the 
literature. As well as being about public ignorance, the term in some cases is tied to a 
narrative of public ignorance: a causality is developed, in which distrust or scepticism is a 
result of scientific ignorance. Thus Sturgis and Allum (2004) explain the term in this way: 
The assumption that it is a lack of public understanding or knowledge that has led to the 
present climate of skepticism towards science underpins what has come to be known as 
the "deficit model". In this formulation, it is the public that are assumed to be 
"deficient", while science is "sufficient". The public's doubts about the value of scientific 
progress or fears about new or unfamiliar innovations... are due to ignorance of the 
science behind them. 
(Sturgis and Allum 2004: 57) 
These more developed descriptions of the deficit model (see also Cook et al 2004; Gregory 
and Miller 1998; Miller 2001) seem to derive from the 1990s work of critical scholars who 
examined both science and the PUS movement's interactions with the public (for example: 
Hill and Michael 1998; Irwin and Wynne 1996; Wynne 1993; 1996). The visions they 
identify are of a deficient public, but the deficiency is not simply of knowledge but of a 
whole raft of other factors as well: agency, capability, and understanding, amongst other 
features such as fear of uncertainty (Wynne 2006a). The 'deficit model', as the term is 
commonly used, and as I will use it, is thus something of a shorthand for the broader 
findings of the critical movement on science's understandings of the public (discussed 
further in chapter 2). 2 
2 These authors do not question that in many cases 'the public' is ignorant of science: that there is, in other words, 
some form of cognitive deficit present. Their work challenges rather the link between 'ignorance' and mistrust, and 
the exact composition of ignorance. Wynne describes one scientific 'deficit' of the public as "Public mistrusts 
science because it is ignorant of science (it is ignorant, but this is not a cause of mistrust! )" (2006: 216). 
-16- 
A deficit model of science? 
The deficit model, then, is a key framework for any study of constructions of 'the public'. 
However, much of the work that has described this model has - as noted above - been 
based on institutional or policy discourses rather than the talk of individuals: a cursory 
reading of these studies could, in fact, result in a deficit model not of the public but of the 
scientific community. From all the references to "science', the 'expert community', and 
generalised 'scientists' (see, for example, Irwin and Wynne 1996; Jasanoff and Wynne 
1998), one can easily build up a picture of a homogeneous scientific body composed of 
individuals who all, in all circumstances, subscribe to the deficit model and hold simplistically 
to their "naive sociology" (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998: 26). 
This is not to deny that science - as an institution, and as expressed through policy, 
communication and other texts - can hold a deeply flawed view of the human (Wynne 
2001) and that it has imposed this view on its publics. However, in a field that has criticised 
science for its lack of reflexivity (Wynne 1993), and which has effectively mapped out the 
complexities, context-dependence and sophistication of public interactions with science, it is 
surprising that depictions of science remain relatively 'smooth' (cf. Law 2004). Studies which 
have shown the diversity and richness of 'the public' have not been repeated on 'science' to 
show equal diversity and richness. We are left with the question of whether there is hidden 
complexity which has to a large extent been ignored. 
With regard to understandings of the public by scientists, then, I have argued that it is 
important to know about these (as they may act to shape the communication or 
engagement processes that individual scientists are involved in), and have noted that there 
are holes in the literature on this, in particular around detailed studies of talk on general 
topics. I have described the 'deficit model' of the public, and suggested that some critical 
literature leaves us asking the question of whether scientists are homogenous in their 
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subscription to this. These points provide the framework for my research in this area, which 
can be summarised by the research question below: 
What discourses do scientists and engineers use in talk about the public, and how do these 
relate to the 'deficit model'? 
This question - or, perhaps more helpfully, research focus - is deliberately broad and seeks 
to give my investigations structure while still leaving them open to other themes that might 
emerge from the data. 
Studying informal 'dialogue' 
My second research focus, which structures my study of science-public informal dialogue 
processes, is similarly broad: 
How are publics constructed within informal science public dialogue events, and what other 
performances and meaning-makings occur within these? 
In this section of my research I thus maintain my interest in the way the concept of 'the 
public' is created and used, while again leaving the question open enough to allow 
investigation of other features which emerge from my study of informal dialogue. 
Such science-public dialogue processes are, as several authors have noted recently, 
increasingly commonplace (Irwin 2006; Kerr et al 2007; Wynne 2005), both within science 
governance and more informal science communication activities (see Turney 2006). If the 
Bodmer Report initiated interest in PUS, then the current popularity of 'dialogue' could be 
seen as dating from the House of Lords Third Report on Science and Society (2000): this 
appeared, at least, to formalise a shift from deficit to dialogue (Lock 2007; Wynne 2005). 
-18- 
The PUS movement has moved to the language of 'public engagement', 'science and 
society', and 'dialogue'; indeed, this is not merely a local shift but one of "international 
concern" (Wynne 2006a: 218; see also Leach et al 2005). These processes - particularly 
those of a more informal nature - have so far received little analysis or investigation. 
Existing studies have tended to focus on formalised processes designed to feed into science 
governance (for example Goven 2006; Horlick-)ones et al 2006; Irwin 2001) or to be rather 
descriptive accounts of practice (Davis 2004; McCallie et al in press; Reich et al 2006). In 
particular, there has been little close, critical, analysis of discourse, despite Alan Irwin's 
2006 call for this (in the form of an argument for the value of studying 'mere talk'; Irwin 
2006: 318). 
In view of these gaps in the literature, this study will focus its interest in 'the public' on one 
case study of informal - rather than policy-informing - public engagement with science, and 
look in detail at the talk present in this site. The case study used is the Dana Centre, 
London: further background to this site is given in chapter 3. 
Thesis structure 
Within this short chapter I have introduced the main interests of this thesis: scientists' 
understandings of 'the public', and how these are expressed in scientist's talk and in 
informal science dialogue events. I have argued that there is a need for both strands of this 
research, noting that there are gaps in the literature around detailed analysis of scientists' 
talk about the public, and of informal dialogue, and I have suggested two 'research foci' 
which will structure my research. Before I move on, however, it may be helpful to sketch 
out the contents of the chapters that follow. 
In chapter 21 expand the background to the project further by examining the existing 
literature around the interests of my thesis. This highlights again the unanswered questions 
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which this study seeks to speak to, but also suggests some key themes: the presence of the 
deficit model - but also context-dependency and variation - in talk; and dialogue processes 
as contested and often problematic. In chapter 31 move on to discuss my theoretical 
influences and methods, concluding the chapter with a 'natural history' of the research 
process which seeks to reflect on the practice of this project. 
In chapter 4, 'Complexity and contradiction'. I start to discuss my empirical findings. This 
chapter relates to my first research question, and describes results from a series of group 
discussions with scientists and engineers. I find that a version of the deficit model is present 
in the talk of these discussions, but that more complex models of publics are also drawn 
upon. I also find science being co-constructed with the public, and discuss these 
constructions. I finish by emphasising the importance of context, and by suggesting that we 
might sum up the discourses I identify as emphasising either separation or identification 
between science and the public. In chapters 5-8 1 move on to investigate my case study of 
informal dialogue, using a structure taken from Dell Hymes' description of the ethnography 
of communication (1974). Chapter 5 examines the'speech situation' and setting of Dana 
Centre events: we find mixed messages in both. Chapter 6 looks at the purpose and genre 
of the events, and leads into a discussion of the ways in which the flexibility and uncertainty 
of events can be problematic for participants. In chapter 71 examine norms of interaction 
and roles of participants - including an analysis of audience framing and constructions of 
'the public' - and discuss the ways in which power is negotiated in the event space. Finally, 
in chapter 8,1 draw my analysis of the Dana Centre together and suggest two different 
ways of reading it: as continual struggle for the floor or as performance. 
Chapters 3-8 thus contain the bulk of my empirical work. In chapter 91 move on to 
something rather different: I start to draw my research together by discussing, and then 
seeking to theoretically answer, some of the questions the preceding chapters have raised 
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about informal dialogue. I argue that a new theoretical model for informal dialogue 
processes is required, and describe one vision of what this could be, ending by sketching 
out two practical models of this. Finally, in chapter 10 1 continue the task of synthesis and 
reflection. I return to the research questions outlined in this chapter, discuss the 
interconnections between the different parts of my research, and end by considering the 
implications of this study for research and practice. 
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Chapter 2 
Scientists' understandings of `the public' and 
science-public dialogue: Existing literature 
This study is interested in two key concepts from the public understanding of science 
literature: scientists' understandings of 'the public' and science-public dialogue. Within this 
chapter, then, I will briefly survey existing research in these areas, attempting to draw forth 
major findings and suggesting what significance these may have for my study. I finish by 
summing up key themes from the literature. 
Scientists' understandings of publics 
Perhaps surprisingly, there is relatively little work focussing on the talk of scientists (a key 
exception being Gilbert and Mulkay's influential 1984 work, Opening Pandora's Boo, both 
on the public and more generally. There is, however, a large literature on science teachers 
and students' beliefs about the nature of science and on their interaction with the different 
cultures of'life-world''life-world'and 'sc(for example Aikenhead 1996; )egede and 
Okebukola 1991; Mohapatra 1991; Solomon et al 1994). Similarly, extensive work has been 
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done on medical professionals' understandings and constructions of relevant publics 
(Asbring and Närvänen 2003; Barr 1983; Cunningham-Burley and Kerr 1999; Ettorre 1999; 
Fisher and Groce 1985; Kerr et al 1997; Loewe et al 1998; Williams et al 2001). At this 
important boundary between academic science, medicine and the public, studies of experts' 
discourse have - perhaps unsurprisingly - shown evidence of boundary work (cf. Gieryn 
1999) and attempts, through constructions of laypeople and of the'social', to maintain 
expert authority. Experts 'tell stories' (Ettorre 1999) that act to protect their professional 
dominance but also, where necessary, to deflect responsibility if things go wrong (Kerr et al 
1997). 
Scientists' talk about science has been examined by a few authors but overall remains 
under-explored. Aside from Gilbert and Mulkay's division of talk into 'empiricist' and 
'contingent' repertoires (1984), Waterton et al (2001) sought to examine scientists' 
reflections on science, arguing that a rich 'folk sociology' of science is indeed present in 
scientific culture. Importantly, they identified heterogeneity within scientists' accounts and 
argued that disciplinary context and career stage affect the discourses of science used. 
Ryder et al (1999) have described how undergraduate science students' views about the 
nature of science developed during an eight month practical project. Although the images of 
science held changed to take account of the role of theory in working science, the authors 
still felt that the social and communal nature of science was underrepresented in the 
students' discussions about science. Such a result is perhaps not surprising given that 
scientists tend to cite Popper as the major influence on their understanding of scientific 
method (Mulkay and Gilbert 1981). While Mulkay and Gilbert have argued that Popper is 
more often cited than prescriptively followed (see also Simonton 1988: 15), it still appears 
that scientists seek to represent their work with a Popperian emphasis on the logical 
progression of science and the method of falsification. Similarly, a study of genetics 
professionals and clinicians (Kerr et al 1997) found that the majority of those interviewed 
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argued that science is objective and simply uncovers facts. This objective knowledge was 
described as in opposition to the realm of the'social' and was in constant danger from its 
contamination. 
Further qualitative work (Koro-Ljungberg and Tirri 2001) has looked at the 'beliefs and 
values' of a small sample of successful scientists, and in particular how these "guide their 
academic work" (p. 141). The authors frame the beliefs they identify in terms of a guiding 
'ethic': of care, justice, or of empowerment. Such 'ethics' are moral systems that encompass 
motivation and principles, and were drawn from their interview data as themes such as 
"Belief in persistence", "Belief in supportive collaboration", and "Value of independence". 
While the authors' discussion of these ethics is useful for understanding how scientists view 
their work and what principles guide and motivate them, perhaps the most important 
finding is the complex and context-dependent nature of their data. They write: 
Scientists' ethical practices and experiences seemed situational, unpredictable and 
non-generalisable. In addition, participants' diverse responses and interview quotes 
did not necessarily form stable and coherent categories or did not support causal 
relations. We observed these trends in our data and acknowledged the difficulty of 
creating a global ethical theory that would explain moral orientations without the 
context in which they were practiced. 
(Koro-Ljungberg and Tirri 2001: 153) 
Subscription to the different ethics was not simply split along gender divisions (as had 
previously been reported). In practice scientists did not subscribe to all aspects of one 
particular "ethic' but drew on different ethics, and different aspects of those ethics, in 
different situations and at different times. Their lived experience was more finely negotiated 
than the careful division of their discourse into three areas would suggest. 
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Koro-Ljungberg and Tirri's and Mulkay and Gilbert's results - while not particularly 
informative as to how publics may be constructed - give us some idea of what we should 
expect from my data. They find unstable, diverse accounts that draw on whatever resources 
are necessary and accessible at the time. Such complexity is to be expected throughout my 
study as well. 
Scientists on the public: survey work 
The only major piece of work to survey scientists' views on public communication is a 
report by MORI and funded by the Wellcome Trust, The Role of Scientists in Public Debate 
(2000). While the focus of this study was to look at how scientists "perceive increasing calls 
for them to become more involved in communicating their research to the public" (p. 4), it 
also included questions relating to scientists' understanding of the public. The picture 
presented is a typical deficit model one. The public is seen as ignorant, with its lack of 
knowledge viewed as the main barrier to greater public understanding of science. Scientists' 
opinions of the benefits of "greater understanding of science among the non-specialist 
public" (p. 13) are reminiscent of the arguments for communication in early PUS literature 
(for example Royal Society 1985; Durant et al 1989). The primary perceived benefit (with 
46% of the scientists interviewed mentioning it) is that a knowledge of science is a benefit 
in and of itself. MORI records only the top five of these perceived benefits, but all of these 
assume a passive acceptance of scientific knowledge and, once accepted, a strengthened 
support for science (for example, 18% of the scientists interviewed mentioned increased 
funding for science as a benefit of greater understanding). 
MORI also reports data on what scientists think the public thinks of them, and contrasts this 
with scientists' own opinions on themselves. They find a large "image gap" (2000: 10): 
scientists describe themselves as enquiring, intelligent, poorly paid and methodical but think 
the public see them as detached, secretive and uncommunicative. These results, while 
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indicating that scientists believe themselves to be poorly understood as a profession, also 
suggest that the scientists interviewed have access to cultural stereotypes of scientists. The 
characteristics that they cite - such as being detached and secretive - are part of our 
society's myths of the scientist and can be found in many versions of the 'mad scientist' in 
film or literature (see discussion in Haynes 1994). That the scientists interviewed have 
access to these stereotypes, reject them, but believe that the "non-specialist public" do not 
is significant both for the implicit construction of the public (as uncritical), and the way in 
which it seems that scientists themselves are able to access different domains of knowledge 
- in this case their own experience and beliefs about scientific life, and society's stereotypes 
of this. 
While the MORI study described above is the only large scale survey to look at scientists' 
understandings of the public, its findings are supported by Rabino (1994) and Frewer et al 
(2003). Both studies are smaller and narrower in their scope. Rabino's survey of German 
genetic engineering scientists builds a picture of a scientific community convinced of the 
public's animosity towards itself and fearful of the effects of this on regulation of the field. 
63% felt that public attention had a harmful effect on progress in their field. "One-sided 
media coverage" was seen as a key reason for this, again implying that the public is 
impressionable. Frewer et al's study looked specifically at food scientists' opinions about the 
public's ability to conceptualise and deal with uncertainty and risk; they found that the 
scientists they interviewed believed that communicating about scientific uncertainty would 
increase public distrust and cause "panic and confusion". The authors conclude that: "many 
food scientists, who are driving risk communication initiatives, still subscribe to the so-called 
'deficit' model" (Frewer et al 2003: 83). 
The research discussed above gives us indications of the prevalence of the deficit model. 
Their methodologies can, however, be criticised in two key ways: by accepting the state of 
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affairs as actually being as described by scientists, they assume that the accounts given by 
scientists are sociologically accurate (compare with Gilbert and Mulkay's concept of 
'vassalage', Mulkay 1981, Gilbert and Mulkay 1984); and they frame and shape the 
responses given by allowing only certain answers or by using pre-defined codes (through 
the use of quantitative survey tools). The researcher thus to a certain extent suppresses the 
scientist's own voice. For example, Rabino (1994) uses a questionnaire designed with no 
input from qualitative research or from the literature, and then goes on to assume that the 
responses within the questionnaire are directly indicative of a real social situation (he draws 
as one of his conclusions that, because many of his respondents have complained of heavy 
and unnecessary bureaucracy within regulatory processes, such processes should be made 
less stringent). Such limitations are to some extent inherent in the large-scale quantitative 
survey approach; for this reason we turn now to look at qualitative studies of scientists' 
constructions of the public. 
Scientists on the public: qualitative work 
Several critical PUS authors discuss scientific constructions of the public (see Irwin 1995a; 
Irwin and Wynne 1996; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). These considerations, however, tend to 
be brief when compared to discussions of the public's constructions of science. Irwin, for 
example, states that attention in the past has focussed on scientists' views of citizens "as 
ignorant, misled or plain contrary" (Irwin 1995a: 5) but offers no examples of such views. 
Others have argued more extensively that assumptions about audiences are deeply buried 
in scientific communication of all kinds, naturalising particular social behaviours so that they 
are not open to question. Jasanoff and Wynne, for example, argue that "the naive sociology 
of the expert community, as well as the prescriptive social standards implied in institutional 
logics of policy and production, remains hidden behind safety standards seemingly dictated 
by nature and revealed by science" (1998: 26). 
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This'na*ive sociology' remains unquestioned because it is unthinking, but may be deeply 
discontinuous with laypeople's real lives and experiences. Thus Irwin found, in an analysis 
of an information leaflet (provided by a petrochemical complex for nearby residents in the 
event of an emergency) that the advice was based on an idealised and simplified picture of 
people's situations (that "all people in the area will be near home, in family groups and that 
'indoors' is indeed the safest place to be, " Irwin 1995a: 91). The residents recognised how 
unrealistic these simplified assumptions were and accordingly rejected the advice, preferring 
to rely on their own understandings and knowledges. As a response to studies such as this, 
and to sociological exploration of public interactions with science, Irwin and Wynne describe 
key ways in which they feel that the public is modelled (Irwin and Wynne 1996; also Wynne 
2006a). They argue that the public is depicted as a homogenous and undifferentiated mass, 
intellectually vacuous and requiring simple certainties. Its values are aligned with those of 
science and it is homogenous in its social status (ignoring issues of social control and 
dependence). 
While it is clear that their own work, and the work of other critical PUS authors, does indeed 
challenge these assumptions about the public, what is at times less clear is where exactly 
the assumptions are derived from. There is also little discussion about who exactly holds 
such assumptions - the authors speak simply of ""institutional structures" and "science". It 
seems likely that this analysis is drawn together from different studies and contexts, 
generalising 'science's' behaviour in particular circumstances to the whole of the scientific 
establishment. Despite calls for further research on scientists' understandings of the public 
(Levy-Leblond 1992; Wynne 1992a), such a programme never developed. While 
descriptions of deficit models used by science may well be realistic (cf. Cook et al 2004; 
Frewer et al 2003), then, there is limited evidence given to back it up. The authors do, 
however, consider the political uses of such assumptions, noting that the construction of the 
public in this way "systematically deflects attention away from critical debate about science 
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and scientific institutions, about the ownership and control of science and its products, and 
about the implicit social visions these carry" (Irwin and Wynne 1996: 215). 
Wynne has gone on to expand his arguments on the framing of the public by science 
(Wynne 1996; 2001; 2002). He argues that scientific communication actually embodies a 
whole range of hidden normative values, from what are acceptable epistemologies to what 
it means to be human. Not only are assumptions made about the social worlds and 
behaviours of the public (generalising assumptions which, as we have seen in Irwin's 
(1995a) study above, can never be accurate), but there are implicit philosophies of what 
kinds of knowledge are valid and acceptable. Given science's power to naturalise such 
assumptions and philosophies, any lay or opposing knowledge is automatically framed as 
invalid or inappropriate. Thus scientists' naive sociologies are in fact performative, bringing 
into being what they assume is already present (Leach et al 2005; Wynne 1996: 58). Given 
these framing normative assumptions of scientific discourse, it is unsurprising that at times 
the lay public reject scientific knowledge. 3 Publics are thus not simply rejecting scientific 
'facts' but an entire sociological system; as Wynne writes, the assumptions behind this 
system "are arbitrary, deeply inadequate and damaging visions of the human" (Wynne 
2001: 475). 
This work again tends to be situated firmly in the general rather than the specific. Wynne 
cites relatively few examples and on the whole argues from broad trends rather than 
analyses specific instances in detail. In particular he pays little attention to the discourse of 
scientists, preferring to focus on the pronouncements of policy-makers or on generalised 
"scientific and policy institutions" (Wynne 2001: 445). Thus while his work provides a strong 
theoretical basis for looking at scientific constructions of the public, it leaves many 
I Wynne's example of this is within the nuclear debate of the 1970s and '80s; we may perhaps add the cases of 
MMR and GM crops as more recent examples of publics rejecting scientific authority and preferring to rely on their 
own knowledges. The Leeds Case Studies (Layton et al 1993) also show publics rejecting, negotiating and 
intermingling scientific and lay knowledges in flexible responses to particular contexts. 
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unanswered questions as to how this applies in practice to individuals and groups within 
science. Similarly, other critical studies have examined more detailed constructions and uses 
of publics but have focussed on policy or on tools of measurement such as survey 
questionnaires. Hill and Michael (1998), for example, identify shifting notions of 'citizens' 
and 'consumers' within the 'Eurobarometer' survey and EU policy makers4. A more recent 
study has identified conceptions of publics as either "consumers' or 'neighbours' within the 
chemicals industry (Burningham et al 2007); other research has noted the use of a deficit 
model of the public within public talk (Michael and Brown 2005; Wright and Nerlich 2006) - 
indicating that these discourses are available within lay as well as scientific cultures. 
Other studies have looked at the discourse of scientists, but have focussed on specific 
controversial issues. A group of linguists (Cook 2004; Cook et al 2004) found few nuances in 
depictions of the public in the discourse of GM scientists, finding that scientists placed 
participants in the debate around GM into three groups: scientists, the public and opponents 
of GM. The category 'public' was viewed as homogeneous, passive, ignorant, emotional 
rather than rational, and vulnerable to manipulation. The groupings were entirely separate 
and did not allow for dual membership: 
They [the scientists] regard this as a homogenous and unproblematic grouping, and 
make no allowance for varying degrees of knowledge among scientists, for differing 
areas of expertise and opinions, or for their own dual existence as both scientists and 
members of the public. 'Scientists' and 'public' are treated indeed as a binary 
opposition... 
Cook et al 2004: 436 
4 There is, in fact, a minor literature examining constructions of the public by social scientists, whether those from 
traditional PUS or more critical backgrounds. Any research, it is argued, can function as a 'subjectifying technology' 
to feed back to the public particular visions of itself. See also Locke 1999; Michael 1998; 2002; Michael and Brown 
2000. 
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The authors conclude that the scientists they interviewed subscribed to the deficit model, 
but also that they made use of this model in order to escape having to engage with public 
concerns around GM. Depicting the public as manipulated and ignorant enabled them to 
argue that, given more information, the public would not oppose GM. The scientists also 
tended to frame the debate as being entirely scientific, ignoring social, economic or ethical 
questions. 
However, studies with scientists involved in animal experimentation (Michael and Birke 
1994a; 1994b) have shown that scientists' constructions of the public and of other bodies 
can be shifting and strategic. In validating their practices scientists rhetorically constructed 
'others' and limited access to a core-set of qualified commentators in order to place 
themselves in an ethically sound position. Those who disagreed with them - including 
sections of the public - were constructed as "cognitively, critically and morally lackadaisical" 
(Michael and Birke 1994a: 202). The scientists differentiated between 'good' and 'bad' 
publics and implicitly placed themselves within the good public, along with qualities such as 
rationality and a correct emotionality. Similarly, Michael and Brown's work on 
xenotransplanation (2000; 2005) found diversity in scientists' constructions of the public. 
While they found evidence for deficit model constructions, they also found more specific 
articulations of the public as fickle and increasingly distrustful (Michael and Brown 2005) 
and distinctions between the 'public-in-general' and 'publics-in-particular' (Michael and 
Brown 2000). In some cases they found that identification with the public was a way of 
negating the need for a moral debate outside of the scientific community: in effect the 
scientists say, "these moral choices do not need debate because we have already debated 
them and we are you - the public" (Michael and Brown 2000: 9). 
Such complex rhetorical manoeuvres, albeit in politically charged and well-rehearsed fields, 
indicate that it is not the case that scientists simply cling to the concept of a deficit-model, 
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homogeneous public. In the case of animal experimentation they specifically differentiate 
the public and are willing to ascribe positive qualities to it - assuming that it aligns itself 
with scientists' views. At times they deliberately identify themselves with the public, using 
their identity as an 'ordinary person' to give their work and decisions the authority of the 
public sphere. Such manoeuvres are reminiscent of the use of empiricist and contingent 
repertoires to endorse or cast doubt on scientific work (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984). Indeed, 
Burchell (2007a) uses this concept of empiricist and contingent repertoires to understand 
crop geneticists' talk about the public. He shows that scientists made use of empiricist 
repertoires (in which "beliefs and attitudes are seen to derive from the natural world, an 
objective and rigorous method, and an ethical framework"; p. 145) to talk of their own work 
and actions, but drew upon contingent repertoires (which highlight self-interest and flawed 
methods) to describe the positions of others, including publics. Burchell briefly links 
contingent repertoires to the deficit model, but, given that the 'others' contingent talk is 
used to describe are not limited to publics but also include groups such as the media, NGOs, 
and other scientists, the connections here are not straightforward. 
Young and Matthews (2007) also find few straightforward answers. Their findings suggest 
contradictory understandings of publics by experts in the aquaculture field: models of 
publics as deficit and passive are drawn upon, but in conjunction with (seemingly) strongly 
positive attitudes to public participation in science. Both Tupasela (2007) and Stilgoe 
(2007a) similarly argue for diverse representations of publics within expert discourse: 
Tupasela suggests that citizens are understood as both passive and active in order to fulfil 
particular rhetorical purposes; and Stilgoe, while noting that the predominantly deficit model 
approach taken by experts involved in public controversy over mobile phones rapidly 
became problematic for them, also observes a distinction between 'general' and 'concerned' 
publics. 
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In sum, then, the work in this area is mixed. Some authors have argued that scientists are 
naive sociologists who view the public as homogeneous and ignorant (a typical deficit model 
perspective), and this view is supported by surveys and by some qualitative work. But other 
studies seem to indicate that the scientific community are adept at using their constructions 
of the public for political purposes and can be more reflective where necessary. While work 
that has sought to examine scientists' talk about the public is by no means coherent, recent 
studies have suggested that there may be many different models that can be utilised by 
experts and that there may be contradictory discourses in use. In all these cases, a public is 
constructed in order to validate or protect science in some way. Similarly, Maranta et al 
(2003) describe how such constructions or "imagined lay people" are of use to expert 
communities, and studies of how 'users' of technology or social research are constructed 
show that these constructions are made in order to be of use to those who build them 
(Akrich 1995; Shove and Rip 2000). It seems likely that the incoherence of different studies, 
and the flexibility of models of publics, are due to different contexts and therefore to 
different uses of the notion of 'the public'. 
Science and identity 
My two key themes are scientific talk of the public and science-public dialogue. However, in 
this short section I will digress briefly in order to discuss literature on what could be 
considered a link between these two themes: the connections between science, identity, 
and role. 
In two well-known studies, Wynne and Michael showed that laypeople's relations with 
science are intimately tied up with identity (Wynne 1992b; Michael 1992). Institutionalised 
science may impinge on and threaten social identities (as in Wynne's study of Cumbrian 
sheep farmers), but it is also (as "science-in-general", Michael 1992) a structure to be 
negotiated around and separated from 'self'. As a commodity, it may also be used in the 
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construction of identity: "To know about black holes, chaos theory, cold fusion, 
xenotransplantation, the 'ear mouse' and so on is to perform a particular identity" (Michael 
1998: 318). Numerous studies have shown that laypeople are sophisticated in such 
negotiations, constructions, and uses of science (de Cheveigne and Veron 1996; Irwin 
1995a; Irwin and Wynne 1996; Kerr et al 1998; Layton et al 1993; Michael 1991; 1998; 
Wynne 1993; Yearley 1999) and have access to different discourses about science (Michael 
1991; 1992). 
Several authors have also noted in passing that scientists, as well as being part of science, 
are also members of the public (Collins and Evans 2002; Cook et al 2004; Levy-Leblond 
1992). How then does this dual role affect identity, and how is science used in the 
construction of this identity (or identities)? There are few clues in the literature. Some have 
implied that the gulf between the cultures of science and the public is unbridgeable (Leach 
et al 2005; Neidhardt 1993). The two worlds are simply incommensurable and speak 
different languages (see Harris 2005, and contra Locke 2002). But this does not help us to 
understand how scientists negotiate both. 
Fischer, in his work on risk (2005), suggests that there are different forms of rationality. 
Arguing in ways reminiscent of both Wynne (2001) and Slovic and Peters (Slovic 1992; 
Slovic and Peters 1998), he claims that conflicts between expert and lay communities 
around risks develop when experts rely on "technical rationality" and laypeople on 
"sociocultural rationality" (Fischer 2005: 55-56). He further suggests that individuals' 
experiences will determine which form of rationality they use in a given situation. Risk or 
policy experts may well have well developed "schemas" of technical knowledge from long 
experience of a field, while laypeople, lacking this, instead use generalised procedural 
schemas based on social issues such as trust and control. But Fischer also notes that: 
"While laypersons tend to rely heavily on sociocultural rationality, it is crucially important to 
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note that few people act or think in one mode of rationality or the other. Such modes 
typically change with circumstances" (Fischer 2005: 58). There are two key points here: first, 
that what seems to distinguish experts from laypeople are particular experiences; and 
secondly that these experiences are specific and so individuals, confronted with different 
situations where they may or may not have expertise, will switch between the two different 
ways of reasoning. Fischer cites a study where experts were asked to make decisions not on 
the basis of their knowledge and expertise, but as parents. The investigators found that the 
technical mode of decision-making was abandoned and sociocultural rationality - taking in a 
broad consideration of other factors - was used instead. Such work indicates that use of the 
different types of rationality is linked to role and that experts are able to use both where the 
situation demands it. This gives us some hints as to how scientists are able to exist in the 
two domains of science and the public: depending on immediate context and the role that 
this places them in, they can switch between different rationalities and - possibly - whole 
sociocultural systems'. 
The ability of experts to switch between diverse roles is further demonstrated in a study on 
constructions of gene patenting by Tutton et al (2005). Participants in focus groups made 
up of 'expert' professions such as genetic counsellors and nurses spoke in different roles 
throughout the group: sometimes as professionals in the area, sometimes on behalf of 
patients, and sometimes as ordinary citizens. Expertise was variable and could be 
constructed on many different grounds. Similarly, Deckers (2005) describes how one 
scientist (in a study that brought together scientists and laypeople in debate) struggled 
between scientific and non-reductionist woridviews in the context of GM crops: 
5 See Scott and Carr 2003 for a further description of'plural rationalities' within science. These authors use'Cultural 
Theory' to show that scientists differ in their way of reasoning on a particular issue (GM). However, they pay little 
attention to context and, similarly to Koro-Ljungberg and Tirri 2002, perhaps the most useful aspect to their study 
is the sheer complexity - almost unclassifiability - of their data. 
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While Craig [the scientist] said that he did 'not really' have specific concerns about 
GM (when the facilitator asked him), he also said that he was against it, a position 
that made him feel uncomfortable: 'I think as a scientist or researcher to say OK I'm 
against because I don't like it... is very difficult. ' 
(Deckers 2005: 462) 
It seems, then, that experts are able to switch between roles, using different knowledges 
and experiences as the context demands. But how aware are they of such switching of 
roles? Do scientists reflect upon their dual identities as members of science and of the 
public? Michael and Birke's study of scientists involved in animal experimentation (1994a) is 
again helpful here. They show that there are times when scientists find it rhetorically useful 
to align themselves with the public. Their scientists at times emphasised their 'normality' - 
such as the fact that they kept pets at home - in order to place themselves within the 
"good" (i. e. intellectually sound and supportive of the scientists' ethical stance) public that 
they had constructed (Michael and Birke 1994a: 202). While this indicates that scientists can 
make use of their dual membership of scientific and public domains for political and 
persuasive purposes, it remains unclear as to how conscious a process this is. Indeed, such 
questions of role and identity remain largely unexplored in the literature. 
Science-public dialogue 
So far I have examined the literature on scientists' understandings of the public - finding 
research pointing towards both the prevalence of the deficit model and flexibility and 
diversity in scientists' accounts - and work on science and identity. As I have noted, there is 
relatively little work in both these areas. Now, however, I turn to examine the burgeoning 
literature of science-society dialogue. 
-36- 
Science meeting the public: background to participatory processes 
The House of Lords Third Report on Science and Society, with its much quoted claim that 
that a "crisis of trust has produced a new mood for dialogue" (House of Lords 2000: 37), is 
often viewed as a turning point within PUS practice in the UK (Lock 2007; Wynne 2005). It 
was this, it is argued, which solidified the growing impact of critical PUS research and 
formalised an establishment disavowal of the deficit model and a new commitment to 
dialogue. Advised on by the critical PUS author Brian Wynne, the Report seemed to indicate 
that the PUS movement was changing direction to become both more thoughtful and more 
democratic. 
This story can, however, be questioned. The Report was extensively discussed and critiqued 
at the time of publishing (see Dickson 2000; Miller 2001), and it remains debatable as to 
how much of an effect in PUS practice it has actually had. The Report was also only ever a 
turning point in a very narrow sense: to view its call for new contacts between science and 
laypeople as revolutionary is to ignore a wide body of practice and theory in ways of getting 
science to meet the public on - to greater or lesser extents - equal footings. Moves towards 
more dialogue-based and participatory science policy processes had also, in the UK context, 
been taking place for some time before the Report's publication (see Durant 1999; Irwin 
2001; Grove-White 2001; Wynne 2002). It should also be noted that the PUS turn towards 
dialogue appears to be part of a broader societal shift to dialogue practices and 
participatory government; see, for example, writings on education (Erduran 2004; Lefstein 
2006) or general governance (Cabinet Office 2002; Involve 2005). 
Public participation practices in science have in the past been most common in 
environmental and planning fields (see Irwin 1995a: 135-167; Webler and Tuler 2002). In 
such areas, where laypeople are often directly affected and where there may be powerful 
special interest groups at work, policy makers are forced (or believe that it is right) to 
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involve the public in key decisions. Webler and Tuler note that: "In decisions that broadly 
affect the public interest, such as the cleanup of contaminated sites, the siting of unwanted 
facilities, and watershed and forest management planning, it is now widely accepted that 
members of the public should be involved, " (Webler and Tuler 2002: 179). As they go on to 
show, however, this is an area of practice that is under-theorised - perhaps unsurprising 
given the wealth of different, and often disconnected, motivations, beliefs and 
methodologies involved. While Webler and Tuler argue that participatory processes should 
be marked by "fairness" and "competence", their theorising is more to provide guidelines for 
practitioners than to analyse what happens in such processes. Irwin, however, in his 
overview of scientific and environmental participatory processes in the 1970s (Irwin 
1995a: 135-167), notes that "there does seem to be a general 'top-down' assumption 
embedded within most participatory mechanisms" (ibid: 151) and argues that many such 
mechanisms are unrealistic in wanting to achieve a consensus. He problematises the issue 
of outcomes from these participatory mechanisms: consensus is often difficult, but many 
such mechanisms simply become a way of legitimating policy without enabling real change. 
There are a range of other places in which science (and, perhaps more commonly, 
technology) has met the public over the last four decades. 'Constructive Technology 
Assessment' (CTA, see Cambrosio and Limoges 1991; Rip et al 1995) was developed in the 
1980s as an alternative to Technology Assessment (TA), which often functioned merely as 
an "after-the-fact gatekeeper" (Rip et al 1995: 2). CTA, on the other hand, seeks to 
influence the management of technologies while they are still in development and to 
consider possible impacts on all users, and therefore to aid the production of technologies 
which are "socially more viable and accepted, [and] which will enhance the economic 
viability of new products and processes, " (ibid: 5). Such processes do, however, tend to be 
formal, policy-based, and liable to the same problems of scientistic framing as 
communication processes (see Wynne 1995). The'Science Shop' movement (Irwin 
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1995a: 155-167; Irwin 1995b; Layton et al 1993; Leydesdorff and Ward 2005) overcomes 
some of these problems by being citizen-initiated and university-based. Science shops were 
set up in universities around Europe (primarily in the Netherlands) to bring together 
members of the public and scientists who had expertise useful to them. Thus individuals or 
groups would go to the shop with specific questions or problems, and a 'shopkeeper' would 
find an expert able to help with that particular issue. In some cases this led to new research 
being done; in others an answer could be given immediately. While science shops have 
been perhaps the most effective way of bringing science and publics together on the 
public's terms, they were not without their difficulties. From the time and effort involved (a 
disadvantage to busy researchers) to the problems of putting scientific expertise to work in 
real-life situations (client groups often found relevant research had a narrowness of focus), 
some have concluded that such interactions will never work without fundamental changes 
within science itself. After reviewing the problems inherent in science shops, Irwin writes: 
From this perspective, science-citizen relations founder not simply because of the 
lack of appropriate mediating structures but because of a deeper incongruity (or 
structural incompatibility) between the needs of citizens and the cognitive and 
institutional structure of contemporary science. Put bluntly, social experiments to 
bring together scientific and public groups have failed due to the impossibility of 
achieving a workable dialogue. 
(Irwin 1995a: 161) 
Similarly, Leydesdorff and Ward (2005) describe the problems that occur at the interface of 
two such different systems: repertoires, meanings, organisation and purposes are all 
different. The Science Shop acts as a bridge and as a translator between these systems, but 
at times it is strained to beyond its natural elasticity and communication breaks down 
completely. Such assessments suggest that any'dialogue' process will inevitably be difficult 
and involve at times problematic communication between different cultural domains. 
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Similar issues of incompatible frameworks and of prior framing by the most powerful groups 
have dogged other participation mechanisms, such as consensus conferences (Blok 2007; 
Joss and Durant 1995; Seifert 2006) and citizen juries (see Cabinet Office 2002; 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2001; Wakeford 2002). Studies of such 
processes are increasingly demonstrating their complexity: Blok (2007), for example, argues 
that one consensus conference could be seen as the opening up of a particular 
tech noscientific'black box' and that the "politics of expert authority" (p. 176) need to be 
better integrated into conference design. Similarly, Seifert's (2006) study acknowledges the 
public relations origins of an Austrian conference. There is, however, one place where some 
of these issues are avoided: scientific controversies which run their course in the public 
domain. Such controversies are unplanned, so are not subject to prior framings imposed by 
the scientific or policy establishments. They also allow for a myriad of opinions to be shown, 
avoiding the tendency to polarisation. Several authors (Cambrosio and Limoges 1991; 
Limoges 1993; Rip 1986) have argued that public controversies can be productive ways of 
assessing technologies and scientific policies. If they are handled correctly - Limoges 
suggests management by external "brokers" - "social learning" can take place and the 
outcome will be more robust and useful to society. He notes that: "when decisions are 
finally made, their robustness is a function of their ability to reflect both the density of 
associations generated during the controversy, and the networking resulting from the 
articulation of diverse worlds of relevance, " (Limoges 1993: 423). Such decisions, while not 
expressing a consensus, will draw together the issues and meanings that have been 
expressed by different actors in the controversy and show the alliances and connections 
that formed. These cases, where expertise is constantly negotiated by actors and where 
laypeople are often empowered by access to mass media, are perhaps one of the few 
places where experts and laypeople can meet with a degree of equality and where the 
views of different social worlds may be articulated. 
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The "new mood for dialogue": the move towards dialogue in the UK 
Despite the wealth of experience in public participation in science described above, and the 
broad trends towards participation rather than education in the UK PUS movement, it 
remains fair to say that the 2000 Science and society Report (House of Lords 2000) 
crystallised these trends in the UK (Wynne 2005). In particular, the Report initiated a shift in 
non-policy PUS activities and organisations towards the language of dialogue. That is to say, 
organisations with no remit other than to promote science (such as the British Association 
for the Advancement of Science (BA), the Royal Society, or individual universities or science 
departments) started to use phrases such as ""participation", "engagement" and "science 
and society". The Royal Institution (RI), for example, says on its website (RI 2005): 
During these 200 years [since its opening], the Ri has continued to communicate 
scientific issues to the general public through its high calibre events that break down 
the barriers between science and society. It acts as a unique forum for informing 
people about how science affects their daily lives, and prides itself on its reputation 
for engaging the public in scientific debate. 
The Ri philosophy is to facilitate dialogue between scientists and the public, through 
a mix of talks, discussions, debates and interactive workshops. Our message is 
simple: science is not reserved exclusively for scientists but plays a role in everyone's 
lives, and we hope that we can encourage people to take an interest in the important 
scientific issues that are facing us today. 
Similarly, the BA's website (BA 2005) says: 
The BA is a UK-wide organisation dedicated to connecting science with people, so 
that science and its applications become accessible to all. We aim to promote 
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openness about science in society and to engage and inspire people directly with 
science and technology and their implications. 
While the language of education still remains implicit ("inform", science to become 
"accessible"), that of engagement and participation is more explicit ("engaging the public in 
scientific debate", "facilitate dialogue", ""promote openness", "engage and inspire"). I would 
argue that this new kind of language use marks a coherent move towards 'dialogue' in PUS; 
a move which has taken on board the language of the Third Report but which remains 
fragmented in practice, meanings and motivation (Lock 2007). 
The new movement is marked by a mass of literature purporting to show why, how and 
when dialogue should take place: as I noted earlier, there is no shortage of literature on this 
area (for examples see Council for Science and Technology 2005; Dickson 2000; Jackson et 
al 2005; Laird 1993; Miah 2005; Miller 2001; Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology 2001; 2006; Wilsdon and Willis 2004). There are also a multiplicity of meanings 
of the word "dialogue'. Miller sees it as a way of combining expert and lay knowledges: new 
knowledge is generated "by a dialogue in which, while scientists may have scientific facts at 
their disposal, the members of the public concerned have local knowledge and an 
understanding of, and personal concern in, the problems to be solved, " (Miller 2001: 117). 
The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology sees dialogue as a way for MPs to be 
informed of "the issues of day" by bringing people together "in small groups to deliberate 
on national or local issues, and so provide considered and informed contributions from 
many perspectives", (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2001: 1). A recent 
paper describes dialogue as "a context in which society (including scientists) can address 
the issues that are arising from new developments in science... dialogue is an open 
exchange and sharing of knowledge, ideas, values, attitudes and beliefs, " (Jackson et al 
2005: 350). Others prefer to emphasise the outcomes of such processes: several authors 
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have noted that without clear objectives and signs that the conclusions of any consultation 
are being acted on, laypeople will swiftly become disillusioned with participatory processes 
(MacMillan 2004; Nature 2004; Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2001; 
Wilsdon and Willis 2004). Alongside this more prescriptive literature are a range of mission 
statements and 'practical perspectives' which also indicate what organisations and 
individuals understand by dialogue and participation (Davis 2004; McCallie et al in press; 
NMSI Visitor Research Group 2001a; Reich et al 2006; Smallman and Nieman 2006), and 
thus how divergent the meanings of these can be. 
In addition, there have been recent calls for dialogue to move "upstream' (Council for 
Science and Technology 2005; Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering 2004; 
Wilsdon and Willis 2004). Such calls are in response to critiques of current dialogue which 
argue that focussing on consequences and risks of new technologies is not only imposing a 
framing on the debate which the public may not agree with, but is in many cases too late to 
significantly alter their trajectories (Wilsdon and Willis 2004). Rather, debate and discussion 
should move 'upstream' in a technology's development, to a stage where research can be 
actually be affected by public views. 
The question of motivation and the purposes of dialogue can also be a vexed one. Jackson 
et al (2005) state three reasons for dialogue: ""increasing democracy by promoting open and 
transparent decision making; greater trust and confidence in the regulation of science and 
the decisions taken; and that better decisions will have been taken, " (Jackson et al 
2005: 352). MacMillan argues that engagement will lead to better technologies and greater 
economic development (MacMillan 2004). While the language of 'democratising science' is 
certainly picked up and used by practitioners, language-use also frequently suggests a 
further purpose of promoting science (as, indeed, the quote from Jackson et al above 
suggests). The Third Report, for example, views the "new mood for dialogue" as triggered 
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by a "'crisis in trust" in science, and public engagement ultimately aims to increase the 
chance that policy "decisions will find acceptance" (House of Lords 2000: 7): as Alan Irwin 
has noted (2006), this - and similar reports - contains an uneasy juxtaposition of 'old' and 
'new' talk about science governance. Stirling, drawing upon Fiorino, has drawn these 
diverse motivations and purposes and described them in three ways: the perspective may 
be normative, instrumental or substantive. He writes: 
From a normative view, participation is just the right thing to do. From an 
instrumental perspective, it is a better way to achieve particular ends. In substantive 
terms, it leads to better ends. 
(Stirling 2005: 220, italics in original) 
As several authors have noted (Hansen 2006; Rowe and Frewer 2000; 2005), the recent 
proliferation in interest and methods in public participation has largely been unaccompanied 
by consistent ways of framing and understanding (and therefore assessing) such processes. 
While attempts to categorise and direct engagement methods are increasing (see Bucchi 
and Neresini in press; Flüeler and Scholz 2004; Hansen 2006; Lehr et at in press; Rowe and 
Frewer 2005), it is safe to say that there is no one consistent terminology or typology. 
(Mwale's (2006) discussion serves to indicate how difficult terms such as'public debate' or 
'deliberation' may in practice be to define. ) Rowe and Frewer (2000; 2004; 2005) suggest 
distinguishing between public communication, consultation, and participation, and define 
these concepts in terms of information flow: this typology is, however, rejected by both 
Lehr et al (in press) (as ignoring the value of informal dialogue events) and Bucchi and 
Neresini (in press) (as ignoring the agency of public groups). Horlick-Jones et al (2007) 
suggest combining Rowe and Frewer's 'measurement' approach with a softer 'assessment' 
one in order to analyse information flow through participatory processes. Alternatively 
Hansen (2006) uses communication theory to derive a matrix (composed of dimensions of 
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'inclusion', 'delegation', and 'mediation', amongst others) for analysis of any kind of 
'participatory technology assessment'. 
On a more theoretical level, there is a body of literature which sites current dialogue 
activities within broader theoretical concepts and societal shifts. Elam and Bertilsson (2002), 
for example, consider the PUS and PEST movements within the context of scientific 
citizenship, examining the ways in which citizenship is framed and constructed. In particular 
they discuss the limitations of the deliberative ideal (see Benhabib 1994; Cooke 2000; 
Davies et al 2006) and the need for radical democracy. Similarly, Callon (1999; 2003) has 
written on the different ways in which laypeople can gain involvement in the production of 
scientific knowledge: participatory processes are certainly included in this, but he also 
considers a much wider range of types of involvement, including direct 'co-production' of 
knowledge through the collective work of concerned groups and technical experts. Such 
writings may be understood as part of a literature which considers the - possibly - changing 
relationship between science and society (for example Irwin and Michael 2003; Locke 2002; 
Nowotny 1993; Nowotny et al 2001; van Dijk 2003) and which seeks to map ways of 
understanding this relationship. Such discussions frequently work to further complexify 
many of the assumptions embedded within dialogue processes: a straightforward distinction 
between 'science' and 'the public' being one example. As van Dijk (2003: 185) argues, "the 
binary opposition between scientist and nonscientist has... dissolved into a continuous 
palette of participants". 
None of these typologies and evaluation systems have become firmly established and are 
not, for example, commonly used in critical analyses of dialogue processes (see discussion 
below). Of those mentioned, Lehr et al's (in press) key distinction between policy-informing 
and non policy-informing processes is perhaps of most use to this study. Lehr and co- 
authors note that few other typologies acknowledge this distinction (they cite Rowe et al 
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(2004) as an example which expressly ignores 'dialogue' without policy impacts) and argue 
that non policy events should be seen as having value. Such non policy-informing processes 
are the focus of this study. Events such as those put on by museums, the BA or RI are 
generally not linked to policy processes: there is no formal way to feed back discussions, 
opinions or meanings in order to influence science policy decisions. This, of course, leads us 
back to the discussion of the purposes of dialogue. The normative democratic argument 
cannot be used to justify non policy-informing dialogue processes, as in no way is science 
being democratically influenced by the populace. Nor, presumably, is better scientific 
knowledge being created or better decisions being made, as again there is no way for the 
participation process to feed back into science. What then is the purpose of such events? Is 
it solely to promote (possible) trust in science through openness and transparency (an 
instrumental perspective), and is practice still based on the deficit model? Critics have 
argued that this is the case, and that many practitioners of informal dialogue use the 
rhetoric of participation while continuing to seek to'educate'the public and to increase trust 
in science (Irwin 2006; Lock 2007; Wilsdon and Willis 2004; Wynne 2005; 2006). 
"Something of a mirage": analysis and critique of current dialogue and participation 
The idea that current dialogue is actually "something of a mirage" comes from Wynne 
(2005), in his discussion of the recent wave of participation processes in science. He is not 
alone in his criticisms, but, building on his critique of science's framing assumptions about 
the public, he has perhaps most powerfully deconstructed the way in which dialogue is 
failing to live up to its promise. As noted earlier, Wynne has argued that scientific 
communication can embody normative values about lay sociology and epistemology (1996; 
2001; 2002), and that such values are systematically imposed on publics. Public discontent 
with science may therefore represent a rejection of these values and of the institutions that 
impose them (Wynne 2001). He goes on to argue that this effect is often heightened in 
participation processes, where scientific institutions almost inevitably frame what debates 
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are about (Wynne 2002). Such framings focus on 'back-end' issues such as risk and 
consequences, ignoring the deeper problems publics may have with purpose and cultural 
framing. As a consequence of this, he writes: 
. the many recent initiatives to render science and technology more participatory, 
transparent and accountable to society, for all their laudable aspects, have perversely 
reinforced attention only on back-end scientific questions about consequences or 
risks (reflecting an embedded implication of prediction and control). This excludes 
more reflexive questions about the human purposes and visions which shape front- 
end innovation commitments. Thus the forces shaping those innovation 
commitments remain as protected as ever from democratic accountability... 
(Wynne 2002: 463) 
Alternatively, debates are constructed as being about ethical questions or trust, and these 
are depicted as ""intellectually vacuous" (Wynne 2001). Thus Wynne writes that: "I have 
characterised expert representations of the public as follows: that expert knowledge is 
grounded in reality whereas lay knowledge and attitudes are politically real but 
intellectually unreal, " (Wynne, 2001: 452). While the public's trust may need to be won to 
overcome the political problem of public discontent with science, their knowledges are 
simply not relevant to science. Again, both the absolute distinction between such 
categories as "risk' or "ethics' and the assumptions about what such categories are 
composed of are imposed upon debates and normalised. Thus Wynne has argued that the 
wave of dialogue and participation in science over the last few years has tended to simply 
exacerbate the problems he has previously described. Ultimately such participatory 
processes are promising much more than they actually give (Wynne 2005). 
Similarly, Irwin has argued in his analysis of one participatory process (Irwin 2001) that 
publics had framings and positions imposed on them by the policy-makers and scientists 
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organising the process. A lingering deficit model perspective meant that citizens were 
framed as ignorant, and therefore that informing them became an aim of the process. He 
concluded that such processes needed to be more flexible, adapting to each individual 
situation. Robin Grove-White, in a reflection on his own involvement in a biotechnology 
commission, raises similar issues in the way that the debate came ready-framed by 
scientific and policy assumptions, and also notes science's apparent unwillingness to 
discuss (or even acknowledge) the "unknown unknowns' the public are often concerned 
about (Grove-White 2001). Arguments such as these lend weight to claims that while it is 
currently fashionable to use the language of dialogue and engagement, such strategies are 
merely a cover for a continued bid to increase public trust in science (Beder 1999; Dickson 
2000; Wynne 2006a). 'Dialogue', if it comes pre-framed in the ways described, may be 
nothing more than the deficit model in disguise. While science may listen on particular 
issues, its core assumptions, often the ones that publics wish to challenge, are left 
untouched6. 
Over the last five years increasing numbers of analyses of particular processes have also 
been published. The UK's GMNation? debate has attracted particular attention: several 
authors have discussed its effectiveness and argued its flaws (Hansen 2006; Horlick-Jones 
et al 2006; 2007; Irwin 2006; Lezaun and Soneryd 2007; Mayer 2003; Rowe et al 2005). 
Irwin, in his discussion of the process (2006), argues that the debate can be seen as 
symptomatic of many of the tensions within current "dialogue': features such as linking 
engagement with enhanced public trust, concerns with representativeness and consensus, 
and attempts at a clear separation between expert and public knowledges all, he suggests, 
point to the debate as a site of conflict between old and new styles of scientific governance. 
6 Interestingly, many of these criticisms and discussions of the current dialogue movement have previously been 
rehearsed in debates around TA and controversies (see Cambrosio and Limoges 1991). These authors comment in 
particular upon the dangers of consultation being a "cheap way to give the illusion of participation" (p. 381), the 
"amorphous character of the notion of the 'public"' (ibid), and the use of 'the public' as a rhetorical device in order 
to gain legitimacy. Such arguments strongly prefigure current debate around dialogue in science. 
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Similarly, Burchell (forthcoming) argues that despite superficial changes in the mechanisms 
of public participation over the last decade, many of the underpinning assumptions - such 
as an emphasis on 'disinterested' publics, ideas of a passive public, and the determination of 
'relevant' topics by government or scientists - have remained the same. Irwin further notes 
that there is a high degree of discursive flexibility around the term 'dialogue' (and similar 
words): such terms do not have settled meanings but are open to reinterpretation. This 
flexibility of language appears to be a key theme within analyses of dialogue processes. 
Schibeci et al (2006) and Schibeci and Harwood (2007), for example, in descriptions of 
Australian biotechnology policy, observe that public participation may be hampered by the 
very structures that are put in place to aid it. While institutional structure ostensibly allows 
space for community involvement, in practice "interested Australian citizens are effectively 
excluded from participating in gene technology policy and treated as consumers of 
information, rather than as active citizens" (Schibeci and Harwood 2007: 248). Similarly, 
Beder (1999) has argued that public consultation processes frequently function merely as 
exercises in public relations, assuming community ignorance and attempting to assuage 
distrust. Finally, Goven's recent analysis (2006) of New Zealand's Royal Commission on 
Genetic Modification -a "widely referenced public-engagement process", p. 568 - indicates 
the need for researchers of such processes to look beyond immediate concerns of 'success' 
or'failure' (an approach Goven characterises in terms of Rowe and Frewer's 2000 
'evaluation criteria') to the broader framing impacts of the surrounding political-economic 
culture and, in particular, neoliberalisation. Goven reminds us of the importance of external 
culture in shaping concepts - such as "scientific citizenship- that are used in public 
participation processes; bringing us back to Wynne's assessment (2002; 2005) of the 
performative effects of such processes in creating the publics they engage. 
One analysis that has particular relevance to this study - because it uses similar 
methodological techniques - is that of the NICE (National Institute of Clinical Excellence) 
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Citizen's Panel (Davies et al 2005; Davies et al 2006). Using ethnographic and discourse 
analytic techniques, Davies and her co-authors examined in detail the institutional 
background and proceedings of this Council - largely based on a citizens' jury - and the 
experiences of those involved in it. They found many positives: lay participants, in 
particular, greatly appreciated and enjoyed the experience and left feeling empowered for 
further political engagement. Their analysis also uncovered some of the complexities and 
problematics of such mechanisms, however, finding difficulties in the process of integrating 
the citizens' deliberations with NICE institutional structure and in creating the 'deliberative 
ideal' that much literature exhorts. They argue that the literature of deliberation - and 
therefore of participation processes - needs to engage better with the realities, rather than 
merely ideals, of such processes, and note that the practice of deliberation is messy, 
flexible, and often hard to define. In particular they find that in practice 'deliberative ideals' 
may clash or come into conflict with one another: encouraging deliberative talk, for 
example, may not always aid inclusiveness, and the creation of group cohesion may impose 
constraints on talk. While this study indicates again the importance of the framing of 
participatory processes (here highlighting clashes between institutional and citizen 
understandings of particular issues), its detailed approach also reveals the complexity of 
such processes on all levels of analysis and, in particular, the danger of speaking of 
'deliberation' or dialogue as homogeneous categories. 
Dialogue processes have been challenged from other directions as well. Within science 
studies, and on a more theoretical basis, Collins and Evans (2002) have raised the problem 
of "extension". They argue that, having solved the "problem of legitimacy" (in which science 
is undemocratic) by opening up scientific debate to the public, there is now a danger that all 
boundaries between experts and publics will be lost and involvement in technical decisions 
infinitely extended. They therefore seek to define in new ways what is relevant expertise - 
necessarily, because of the legitimation problem, including lay as well as scientific 
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expertises. Their arguments have been hotly debated (Collins and Evans 2003; )asanoff 
2003; Kerr et al 2007; Rip 2003; Wynne 2003), not least on the grounds that they 
concentrate on propositional questions (questions of scientific fact such as: will beef give 
me vCJD? ) and ignore questions of framing and purpose. On a pragmatic level their 
arguments do not speak into the current situation as they depend on publics making 
powerful differences to science. This, as they acknowledge, is not currently the case. Others 
have criticised the whole idea of dialogue in science per se (Durodie 2003; Taverne 2004). 
Durodie, an unashamed modernist, argues that dialogue in science demoralises scientists, 
patronises the public and merely functions to deflect blame from government if things go 
wrong. 
One further, more reflective analysis of a dialogue process is useful to us here (Tutton et al 
2005). Unlike the other analyses, this is an imagined dialogue based on a focus group 
research project. The authors argue that the dialogue would: 
... be less about sorting out a policy 
for gene patenting than about negotiating 
authority and status and preserving precarious alliances and interests (particularly 
when this type of consultation exercise would not translate into actual policy). 
Participants would form alliances across different subject positions, and construct 
knowledge/morality hybrids in the process... 
(Tutton et al 2005: 112) 
The dialogue these authors imagine is a performance; a dance where meanings shift, 
authority is negotiated, and alliances are formed. Participants perform to one another in 
order to negotiate their identities and statuses. In this local context relationships become 
more important than the subject under discussion: the science simply becomes a means to 
an end. As with Davies et al's study (2005; 2006), this picture of dialogue highlights its 
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complexity and relationality. Given that my own study is on a similarly micro-level, it seems 
likely that such features will also be important for my results. 
Museums and dialogue 
Where will the non policy-related dialogue that we have been discussing take place? 
Obviously, as I have noted, in organisations such as the BA, the RI or the Royal Society, 
which do not use their public events as a way of steering policy. But science museums are 
also currently seen as a key place for engagement to occur (Chittendon et al 2004; Davis 
2004; Durant 1994; McCallie et al in press; Reich et al 2006). This literature has argued that 
museums, as generally trusted environments, are both good at engagement and have a 
responsibility to focus on this particular activity. However, this remains a relative new turn 
in museums culture. Despite the growth of interactive science centres initiated by San 
Francisco's Exploratorium (Hein 1990; McManus 1992; Stewart 2004), the shift from 
interactivity to dialogue has been a recent one which has developed in parallel with the 
dialogue turn in PUS. There is therefore little academic analysis of dialogue in museums, 
only theoretical perspectives (see Chittendon et al 2004) or accounts of practice and 
internal evaluation (Davis 2004; McCallie et al in press; Reich et al 2006; Simonsson 2006). 
There is, however, a body of existing work that looks at science museums, in everything 
from the role of objects to the success - or otherwise - of interactive exhibits (for example 
Bud 1995; Heath et al 2005). More relevantly, the portrayal of controversial science in 
museums has been analysed (Macdonald 1996; Macdonald and Silverstone 1992; see also 
Mazda 2004), raising the question of whether it is ever possible to adequately represent 
controversy in a medium that is almost by definition fixed, didactic and stable. Macdonald 
(1996) has argued that, in her case study, a message of controversy was constrained by the 
exhibition medium and the museum in question's institutional structure. Other authors have 
shown that museums tend to create an idea of science as fixed, definite and free from 
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controversy (Einsiedel and Einsiedel 2004; Rennie and Williams 2002). Perhaps because of 
these constraints of the traditional museum form, dialogue in museums has tended to be a 
somewhat separate activity, often taking place in separate buildings or centres, and 
involving live interaction rather than - or as well as - more traditional modes of 
communication such as text, image and new media (see Davis 2004; Mayfield 2004). 
Despite these possible drawbacks, the rhetoric of dialogue has been fully taken on board in 
many science museums. London's Science Museum's vision statement, for example, is to 
"engage people in a dialogue to create meanings from the past, present and future of 
human ingenuity" (NMSI 2002), and they have a range of internal documents describing 
what dialogue is Ca process of communication in which two or more participants engage in 
an open exploration of issues and relationships on an equitable basis, " NMSI Visitor 
Research Group 2001a: 1), the conditions necessary for it to take place, and how to evaluate 
it (McCallie et al in press; NMSI Visitor Research Group 2001b). Similarly, the Darwin Centre 
Live in London's Natural History Museum aims to create "an environment where professional 
scientists and the public can actually have a dialogue; [give] people the opportunity to 
actually feel they have the confidence and the relevance to ask questions... [encourage] 
people to look at how the work here and work elsewhere actually relates to their own lives" 
(Bloomfield 2004). Despite such language, though, early unpublished analysis has indicated 
that the messages delivered about science in such centres often remain traditional ones, 
and that communication generally remains unidirectional (Lawrence 2003). Audience 
research at the Dana Centre - part of London's Science Museum - suggests that the 
presence of 'dialogue' can be variable within and between events (Simonsson 2006), 
although other work in progress indicates that collaborative argument-building may take 
place (McCallie forthcoming). All such work remains provisional and, importantly, rests on 
assumptions (such as what'dialogue' is and how it can be measured) that this study may 
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not share. Others remain sceptical about the value and ultimate effectiveness of such costly 
(in many senses) programmes and centres (Pohlman 2005). 
Conclusions 
Having completed this brief survey of the relevant literature, what key themes have we 
seen emerging? And what lessons can we take from it for this study? 
Firstly, I would argue that we have seen the need for this piece of work: we have observed 
gaps in the literature that this study is designed to help fill. In particular we have noted a 
general paucity of work examining scientists' talk and, more specifically, a lack of studies 
looking at "the public' in scientists' talk in genera/contexts (rather than being focussed on a 
particular issue, such as GM crops or xenotransplantation). Despite the far greater extent of 
the literature on science "dialogue' processes -a literature which extends into several other 
domains, including broader policy issues and the relationship between science and society - 
we have seen that this also contains key gaps. Not only is the literature diverse and 
uncoordinated, but there is very little work considering what I am calling 'informal' or'non- 
policy' dialogue processes: those with no formalised connections to science policy. Critical 
analyses have focussed on policy-related dialogue and those dialogue processes run by 
informal organisations and institutions have, other than internal evaluations, been ignored 
both empirically and theoretically in the literature I have considered. 
A few key themes do seem to have emerged. My review of literature on scientists' discourse 
found the majority of studies emphasising the presence of versions of the deficit model, 
with some of these also identifying other, more complex models of the public. In summing 
up these studies, and acknowledging key differences between them, I suggested that we 
might look to the purposes of talk as reasons for these differences. Scientists' talk seems to 
be context dependent and to act - from the studies I have reviewed - primarily to protect 
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science. The literature on dialogue processes is more dispersed and this itself, I would 
suggest, is significant: I argued that the move towards dialogue within the PUS and PEST 
communities is one that is fragmented and which exhibits discursive flexibility around key 
terms such as 'dialogue' (cf. Irwin 2006). In reviewing the critical literature on participation 
processes, I noted first that there is a large degree of continuity with previous moves 
towards public participation in science (such as in science shops, consensus conferences, or 
citizens' juries). Analysis of these and more recent attempts at dialogue suggests that a key 
issue remains the framing of such processes: they are largely shaped and understood 
through underlying assumptions derived from science (affecting, for example, what it means 
to be a 'citizen', the location of 'genuine knowledge' within the process, or defining what are 
'relevant' questions for debate). Other key themes appear to be that these are contested 
and flexible sites, with different meanings to different groups or in different situations. More 
detailed studies have suggested that this complexity extends to the interactions within 
dialogue processes; although, again, there is a shortage of analyses that consider this level 
of detail. 
Other than providing a framework for this study to speak into, how might these key themes 
affect my research? In part they give us some idea of what to expect from my own results. 
Despite the differences between my research framework and those of previous studies (of 
which the key one is my emphasis on generalised talk about the public, rather than a focus 
on discussion of particular scientific issues), it seems likely, from previous work, that I will 
find the presence of the deficit model alongside - perhaps - more sophisticated models of 
the public. Similarly, the work of Davies et al (2005; 2006) suggests that my own analysis of 
the interactions in dialogue processes (albeit informal ones) will find complexity in the 
relationships present. That the bulk of critical work on dialogue has found scientific framings 
imposed also suggests that this may be present in non-policy dialogue as well. 
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While this body of previous work may give us some ideas of where my data may take us, 
my study has some key differences to those discussed above. I will shortly turn to discuss 
my findings, looking at scientific understandings of publics within group discussions, and 
such understandings - as well as the broader interactions that occur - in informal dialogue 
processes at the Dana Centre, London. Before I do so, however, I wish to examine the 
theoretical and methodological underpinnings of my study, indicating the background and 
process that makes it distinct. 
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Chapter 3 
Telling stories from data: Theoretical 
frameworks and methodologies 
We speak with the voices of our communities, and to the extent that we have individual 
voices, we fashion them out of the social voices already available to us, appropriating the 
words of others to speak a word of our own. 
Lemke 1995: 24-5 
In the last chapter I placed my work within the literature of the public understanding of 
science (PUS): more specifically, I have been writing from the point of view of the critical 
PUS movement (see Michael 2002). 1 have also referenced discourse analytic studies (for 
example Cook et al 2004; Gilbert and Mulkay 1984; Michael and Birke 1994a; 1994b). These 
schools and authors go some way, already, to frame my methodologies. The title I have 
given this chapter, and the quote which heads it, further indicates my methodological 
stance. Quantitative researchers are unlikely to refer to their analysis and interpretation as 
"telling stories': the phrase suggests the more openly interpretative approach that qualitative 
research enables. I am, then, doing qualitative research, and will be focussing on language 
and meaning rather than quantification, seeking to identify broad themes - qualities - of 
the data (Flick 2002; Silverman 2005). As Denzin and Lincoln (2005: 10) note, qualitative 
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researchers "stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship 
between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape 
inquiry". By talking of 'telling stories', I am identifying myself with this situated, 
interpretative position. I am acknowledging the role of the researcher in producing an 
analysis; and the fact that this analysis will always be incomplete, ignoring certain 
perspectives or aspects of the data (Law 2004). While I will argue within this chapter that 
my methods are the best possible for the purpose and that the analysis I perform is 
rigorous, I also want to make it clear that any analysis can only be one story of many. 
There are a range of broad theoretical positions which have influenced my work, and which 
help to explain how I frame my methodologies and perspectives on my data. Having 
situated myself within the qualitative tradition, I will briefly discuss these further 
frameworks before going on to more specific details of this project. (They are not, it should 
be noted, 'frameworks' in exactly the same way; some are broad methodological schools, 
others theoretical positions or perspectives which affect the research process. All have, 
however, influenced the way I do or think about this research. ) 
Social constructivism 
Social constructivism is now a widespread movement within the social sciences and 
humanities and has been particularly key in the development of science and technology 
studies (see Schulz-Schaeffer et al 2006): key studies in the field (Knorr-Cetina 1999; Latour 
and Woolgar 1986) have argued that scientific knowledge is constructed through the social 
processes of science. Burr (2003) acknowledges that social constructivism is a broad school 
but notes four premises common to all social constructivist approaches: 
0A critical approach to taken-for-granted knowledge 
" Historical and cultural specificity 
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0 Link between knowledge and social processes 
" Link between knowledge and social action 
(Burr 2003: 2-5) 
Social constructivism thus rejects common sense assumptions about the world 'out there'. It 
highlights the importance of social - in the form of historical and cultural - conditions in 
shaping what we know, and argues that there is a continuous two-way interaction between 
knowledge and social action. Social constructivist approaches are thus interested in finding 
out more about this process of knowledge construction, and will emphasise the social 
practices that do this. 
For my research, taking a social constructivist approach will mean that I do not take for 
granted the 'knowledge' that I am told in interviews or what is'common sense' in the 
cultures I investigate. I will want to look at how this knowledge is made within social 
interactions, and to question what purposes it could have. 
The acknowledgement of "mess' 
John Law's writings on method (2004) are almost unique in that they spend no time 
discussing how to conduct interviews or how large a data set should be used. Instead, Law 
provides a theoretical background for social researchers which goes one step beyond social 
constructivism to highlight, amongst other things, the complexity of the world and the 
inability of any one 'method' to capture that complexity. Drawing on philosophical 
romanticism, the world, he says: 
is so rich that our theories about it will always fail to catch more than a part of it; that 
there is therefore a range of possible theories about a range of possible processes; that 
those theories and processes are probably irreducible to one another; and, finally, that 
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we cannot step outside the world to obtain an overall 'view from nowhere' which pastes 
all the theory and processes together. 
(Law 2004: 8) 
What does this mean for social research? The answer is not, he says, that we should simply 
give up. He spends the rest of the book discussing how to'remake'the concept of methods 
so that they become "quiet and more generous" (2005: 156); more able both to map 
complexity (in the form of 'mess') and to acknowledge the limits of our maps. In particular 
he rejects the idea of 'the' method: that prescriptive formulae for social research can ever 
help us understand the messy world. He is not arguing for a wholesale rejection of 
traditional methods, but rather for a rejection of general rules and the acknowledgement 
that social studies are involved - as science is - in the political process of producing one 
particular "good', truth. 
From Law - whose work chimes with my own experience -I have drawn an emphasis on 
the irreducibility of the world and that our methods can never do justice to the richness of 
the social processes under study. I have also taken the expectation that data will be 
complex, that it will be messy, ambiguous and unclear; and that the methods required to 
deal with this may also be 'messy'. 
Critical research 
I have already mentioned the so-called "critical' movement in PUS research (see p. 27) 
without commenting on the meaning of 'critical'. I have also, above, briefly noted Law's 
(2004) point that all research is political in one way or another; that it makes invisible 
decisions as to which voices to display and which to hide, decisions which go on to frame 
and shape the 'truth' which is produced. This point leads us on to discuss the critical 
movement in social research. 
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Like social constructivism, critical perspectives are not confined to one discipline or 
methodology. Cameron (2001) notes that critical theory is best thought of as "a set of 
interests and theoretical commitments" (Cameron 2001: 50). Critical theorists, then, write 
from a particular (and acknowledged) perspective and are aware of the political implications 
of their work, often using concepts such as power, ideology, and inequality and studying the 
naturalisation of the structural relations of these. On being "critical', Carspecken (1996) 
writes: 
Those of us who openly call ourselves "criticalists" definitely share a value orientation. 
We are all concerned about social inequalities, and we direct our work toward positive 
social change. We also share a concern with social theory and some of the basic issues it 
has struggled with since the nineteenth century. These include the nature of social 
structure, power, culture, and human agency. We use our research, in fact, to refine 
social theory rather than merely to describe social life. 
(Carspecken 1996: 3) 
Again like social constructivism, the critical approach is a broad school and not all critical 
researchers would agree with Carspecken's description (Kincheloe and McLaren 2005). 
However the main points are clear: a critical stance towards the nature of culture and 
society and a normative position on "social change". The critical analyst is not, as 
Carspecken says, simply trying to document social life and culture but also - implicitly or 
explicitly - normatively commenting on them (Fairciough 2003). From critical theory I take 
an interest in power in the social interactions that I study: where is it located and are there 
inequalities in this? I also take a normative stance - that equality is something to be worked 
towards - and an awareness that my research, as any, is political and can be used in 
particular ways (Richards 1996; also Fay 1993). 
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The ethnographic tradition 
Ethnography as a research practice originally derives from anthropology but has become 
widespread throughout the social sciences, in some disciplines being synonymous with 
'qualitative research'. As with the early anthropologists who immersed themselves in an 
alien culture, seeking to understand the culture as a 'participant observer', ethnography 
involves participation in a particular culture in order to understand the meanings, beliefs 
and processes of that culture (Bogdan and Biklen 1998; Flick 2002; Silverman 2001). 
Atkinson and Hammersley (1994) note four features of ethnographic research: 
0A strong emphasis on exploring a particular social phenomenon, rather than setting 
out to test hypotheses about them. 
0A tendency to work primarily with 'unstructured' data, that is, data that have not 
been coded at the point of data collection in terms of a closed set of analytic 
categories. 
0 Investigation of a small number of cases, perhaps just one case, in detail. 
0 Analysis of data that involves explicit interpretation of the meanings and functions of 
human actions, the product of which mainly takes the form of verbal descriptions 
and explanations, with quantification and statistical analysis playing a subordinate 
role at most. 
(Atkinson and Hammersley 1994: 248) 
Ethnography's focus on not imposing theory or hypotheses on the culture under study and 
on a detailed, interpretative analysis means that, as a methodology, it involves `thick 
description' of the data (Carspecken 1996; Lindhof 1995) from participant observation. 
Ethnographers may also use 'informants' to give them an insider's view of the culture, and 
to help them identify important issues, enabling them to focus their investigation. 
Ethnography is, as Atkinson and Hammersley (1994) note, explicitly interpretative and relies 
heavily on the creation of a carefully constructed verbal argument to support the 
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interpretation as well as on description: ethnographic write-ups do, quite literally, 'tell 
stories' and then interpret - through further stories - those stories. 
What do I take from ethnography in my own methodology? Firstly I have consciously 
adapted some of the methods of ethnography, such as participant observation, thick 
description, and interviewing, and the focus on being within a culture and gaining 
understanding through this 'insider's view'. Secondly, I will be acknowledging the role of 
interpretation in my data analysis and relying heavily on written arguments and examples to 
make my interpretation persuasive. And finally I will seek to retain its emphasis on letting 
the data speak for itself, rather than imposing theoretical frameworks or testing hypotheses. 
Grounded theory 
Grounded theory is another common methodology in the social sciences. Initially developed 
by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and further elaborated on by Strauss and Corbin (1998), in its 
last formal incarnation grounded theory is described as: 
... theory that was 
derived from data, systematically gathered and analyzed through the 
research process ... the researcher 
begins with an area of study and allows the theory to 
emerge from the data. Theory derived from data is more likely to resemble the "reality" 
than is theory derived by putting together a series of concepts based on experience or 
solely on speculation... 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998: 12) 
Strauss and Corbin go on to elaborate a process for producing this grounded theory, 
involving detailed coding of the data in various ways (open, axial, selective; see Flick 2002). 
A further key aspect of this process is that there is no separation between data collection 
and analysis: both are carried out concurrently and are expected to feed into one another. 
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This and the emphasis on theory emerging from, rather than being imposed upon, the data 
are the hallmarks of the grounded theory process. 
Grounded theory has been enormously influential in the social sciences, and as a method is 
frequently cited (although also often loosely applied; Flick 2002). In particular the concept 
of coding then combining and organising codes to produce theory has been taken up and 
has become an extremely powerful tool for data analysis. It is this concept that I will be 
making use of in my own data analysis. 
Harmonising diverse frameworks 
It should be clear, by this point, that I am drawing on a disparate range of sources to 
situate my work. Some of these sources explicitly disagree with one another: grounded 
theory, for example, in its most traditional form (Glaser and Strauss 1967), seeks to impose 
(what it sees as) the rigour of quantitative research upon qualitative work and to enable a 
neutral researcher to dispassionately construct theories directly from the data. Such a 
stance is directly opposed to writers such as John Law (2004), who argue that there is no 
such thing as the'neutral' researcher. Similarly, much critical work presupposes an external 
analysis - the researcher is able to analyse particular texts or processes from the outside, 
critiquing the power relations implicit in them - while ethnography's main focus is on the 
researcher as within a particular social system, gaining an understanding of the meanings 
involved from personal experience and relationships with informants. How can I use such 
differing perspectives to draw together a coherent methodology? 
The answer is that I am not - as should have been clear from my discussion of each 
framework -adopting each of these theoretical positions in their entirety. As Coffey and 
Atkinson (1996) and Flick (2002) note, a methodology can productively be made up of a 
'mix and match' of methods and theoretical perspectives. (This also, of course, coheres with 
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Law's writing on method (2004): a complex and messy world will require a complex and 
messy'method assemblage'. ) Indeed, I would argue that a rigid imposition of one 
methodology, regardless of the quirks and specificities of each research project, would be 
counterproductive. I have thus taken particular emphases, interests or methods from each 
of the frameworks discussed above, and knitted them together to form a coherent and 
usable whole. I take, for example, grounded theory's emphasis on coding and on theory 
emerging from data (in which it coheres with ethnography) while rejecting its concept of the 
neutral, entirely theory-free researcher. I will be doing this in practice as I move on to 
discuss my methodologies in more detail. 
Before I do this, however, I would like to note that my work remains marked by several key 
tensions. One of these relates to the frameworks described above and is the dichotomy 
between 'insider' and 'outsider' perspectives - also known as emic and etic approaches (see 
Berry 1999; Zetterberg 2006). 1 am consciously drawing on ethnography's interest in the 
insider's point of view, meanings, and terms, through participant observation and 
interviewing; but also claim to take a critical stance, imposing particular normative 
perceptions on what I find. Is this contradictory? 
This is certainly a tension, but I think - as Berry (1999) has argued - that the two positions 
do not need to be seen in opposition, but rather can be used as complementary to one 
another. My work therefore seeks both to understand the terms of reference for a culture 
from within and then to analyse those terms from without'. 
The two approaches can perhaps be correlated to my two main methods of analysis (to be discussed in detail 
later): discourse analyse and coding of ethnographic description and interviewing. Thick description and 
interviewing seek to explicate the experience of being in a culture, and coding of these data aims to sum up and 
explain these experiences in the subjects' own terms. Discourse analysis looks at language from outside and 
searches for underlying assumptions and meanings, often invisible to the subjects themselves. 
-65- 
I would also like to note one underlying theme, present to varying degrees in several of the 
theoretical perspectives above: an interest in language. Social constructivism's interest, for 
example, in how the social makes what we understand as reality often manifests itself as 
looking at how this is performed through language; while critical researchers often analyse 
language use to study patterns of power and resistance (Fairclough 2003). Ethnographer's 
`thick descriptions', as well, frequently include detailed notes on how people speak - as well 
as non-verbal language-use - in order to understand a particular social situation. This 
interest in language will be a key feature of this study. 
Methods and research process 
I have previously described the broad research questions around which this study is 
focussed. To briefly recap, they are: 
1. What discourses do scientists and engineers use in talk about the public, and how do 
these re/ate to the 'deficit model? 
2. How are publics constructed within informal science public dialogue events, and what 
other performances and meaning-makings occur within these? 
The study, as described by these questions, therefore has specific foci - scientific 
understandings of publics, and how these are worked out within dialogue contexts - but 
retains flexibility so that further key meanings or processes that emerge from the data can 
be investigated. This position is coherent both with an acknowledgement of the researcher's 
own agenda and interests (I am not'neutral') in the critical and ethnographic traditions, and 
with an ethnographic embedding into a culture which allows the data to'speak for 
themselves'. 
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These questions divide the study into two research phases: firstly, an investigation of 
scientific/technical constructions of 'the public' (question 1); and secondly a more general 
investigation into informal science-public dialogue (question 2). Fieldwork, therefore, was 
conducted in two main phases. I will discuss the methods used in each of these phases 
below. 
Phase I: Talking to scientists 
The first research question - or focus - seeks to investigate the way in which scientists and 
engineers use discourses of 'the public'. Given that these discourses - though present in 
scientific culture - are unlikely to be frequently articulated, participant observation amongst 
scientific groups would not be particularly helpful (or only on an unrealistically long-term 
scale). Instead, the decision was made to force scientists to articulate and consider these 
discourses using the setting of semi-structured group discussions. Talk focussed around the 
topics of communication and the public, in order to draw out discourses of the public, but 
had a flexible structure to try to produce as naturalistic a setting as possible (further aided 
by having the discussion within lab groups, whose members are familiar and comfortable 
with each other). 
Interviews - and even more so group interviews - are always social situations, where 
meanings are actively negotiated and constructed between individuals. The interviewer is as 
much part of this process as the interviewees: however naturalistic the setting and relaxed 
the group, the interviewer's presence will always help define the responses given. A 
constructivist view acknowledges this, and seeks to use an interview not to study 'facts' 
about behaviour or even authentic experiences but the way in which meanings are 
constructed (Silverman 2001). In practice this means that care must be taken during 
analysis to study the narratives and turn by turn build up of meaning of interviewees 
(Cameron 2001). In a group, true discussion and debate should be encouraged rather than 
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expecting the interview to simply produce lists of individuals' own experiences. The 
meanings that are produced will be social ones, created in a particular situation by a 
particular group of people. Because in this study the interviewees are from the same social 
background (science, and at even more specific level, the same discipline and the same 
lab), they are likely already to have access to shared meanings and context-specific 
language. This means that the interviewer must take care to take nothing for granted, but 
rather be continually seeking clarity on meanings. 
Flick (2002) differentiates between group interviews, group discussions and focus groups. 
However, the differences are mainly based on historical background and some small 
differences in method; in practice the forms are closely related. The key variable tends to 
be the level of interviewer involvement, which can range from the highly structured 
(common in positivist methodologies) to the open where the discussion is led almost 
entirely by the participants themselves. Such open discussions are useful where a heavy 
theoretical background has not been imposed and therefore where the interviewer is 
seeking to let participants define key issues (Morgan 1997). 
In this study the aim was for a discussion that was as open as possible (to allow 
participants to define issues in their own terms) while remaining focussed and relevant to 
the research questions. The interview schedule (used by the researcher) therefore included 
three main discussion questions as well as an ice-breaker and introductory questions (which 
served to get people talking), and the aim was for the participants to guide their own 
discussion around these8. I, as the interviewer, would then ideally have little to do other 
than make sure that no-one was being excluded from the discussion, and occasionally ask 
questions to elucidate shared meanings. However, this ideal did not always take place. 
Discussion faltered and in some at least of the discussion areas the participants found it 
8 See Appendix for a full copy of the interview schedule. 
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hard to articulate their thinking. Provision was made for these situations with selections of 
probe and follow-up questions which focussed on particular aspects of what was under 
discussion, or which sought to elucidate further what had been said. In such situations I 
took a more structured approach in order to enable the participants to articulate their 
understandings or to think through the topic, while still allowing them to define the key 
terms of the discussion. 
Having discussed the theoretical framing of the group interviews, it may also be helpful to 
briefly describe the 'model' of scientific culture upon which I am drawing in my research 
design and analysis. My model, therefore, is of science as a 'culture' (cf. Knorr-Cetina 1999) 
through which various 'discourses' circulate (Cameron 2001; Fairclough 2003). There may 
be multiple discourses of any concept - of 'the public', for example. Within a culture - or 
subculture - some discourses may be more accessible than others: more readily available to 
participants. The group interviews are designed to function as a way of drawing forth 
discourses of particular things - primarily, in fact, to find out what discourses of "the public' 
are in terms of their content. They may also tell us something about the relative 
accessibility of these discourses: which are more frequently drawn upon. In addition, I think 
that the interview transcripts will enable us to look at the way in which discourses are used 
in a social context: how they are negotiated, manipulated, and reconstructed, and the uses 
and functions they have within talk. We will gain some sense, to pick up on the language of 
the quote which heads this chapter, of science's 'social voices' and how these are 
'refashioned' (see Lemke 1995). 
The practicalities of this phase of the research are straightforward: concurrent with question 
design, contact was made with research groups9 around Imperial College (through Heads of 
9'Research' or 'lab' groups are the predominant way in which most scientific research is organised. Their size and 
contact with other groups varies, but they form coherent social units in which scientists and engineers within the 
academy spend most of their time. The long-standing relationships between group members, relatively fixed 
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Department, personal, and academic contacts) who would be willing to take part in a single 
group interview. A concerted effort was made to work with groups from a variety of 
disciplines, and eventually interviews were arranged with research groups from the 
engineering, life sciences, physics, chemistry and medical faculties. At this stage the focus 
of research was described to contacts in non-specific terms. Seven interviews were 
arranged and took place between April and October 2005, in most cases using the time slot 
and venue usually used as a group or lab meeting (a weekly or fortnightly meeting where 
the group meet to discuss their own or external research). In this way an effort was made 
to create a naturalistic and comfortable environment for the participants: the interview took 
place in a familiar place and time and with familiar people. The hope was that the kind of 
free discussion that would normally take place around a research paper or recent finding 
would be extended to the discussion topics the interviewer introduced. '0 
As the discussions started I introduced myself and the interview format, and asked for 
permission to record (see details in the interview schedule in the Appendix). Various'warm- 
up' devices were then used: participants were asked to introduce themselves and their work 
briefly, and then asked, more generally, whether anyone had had any experience in doing 
'science communication'. From then on the exact format varied from group to group. Cards 
had been created with the three key discussion topics on: some groups used these to focus 
the talk, requiring little or no interaction from the interviewer, while others seemed to prefer 
a more structured format and needed more prompting. Interviews lasted between 55 
minutes and 100 minutes, and were recorded onto an Olympus DSS digital recorder and 
later downloaded onto a hard drive. 
internal hierarchies, and focus around one area of research makes them useful sites for analysis - Latour and 
Woolgar (1986), for example, analysed a single lab group. 
lo Of course, the counter to this is that the group hierarchies and dynamics were also inherited from the lab 
meeting format. How powerful an effect this was seemed to vary from group to group; in any case, in any group 
discussion hierarchies are likely to develop (Morgan 1997). 
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Phase II: Understanding dialogue 
From the relatively focussed research methods used in the first phase we move to a more 
traditionally ethnographic and open-ended approach in the second phase of fieldwork, in 
keeping with the deliberately unfocussed research question. The question this phase was 
designed to elucidate was: 
2. How are publics constructed within in formal science public dialogue events, and what 
other performances and meaning-makings occur within these? 
An emphasis on constructions of "the public' is retained from the phase I research, but in 
addition there is scope for a more general investigation of dialogue processes. I used a 
variety of methods and data types in order to compile a 'thick description' (Carspecken 
1996; Lindhof 1995) of dialogue and to draw forth key aspects of the interactions within 
them, as well as retaining an interest in language that constructs the public. I will discuss 
these individually below. 
Participant observation at a range of science-society dialogue events 
I am interested in the phenomenon of science-society dialogue as it occurs in informal, non- 
policy-related processes. Such events occur at a range of locations and although I wished to 
study one venue in detail, I also wanted to be able to speak about the movement as a 
whole. I therefore attended approximately 35 dialogue events over a period of 18 months, 
including ones run by the Cafe Scientifique movement, the Darwin Centre at the Natural 
History Museum, and a Royal Institution 'Headline Debate". Although the range of events I 
attended is by no means comprehensive, it does cover the key institutions and types of 
institutions involved in the informal dialogue movement (the BA, RI, Cafe Scientifique, 
museums). 
11 See Appendix for a detailed list of events attended. 
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I engaged as a participant observer at these events. I sat with other members of the public 
within the 'audience' space, followed the debate and talk, and at times spoke to people 
around me. According to Adler and Adler's (1998) typology, I was a peripheral-member- 
researcher', 'within' a cultural phenomenon but not fully enrolled in or committed to it. 
Before, during and after the events I took detailed fieldnotes (Adler and Adler 1998; Bogdan 
and Biklen 1998; Silverman 2001), noting down my observations of what was taking place 
and my impressions and understandings of these events. 
Participant observation at the Dana Centre 
The broad fieldwork described above convinced me that the Dana Centre - part of London's 
Science Museum, where I already had made contacts - was a suitable case of science- 
society dialogue to study in more detail. It is typical of the informal dialogue movement, 
encapsulating the key features and trends, and I therefore use it in this research as a case 
study (see Gomm et al 2000) of science-society dialogue without policy connections. My 
description of the Dana Centre thus enables me to make suggestions about the movement 
as a whole. 
The Dana Centre is part of the UK's National Museum of Science and Industry (NMSI), and 
is in a purpose-built building on the same site as the Science Museum, in South Kensington. 
The Wellcome-Wolfson Building, in which the Dana Centre is housed, opened in November 
2003 and was funded by the Wellcome Trust and a number of other charitable bodies. It 
has several floors, some of which are devoted to office space, and includes an event space- 
cafe bar ("d. cafe") on the lower ground floor, an internet lounge and gallery overlooking the 
event space, and a studio and meeting room ("d. studio" and "d-study"). The event space 
thus doubles up as a cafe-bar and during the day is open for this purpose; the internet 
lounge is also open, for free, throughout the day. 
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Figure 3.1: The exterior of the Dana Centre building. Photo courtesy of Gaetan Lee. 
The Dana Centre is a collaborative enterprise between several organisations, but the 
Science Museum takes on the bulk of the events: in a typical month there might be 12 
events, of which the Science Museum runs or coordinates nine. Events typically run on 
midweek evenings. The Museum funds a dedicated 'Dana event' team, and much of the 
vision behind Dana came from Science Museum staff. In a 2004 interview, the (then) 
Museum Head of Learning noted that: 
.. really 
from 2000 onwards there was a feeling that what we really wanted was a centre 
.. 
for public events, as well as being the home of the Science Museum's team who 
would develop science engagement. 
(Gammon 2004) 
The development of the Dana Centre - after the influential House of Lords Third Report 
(2000) - therefore seems to be within the 'dialogue' movement which flowed out of the 
Report. Similarly, the Centre describes what it does in terms of "dialogue" and "debate", as 
its'About us' webpage indicates: 
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The dana centre is a stylish, purpose-built venue in London (UK). It is a place for 
adults to take part in exciting, informative and innovative debates about contemporary 
science, technology and culture. 
No two days will be the same at the dana centre. It's the place for experimental dialogue 
events, blending the best from science, art, performance and multimedia to provoke 
discussion and real engagement with the key issues of the day. In the Jana centre you'll 
see science delivered in a very different way, everything from Edinburgh-Fringe-style 
stand-up comics debunking science myths to updates on radical research, handling 
sessions of rarely seen objects from the Science Museum's collection and challenging 
debates on modern science. 
The events focus on themes that are important to you and present them in new and 
attractive ways - all in a lively, informal atmosphere. If you care about how the science 
behind the headlines affects you and your environment, want to challenge leading 
experts face to face, argue the case for valuing animals over human embryos, or learn 
how to make ice cream in 90 seconds, then check out what's on at the dana centre. 
(Dana Centre 2007) 
The Dana Centre, as described here, is "a place for adults to take part in exciting, 
informative and innovative debates". It is also "stylish", "experimental", "state-of-the-art", 
and relevant (focusing on themes that are "'important to you"). The emphasis is firmly on 
"debate": the Centre's aim seems to be a forum for dialogue on science. Elsewhere we learn 
that the Dana Centre has a "mandate to be innovative [and] experimental ... generating 
dialogue about contemporary science" (McCallie et al in press). 
In addition, we learn that the Centre is "for adults". This is also affirmed by less public 
documentation: specifically, the target audience is 19-45 year olds (Brehaut and Simonsson 
2006). Audience profiling by the Science Museum's visitor researchers tells us that 81% of 
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those who attend fall into this target audience; that slightly more women than men attend; 
that 42% of visitors have a science, technology or medicine-related occupation; and that 
just over a third have visited the Dana Centre before (ibid). Visitor research also found that 
- over 2005-2006 - there was an average of 59 attendees at each Science Museum-run 
Dana event (Simonsson 2006). 
I attended events here on a regular basis and in particular selected six events, with the help 
and permission of the Dana Centre event staff, to study in detail. The events chosen took 
place between October 2005 and May 2006 and covered a range of topics (from Einsteinian 
physics to drugs and the brain). They also involved a variety of different formats. I built up 
contacts with the Dana staff, attending two of their team meetings (in part in order to 
explain my research) and chatting to them at events and at casual meetings. I took 
fieidnotes as described above at the events and after any meetings, and, in addition, at the 
six events that were intensively studied I produced sketch plans of the event space, 
including speaker locations throughout the evening (Adler and Adler 1998). 1 also collected 
other materials associated with the events, such as speaker biographies used by the Dana 
staff, leaflets given out at the event, or information given about the event on the Dana 
website, and took photographs of the space. This stage of the research could therefore be 
described as mixed method ethnography (Silverman 2005) or as "thick description' of the 
entire Dana Centre experience. 
The Dana Centre has facilities for webcasting and routinely records - although not always 
broadcasts - its events. I was given access to these recordings (in low quality wmv format, 
used for web-streaming) and used these as a record of speech and movement throughout 
the evening (although their scope of vision was necessarily limited: the fieldnotes were 
therefore a valuable supplement to the video recordings). 
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Informal interviewing at the Dana Centre 
I also carried out informal interviews with scientists and members of the public who had 
participated in the dialogue event at the six events that I studied in detail. Audience 
members were interviewed briefly in event intervals to try and draw out their experiences or 
opinions of the event, as well as their views on the speakers. Scientists who had been 
formally invited by the Dana team (to act as 'speakers') were interviewed after the event 
had finished. These interviews again probed for experiences of the event but also repeated 
questions about communication and the public used in the phase I interviews. Both kinds of 
interviews were necessarily more flexible and diverse than those in phase I, given the 
pressures of the surroundings (noise, limited time and space): some were with groups (of 
scientists or of members of the public - not a mixture), others with individuals. Some were 
more planned and formal, others made use of opportunities that had to be seized on the 
spur of the moment. All sought to draw forth meanings created at different times and by 
different participants12. 
The number of interviews carried out at each event varied from one to five, and involved 
one to four participants. Interviews with audience members were generally brief, lasting 
three to five minutes, while those with the invited scientists tended to be between 15 and 
30 minutes. The final corpus contains 15 audience member interviews and six scientist 
interviews. At the start of each interview I introduced myself and asked permission firstly to 
carry out the interview, and secondly to record it (further details of information given can be 
found in the interview schedules in the Appendix). Each interview was recorded and 
downloaded in the same way as the earlier interviews. 
lZ Interview schedules used to guide questioning can be found in the Appendix. 
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Ethical issues 
There are two key ethical issues relevant to this project (in common with much 
ethnographic work): informed consent and the'passive deception' involved in observation 
(Adler and Adler 1998; Bogdan and Biklen 1998; Russell Bernard 2002; Silverman 2005). To 
consider the principle of informed consent first, permission was always requested and 
information about the project given when conducting interviews (as has been described 
above). Openness was key: in gaining access to research groups in phase I, for example, an 
email description of the interview process and a one page project summary was provided. 
While the specific aims of the group interviews (to understand scientific constructions of the 
public) were not disclosed unless requested, questions about the research were always 
answered fully. Consent was verbal (sufficient, given that the groups I was working with are 
not particularly vulnerable) and participants could stop the interview at any point (and, 
indeed, did - for example if they had another meeting to go to). Participants were told that 
any quotes used from the interviews would be anonymised, and this procedure has been 
carried out. 
The ethical issues around the phase II fieldwork are perhaps slightly more complex. As 
noted, access to the primary field was granted by the Dana Centre staff team (and, at a 
higher level, the Science Museum senior management). Again, a one page project summary 
was prepared for staff to give a clear picture of the research aims and the exact methods 
that would be used (found in the Appendix). Verbal consent was obtained to all interviews 
carried out, and the same policy of openness about the research if questioned, and 
anonymising of quotes, was carried out at all times. But given that the Dana Centre and the 
other dialogue sites are public spaces, it was not considered necessary to gain consent for 
participant observation from all those in the space. This is standard procedure in 
anthropology (Adler and Adler 1998; Russell Bernard 2002) and involves "passive 
deception" (Russell Bernard 2002: 419): to another Dana audience member, I appear to be 
-77- 
just another audience member. Russell Bernard argues that such deception is "ethically 
aseptic" (ibid: 420) and justifiable. Though Adler and Adler note that the concept of public 
and privates spaces in conducting observational research can be problematic, I would agree 
with Russell Bernard that observation of demonstrably public spaces, when combined with 
openness when questioned, is ethically justified and does not compose an intrusion into 
subjects' privacy. The work I carried out at the Dana Centre and other dialogue sites does, I 
would argue, obey Erikson's 'rules' for research (cited in Adler and Adler 1998: 102): 
It is unethical for a sociologist to deliberately misrepresent [her] identity for the purpose 
of entering a private domain to which [she] is not otherwise eligible. 
It is unethical for a sociologist to deliberately misrepresent the character of the research 
in which [she] is engaged. 
Transcription 
As should have been apparent from the description of fieldwork above, the key data on 
which to focus my interest in language are the group interviews (in phase I), and the 
informal interviews and events themselves (in phase II). I have records of all of these in the 
form of audio or video recordings, and these were then transcribed to produce a written 
record of talk. 
As many commentators have noted, transcribing audio or video recordings is not a simple 
matter of converting data to a different format (Cameron 2001; Chafe 1995; Edwards 1995; 
Ochs 1999). Edwards (1995: 19) writes that "Far from being an objective and exhaustive 
mirroring of events of an interaction, a transcript is fundamentally selective and 
interpretative". There is no such thing as a perfect transcript; there are always omissions 
and mistakes and the structure and conventions used always imply "a theory of what is 
significant about language" (Chafe 1995: 55). The sum of an experience - of an interview, 
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or live event - can never be codified. Some meaning will always be lost. Having 
acknowledged this, however, it remains the case that having a written record of 
communication is useful for analysis (Cameron 2001). 
I have used my own variation on Jefferson's transcript notation (see Atkinson and Heritage 
1999; Roberts 2006; Silverman 2001), which can be found in the Appendix, to transcribe my 
data. I have transcribed fairly closely (showing, for example, repeated words or phrases, 
overlapping or latching speech, and giving some indication of pauses in and between 
speech). In addition, where I have analysed particular sections of video in detail, I have 
recorded movement and other features of the interactions taking place (see Heath and Luff 
1992), including hand gestures and pointing, activities such as note-taking, and gaze. 
Data analysis 
My final data corpus consisted of approximately eight hours of phase I group interviews, 
three hours of informal interviews, and nine hours of event video, along with fieldnotes, 
sketches and associated materials (phase II). The seven phase I interviews were 
transcribed in full; of the phase II data, interviews and events were transcribed in full for 
four events, which were then used as the basis for a detailed study of language and 
interaction. (Transcription continued until it became clear that "saturation' (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998) had been reached and that there was enough data for a full analysis. ) In 
addition, particular exemplar sections from the video data were transcribed in greater detail 
for closer analysis. 
My analysis - in keeping with my previous discussion of having a variety of influences - 
utilises two strategies: interpretative coding (Coffey and Atkinson 1996; Strauss and Corbin 
1998) to draw out key'themes'; and discourse analysis (DA) of stretches of talk (Cameron 
2001). While coding could be seen as a more traditionally 'sociological' technique and DA as 
-79- 
an analytic form based in linguistics, in practice the distinction is not clear cut. In particular, 
forms of DA have become relatively standard within sociological disciplines (see, for 
example, Burchell 2007a; Fairclough 2003; Gilbert and Mulkay 1984; Michael 1991; 
Silverman 2001). Furthermore, while this particular blending of analytical practices remains 
unusual it is not unique. Both Cook (2001; Cook et al 2004) and Waterton et al (2001) 
describe a similar blend of sociological and linguistic techniques. 
This blend produces in my work a further tension (similar to that of the emic/etic 
approaches described above): that between analysis on a macro and micro level. Coding 
lends itself to dealing with large quantities of data. It enables the drawing together into 
themes and concepts a mass of fieldnotes, transcripts and notes; the 
codes/themes/concepts in some ways'sum up' the data and allow the researcher to 
manipulate and understand these rather than the entire corpus (Coffey and Atkinson 1996). 
On the other hand, DA - at least in those forms which have influenced my work - is 
frequently a technique for detailed and small scale analysis. Write ups focus on small 
segments of data and expand on them in order to identify particular (generalisable) features 
of discourse: an analysis will often be far longer than the data being studied (see, for 
example, Schegloff 1997). Again this leaves us with the question of whether this is a 
problem for my methodology, and again I would argue that the contrasting approaches can 
be used to complement one another rather than needing to be set in opposition. Using both 
macro and micro approaches to analysis enables me both to get a grasp on the mass of 
data in my corpus, identifying key themes that run through it, and to analyse the 
occurrence of these themes in detail. Any tension, then, is productive. 
It is also important to note that though I will describe these analytical strategies separately 
below, in practice they are not used independently but influence each other and merge 
within the actual practice of analysis. Thus the coding uses principles from DA in the 
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interpretation of the data, and DA is used to identify particular themes. Analysis is thus a 
form of craftsmanship rather than the strict imposition of particular rules: as Coffey and 
Atkinson say, it is "imaginative, artful, flexible, and reflexive" (1996: 10). 
Interpretative coding 
Written data (fieldnotes and transcripts) were marked up and coded in a manner informed 
by grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1998). In particular, there was a focus on intense 
familiarity with the data: the researcher is 'immersed' in it and examines it minutely. While 
the codes do emerge from the data, however, it is not the case that this process was 
approached with the same emphasis on 'in vivo' coding as is laid out by Strauss and Corbin. 
Instead, there was some structure to analysis: the research questions were kept in mind 
and the data examined to elucidate these (see Coffey and Atkinson 1996; Flick 2002). Thus, 
for example, for the phase I data there was an effort to identify and code for ways in which 
the public was constructed. Other important or repeated points not directly relating to the 
research questions were, however, also coded for: this is important given my emphasis in 
interview procedure on allowing participants to set their own terms and frame the issues 
themselves (and, in fact, resulted in a further key theme - co-constructions of science and 
the public - emerging during analysis). 
At least part of the reason for the differences between my coding and that laid out by 
Strauss and Corbin is my emphasis - following ethnographic and constructivist practice - on 
interpretation. While some of my coding is for particular kinds of content, much is directly 
interpretative. Thus codes used included 'Speaks as an individual' - coding segments where 
the speaker explicitly emphasises that something is their personal opinion - but also 
'Scientist as "other"' - used to identify stretches of discourse where the speaker linguistically 
sides themselves with the public in opposition to science. Such coding is influenced by my 
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DA methodology and begins the work of a more detailed analysis, allowing more 
sophisticated themes to emerge than simply content-focussed ones. 
Coding and mark-up was initially done by hand: underlining, notes, and codes can be more 
freely inserted onto hard copies than digital ones. After this initial immersion in the data 
(copies were read over several times and annotated), the software MAXgda213 was used to 
code in a more structured way. After coding of data (for each phase) was complete, this 
software, in conjunction with the accompanying visual tool MAX Maps, was used to organise 
codes and to identify particular themes. Code maps were created and used to analyse the 
frequency and types of occurrence of particular themes and concepts, to group together 
particular themes, and to indicate connections between them. Hard copies of these were 
further annotated and used to develop answers to the research questions. 
Discourse analysis 
As already noted, discourse analysis (DA) has become an increasingly common technique 
within social studies, particularly since the concept of locating 'actions and beliefs' in actors 
has been problematised (Mulkay 1981). However, 'discourse analysis' is a disturbingly large 
field covering a range of methodologies (see Cameron 2001; Philips and Jorgensen 2002; 
Schiffrin 1994). Schiffrin discusses six distinct schools, each with its own interests and 
methods and corresponding theoretical assumptions. While to some extent these methods 
can be 'mixed and matched' (conversation analysis techniques, for example, are frequently 
drawn on by those of other theoretical persuasions), it is at least necessary to examine the 
assumptions that underpin them. 
13 MAXqda2 is one of a range of 'CAQDAS' - computer assisted qualitative data analysis - programs. Such software 
does not perform analysis or coding automatically (as some quantitative software does), but enables the 
researcher to code and then manipulate those codes in various ways electronically. At their simplest, CAQDAS 
provide a way of easily organising and searching a mass of research data. See Bauer and Gaskell (2000); Coffey et 
al (1996); Lee and Fielding (1996); Lewins and Silver (2006); and Tesch (1990) for further details. 
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Those in science studies who have used DA techniques have tended to be somewhat vague 
about which theoretical school they are drawing on. Gilbert and Mulkay, in their work 
Opening Pandoras Box(1984), appear to draw on a wide range of authors, including 
conversation analysts (such as Harvey Sacks) and the functional linguist Michael Halliday. 
Michael, in his most methodologically-focussed paper (1991), cites the discursive 
psychologists Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherall and also the critical scholar Norman 
Fairclough. Others have used computerised corpus analysis (Cook et al 2004). No one 
distinctive DA practice, it seems fair to say, has been developed and used within science 
studies or critical public understanding of science. 
The DA techniques I have used have been influenced by the analyses of writers such as 
Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) and Michael (1991; 1992). In particular, I have used Michael's 
concept of 'ideal-type' discourses in reconstructing specific stories of the public (cf. also 
Koro-Ljungberg and Tirri 2001). More specifically, however, two theoretical programmes are 
particularly key in the way I use DA: the ethnography of speaking (Cameron 2001; Hymes 
1972; 1974; Schiffrin 1994), and critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Cameron 2001; 
Fairclough 2003). While again acknowledging that the divisions between these theoretical 
schools are not particularly clear cut, and that in practice my methods merge these 
approaches, I will briefly discuss these two programmes and the ways in which they have 
influenced my analysis. 
The ethnography of speaking (or communication), as developed by Dell Hymes, draws - as 
the name might suggest - from anthropology in its emphasis on the surrounding culture of 
a communication. Cameron writes: 
The ethnographic approach is one in which attention is paid to the interdependence of 
language-using and other activities. Any given instance of language use is analysed as 
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part of a whole social situation; more generally, ways of using and understanding 
language are analysed in relation to the wider culture in which they occur. 
(Cameron 2001: 53) 
Hymes proposed that such social features could be identified by using what is known as the 
SPEAKING grid: a mnemonic for communication components such as setting, ends 
(purpose), and genre (see Hymes 1974; Schiffrin 1994: 142); also that three levels could be 
analysed: the speech situation, the speech event, and the speech act. Cameron (2001) 
notes that a rigid application of these analytical tools may not always be helpful; they do, 
however, provide a helpful reminder of features which may be important for analysis. 
The ethnography of speaking is particularly useful to me because it fits in with my 
ethnographic approach to - in particular - events at the Dana Centre. It allows me to look 
at the language used in the context of the immediate environment and to discuss the 
physicality of communication. While context is clearly important within the phase I 
interviews, and analysis must show an awareness of this, it is, I think, in the setting of 
science-society dialogue events that this analytical approach will be most productive. 
Critical discourse analysis is a broad approach to analysis rather than a series of specific 
methods (Cameron 2001; Fairclough 2003; van Dijk 1993). Its central focus is an interest in 
"the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance" (van Dijk 
1993: 249) - in which it clearly draws from, and indeed is closely related to, broader critical 
approaches. Cameron notes that CDA links discourse as language in use (via close analysis 
of texts) to discourse in its wider sense, as "a form of social practice that constructs the 
objects of which it purports to speak"' (Cameron 2001: 123). Practitioners of CDA, such as 
Norman Fairclough (see Fairclough 2003), thus perform analyses of texts in order to point 
to broader social patterns of inequality or injustice. As such, there is often an emphasis on 
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features such as intertextuality. Analysis has a purpose and a position and, of necessity, 
comes from outside a social situation (see Wetherall 2001). 
From this analytical position, then, I will be taking an interest in power and resistance in 
discourse, and seeking to relate what I find to broader patterns in society. I will examine 
the assumptions implicit in talk, look at how constructs in the data position and make use of 
issues of power; and, at times, I will be normative about those uses of power. 
Finally, a comment about the use of DA on interview data. Silverman (2005) notes that this 
practice can be problematic, as DA "cannot treat interview accounts as providing a definitive 
version of reality" (p. 121). This seems to me to underestimate the ways in which interviews 
can be used: as I have explained earlier, I do not view my interviews as even attempting to 
provide a "definitive version of reality". DA can, I would argue, be employed on interview 
transcripts as long as the context of an interview is always kept in mind (examples of this 
being done successfully are Burchell 2007a; Gilbert and Mulkay 1984; Kerr et al 1997; 
Michael and Birke 1994a; 1994b; Michael and Brown 2005; see also Cameron 2001 for a 
discussion of this). Particularly in combination with the interpretative coding described 
above, it becomes a powerful tool to identify how meanings are made in a particular social 
situation. 
A natural history of research 
Methodology chapters tell and codify a particular story of how research was conducted, 
giving the illusion of objectivity (Law 2004). Silverman (2005) suggests writing a 'natural 
history' of research, in part to rectify this (and also, he argues, to produce a more 
interesting read). Such a natural history will also give space for reflexivity and reflection on 
the practice of research. I would like to conclude this chapter, then, with a brief natural 
history of my research process in this way. I will structure this with a series of topics and 
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questions which have impinged on my work - partly inspired by Silverman's suggestions, 
and partly coming out of my own reflections as I carried out the study. 
The personal context of the research 
Every research project derives, to some extent, from the researcher's own interests and 
background. Arguably, a project not guided in this way would be lacking: interest in the 
subject under investigation is often necessary to sustain a long and detailed analysis. In this 
case there are several points which led me to conduct this study, in this manner. 
0 Obvious gaps in the literature. There are gaps around both scientific talk and 'non- 
policy' dialogue in existing literatures. Coming from a science communication 
background, it was particularly frustrating to see a lack of critical work on informal 
science dialogue - despite the fact that this is prevalent and increasing. There 
seemed to be a lack of communication between theoreticians and practitioners and 
this meant that there was no thorough analysis or way of correcting and informing 
practice with critical thinking. 
0 An interest in the small - rather than large - scale. The emphasis on democratising 
science through policy and formalised public participation has led to research on these 
'large-scale' processes. Personal inclination has led me to focus on the small-scale: 
individual interactions, the minutiae of speech, focussed case studies. The power of 
interaction on an individual level is particularly important to me and has played a role 
in my theoretical vision of science being more productively changed from the bottom- 
up - through small-scale and informal interactions - than the top-down (i. e. imposed 
by policy). 
0 The personal, normative stance that science and scientists should be encouraged to 
take opportunities to be reflective about practice; and that such a reflective science 
would be both more effective and socially robust. In addition my understanding that 
-86- 
science is an incredibly powerful institution in our society, and that that power is not 
always used reflectively, has led to my interest in critical approaches. 
Shifting research emphases 
My project proposal was first developed for the process of applying for research funding: I 
had an idea, and this was worked up through reference to the literature and the sites of 
interest in order to be sent off to the project funders. Having secured funding, I spent the 
start of my PhD continuing to research the literature and visiting science dialogue sites, and 
building research questions based on this. Then, as my fieldwork began, I continued to 
reflect on what was interesting in the sites I was investigating, and what I could find out. 
This process meant that my research foci shifted over the period I was doing my research. 
Both the practice of fieldwork and my reading of the literature refined what I originally 
thought I was interested in: my understanding of particular concepts developed and I found 
new and interesting issues emerging. In particular, the key shift was one from an interest in 
changes of beliefs and attitudes in individuals to an interest in discourse used at particular 
sites. As I read more, I started to problematise the possibility of adequately understanding 
'beliefs and attitudes' and any changes in these. Work that did this stemmed mostly from 
social psychology (see Gaskell 2001; Jaspars 1978; Lee and Balchin 1995) and seemed to 
me to over-simplify the complexities of the interactions involved. My own experience of 
dialogue events also made me realise that my initial separation of individuals who had or 
had not experienced dialogue processes was over-simplistic. The concepts of 'before', 
'after', and 'dialogue' were all more complex than I had initially assumed. I moved, then, 
from wanting to chart changes in the beliefs and attitudes of individuals who had taken part 
in dialogue to being interested in the way that discourses were used and drawn upon. I also 
started to problematise the idea of 'dialogue' and the categories involved in it ('science' and 
'the public'). I had originally assumed that this took place at the sites I was studying in a 
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straightforward manner; however, again both the literature and my own experiences made 
me start to question this. This problematisation led to my interest in the structure of the 
science-society event as a site of power and resistance (rather than simply as a place where 
people's minds are changed) and to the thinking I have done on the theoretical concept of 
dialogue outside of policy. 
There is no doubt that the research process would have been easier and neater if I had had 
exactly the right questions and frameworks as I started. However, every methodology text 
emphasises that research should be iterative; that insights gained should be fed in to the 
investigative strategy. The process that I went through has acted as a refining tool on my 
study, making it become -I believe - more sophisticated in its analysis of what is a 
complex social phenomenon. 
Shifting project scope 
As well as my analytical emphases shifting through the course of this study, the scope of 
the project has also done so. In particular there has been a gradual scaling down of my 
ambitions in terms of data collection and analysis as I realised, firstly, how time consuming 
transcription is (although not without its benefits for the analyst), and secondly how rich the 
data I was collecting was. Thus I had originally intended to study two sites of dialogue, and 
to conduct a much more extensive analysis of the talk of scientists who had been involved 
in dialogue processes; I have, in fact, recordings and video from several other events and 
interviews, both at the Dana Centre and at a further site. As I began my analysis it became 
increasingly clear that I actually had more than enough data to deal with, and that the 
detailed approach I was taking was best used on relatively small data sets. The project 
scope was narrowed down, therefore, to focus on one site and to deal with this one case as 
comprehensively as possible. 
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Interviewing practice 
My role within the interviews I carried out varied greatly - as was expected: I had 
anticipated that the role I was expected to take might differ in different interviews (student, 
facilitator, scientist, participant; see Bauer and Gaskell 2000: 51). But I found that, 
particularly in phase I interviews and in phase II interviews with scientists, I was often 
placed in a learner role. The fact that I was a PhD student meant that many of the (post- 
doctoral and beyond) experts I spoke to were able to view me in a particular way and to 
construct the interview as a teaching process. The way that I introduced the interviews 
probably also assisted in this: I would talk about wanting to know their 'opinions and ideas'. 
Given that it was at times difficult to recruit groups for interview, I was also clear that I was 
grateful for the time interviewees had given to participate and deferential in arranging 
interviews (fitting around group schedules). 
All of these things shifted the balance of power in the interviews towards the interviewees - 
an unusual situation in interview practice and one similar to elite interviewing. Although 
uncomfortable for me at times (for example an interviewee told me I had asked a "not very 
good" question), I- as a researcher - found the situation useful. I wanted interviewees to 
feel able to guide the interview and for the situation to be as comfortable and naturalistic as 
possible. The expert interviews were in this way something of a contrast to the other 
informal interviews I carried out at the Dana Centre. Here the balance of power was broadly 
with me and participants, apparently under the impression that I worked for the Dana 
Centre or was involved in running the event (contrary to my self-introduction), would 
frequently seem to emphasise their positive experiences over their negative ones (while still 
being prepared to discuss these). 
All of this convinced me that interviewing is a delicate and situated practice. In particular, it 
cannot be regarded as providing the 'truth' of a situation or even of participants' 
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experiences of that situation. My interviews provide us with particular stories told in 
particular places, and this context-dependence is essential when interpreting and analysing 
the data from them. 
The messiness of the research process 
Part of the usefulness of this kind of 'natural history' section, I believe, is that it allows a 
space which acknowledges the contingency of research -a place to note the messiness of 
the process in contrast to the inevitable smoothness of the main content of the chapter. 
There were many factors - for the most part formally unacknowledged - which affected 
how I carried out this research. In practice, for example, the two phases of research 
described above overlapped at least in part. I have already mentioned difficulties in 
recruitment for interviews (meaning that I had to work with what I had, rather than an 
`ideal' set of groups); similar pressures in access to events also occurred. The fact that I had 
contacts at the Science Museum inevitably shaped my choice of the Dana Centre as a 
research site. Subconsciously I will also have made decisions which affected the data I 
collected: the choice of which participants to approach during a Dana Centre event; how to 
gauge my involvement in the group interviews; which events to study. 
Noting these factors is not to compose a list of 'what went wrong'. Such accidents and 
contingencies are inevitable in research; the point is rather to acknowledge that they 
happened and to step away from the idea of a perfect, 'value-free' data set. We work with 
the data we have, embracing its provisionality and being careful to keep the research 
'humble' (Law 2004) - though noting that it is still meaningful - because of it. 
Consent, interpretation, and the use of data 
Finally, a reflection on discourse analysis and informed consent. As I have discussed above, 
the ethical framework that I developed meant that I sought informed consent from all 
-90- 
interview participants. Whilst telling them that their words would be recorded and used in 
analysis, I did not, however, give them any details of how that analysis would be done or of 
the level of detail at which I would be looking. Were interviewees - for example the 
researchers involved in the phase I group interviews - to see some of the detailed, micro- 
analytical DA which I have performed, I am confident that they would be bemused but also, 
perhaps, feel misrepresented. My analysis is interpretative: perhaps they would not agree 
with my interpretation (of, for example, so-called deficit model language). 
It is hard to know whether this is a problem - whether the 'owners' of words should have 
some say in how they are interpreted and used - or whether it is an unavoidable part of 
research. Should the author or the analyst's interpretation be privileged? In this research I 
have focussed on the analyst's voice - my own. Whilst I would not wish to change this, in 
the future I would consider working more closely with the groups under study in order to 
gain some feedback. In the past scientists have complained that studiers of science have 
misunderstood and misinterpreted them (see Waterton et al 2001); a closer relationship 
throughout the research process could only be productive for all involved. 
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Chapter 4 
Complexity and contradiction: science and 
the public in scientists' talk 
So far, I have introduced this study, examined background literature, and explored the 
methodological and theoretical frameworks I will be using. I turn now to examine the key 
findings from my data, starting by focussing on results from the phase I fieldwork (group 
discussions with scientists and engineers). As discussed, this research is interested in what 
Jean-Marc Levy-Leblond has called "the understanding of the public by scientists" 
(1992: 20). In particular I am interested in their use of the 'deficit model': one question I 
have suggested as important for this research to answer is whether scientists and engineers 
are as homogenous in their use of this model of the public as some literature might suggest 
(p. 17). Is the deficit model as strong a discourse in the talk of scientists as it seems to be in 
the (often unspoken) rhetoric of policy and practice? 
The answers to these questions discussed in this chapter are based on data from group 
discussions held with seven different research groups. Using this data I will argue against 
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homogeneity in scientific talk: my key point is that, though 'deficit' discourses certainly 
appear, they are intermingled with other, more complex, models of publics. In contrast to 
some previous studies in this area (Cook et al 2004; Frewer et al 2003) 1 will seek to 
highlight the sophistication of scientific talk - while still acknowledging the power of 
dominant deficit discourses to problematise the public and protect science. 
This chapter therefore starts by surveying talk about the public in the group discussions. I 
identify a range of 'deficit' discourses which can be compared to accounts of the deficit 
model in the literature, and reconstruct an "ideal-type' deficit model from my own data. I 
then move on to discuss more complex competing discourses of the public; as, for example, 
active, knowledgeable, or diverse. Talk about the public frequently co-constructs science: I 
therefore move on to discuss the ways in which science is constructed in this data and how 
its boundaries are policed. I also briefly mention the importance of 'the media' as a theme in 
this kind of talk, and suggest some reasons for this. In my discussions of constructions of 
the public and science I will argue strongly that there is diversity and flexibility in scientists' 
use of these, and I finish this section of my analysis by exploring the importance of context, 
on a macro and micro level, in the use of these diverse constructions. Finally, I seek to draw 
together my analysis by suggesting that the different discourses drawn upon might be 
summed up in terms of identification or separation between science and its publics. 
Deficit and diversity: "the public' in scientists' talk 
As I note above, the first, key, point to make is that my findings indicate that there is 
indeed diversity in how scientists talk about the public. There is not one smooth narrative - 
such as the deficit model - which dominates. Indeed, this diversity at times threatened to 
overwhelm the data and to produce a sense of irreducible chaos and complexity. A further 
key point is that the way in which talk about the public appears is also not neat or smooth. 
It can be hard to reconstruct coherent narratives given that sudden 'switches' from one 
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discourse to another can occur throughout the groups, within the talk of a single individual, 
and even within a single turn. In practice, competing discourses are intermingled and 
particular 'stories' of the public are not easy to untwine and reconstruct. However, there are 
certain themes and ideas which are frequently repeated and which can be reconstructed 
from their traces in scientific talk. This process of reconstruction is perhaps similar to that 
performed both by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) in their discussion of'repertoires', and to 
Michael's (1991) creation of an `ideal type' (cf. also Koro-Ljungberg and Tirri 2002): not all 
aspects of a particular discourse will be present at all times, but by examining fragments 
and traces in the talk under study we can identify and explore key features of the 
discourses drawn on. 
I first wish to consider a complex of negative portrayals of 'the public' which has obvious 
similarities to the canonical deficit model (see, for example, Irwin and Wynne 1996). 
The public are impressionable/passive 
Passivity as a characteristic of the public is linked to the concept of one-way communication 
and a simple "filling up' with scientific facts, and is therefore also related to fears of the 
impact of the media upon an impressionable public. This concept of passivity or 
impressionability is by far the most frequently occurring description of the public, indicating 
that it is an easily accessible and important discourse within scientific culture. Such concepts 
are demonstrated in the quotes below: 
Dm: So I think that I think that they are respectful I think that that actually I think that 
the public are unbelievably () blindly trusting in what () a- a scientist would say. 
(Group 1) 
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I: Do you think the public are quite accepting of what (. ) science there is in the media. 
Stf: Yes. I think they take- I think they take it as gospel, that what's in there is true. And 
I think it's really scary, that they do... 
(Group 6) 
Here the public are unquestioningly accepting, both of the media and what scientists 
themselves tell them. They demonstrate no discernment and are, in fact, the classic 'empty 
vessel' which absorbs what it is given. And as the final quote from Stf indicates, this 
frequently links to discourses of the media and of the danger of this passivity. 
The public are not critical 
Linked to passivity is the concept of the public as uncritical, often expressed very directly: 
Tm:... So yeah I think people unfortunately take too much () uncritically. 
(Group 3) 
Dm:... If one scientist says one thing and another scientist said another thing, so people 
don't have (. ) a deep understanding of the process of science such that they can 
critically analyse (. ) what anybody said. But if everybody's agreed (. ) if scientists as a- 
have consensus on something people will definitely go with that, but if there's a (. ) 
difference of opinion the public has no way to:: er (. ) critically a- analyse wh-what that 
means at all. Which is- you know that's because eff-effectively (. ) they're not scientists 
they don't actually understand the process that deeply... 
(Group 1) 
This lack of critical ability or analysis, as Dm explains it, is linked directly to the fact that the 
public are not scientists. In some ways an extension of the construction of public passivity, 
this discourse points out something (important) that the public are lacking and which 
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science - as I will discuss later in more detail - is constructed as having. The quote from 
Dm also demonstrates a claim as to the result of the inability to critically analyse/discern: 
the public cannot cope with scientific disagreement or uncertainty. 
The public are ignorant 
Statements of public ignorance are found in my data, sometimes in the bluntest of terms: 
Gm:... it's like people are amazingly ignorant about medicine and- and biology and their 
own bodies and they would be better off if they knew a bit more, I think. 
(Group 1) 
Note that there is an implicit judgement within what Gm says: ignorance is not a neutral 
state but something which people would be "better off" without. (We might also note that 
ignorance is a passive position, of simply "not knowing', rather than an active decision to 
avoid certain kinds of knowledge; cf. Michael 1996. ) We also find ideas of a public deficit in 
knowledge of the process or culture of science, as well as of its content: 
Om:... I don't think they really have that much of an idea of what it actually means to be 
a scientist and we what we- (. ) what-what you what you do on a day to day basis. 
(Group 7) 
The public fear/blame/mistrust science 
There are a constellation of themes relating to the public having negative attitudes to 
science. While the idea of fear of science is a particularly strong one (in terms of times it is 
referenced), these themes are not clearly distinguished and appear to be interrelated, as 
well as being linked to ignorance. Thus we not only see references such as this: 
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Sf: I think science is seen as evil, and scary, and as () causing all the problems in the 
environment 
(Group 3) 
but also segments where the fear (or other negative attitude) is linked directly to a lack of 
knowledge or understanding: 
Hf:... a lot of people for example um () genetically modified crops or something like that, 
people don't really understand what they're all about, because () they- they're just 
scared of something, that they don't understand 
(Group 3) 
This chain of causation (ignorance leads to fear) seems to be a strong and coherent 
narrative. Thus we also see the converse expressed, that, as other authors have expressed 
(Turney 1998), 'to know science is to love it': 
Cf:... the more people know about science (. ) that- the more they know the more they'll 
support us I think- 
(Group 6) 
In segments such as these we therefore are given a picture of science as a good thing, 
while the public are problematised by their ignorance. 
A range of similar, less prevalent discourses also appear in the data, such as the public as 
'anti-science' or as readily misunderstanding scientific information; many of these, however, 
can be viewed as sub-categories of the main discourses described above. Taken together, 
we therefore have a strong discourse made up of a network of negative characteristics: the 
public are passive, uncritical, ignorant, and have a wrong attitude towards science. In 
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addition, many of the quotes given above will have demonstrated a coherence between 
these characteristics. The different themes often colocate and are linked together in talk. In 
particular, it seems that the passivity/ignorance/uncritical themes are linked to and colocate 
with the fear/blame/distrust ones: 
Tm: ... because they're so ignorant of what's going on () it's very easy to induce fear and 
loathing and suspicion and hatred and all of those kind of things- 
(Group 3) 
Mm: Er:: some- some people I-I I would say are:: (. ) scared of what they don't 
understand 
(Group 4) 
Taking, as an example, Tm's quote above, we can see that ideas of ignorance, passivity 
(through the easy 'induction' of particular emotions) and fear/hatred of science are all 
present in his talk and presented as interlinked. From this and the rest of the discussion 
above we might reconstruct an 'ideal-type' narrative which both constructs the public and 
defines the causality behind its attitude to science. This reconstructed narrative would go 
something as follows: 
The public are passive and ignorant. They can be easily manipulated and fear what they 
don't understand. This leads to a negative attitude towards science. 14 
Note the implied references to other narratives within this: the concept of manipulation, for 
example, refers to a manipulator of some kind, details of which are not explicitly included 
within this reconstructed narrative. Such references suggest coherences and links on a 
14 I work on the assumption here that being uncritical is a sub-factor of passivity. Passivity, ignorance and lack of 
critical ability are all linked together as 'causes', while negative attitudes (fear/blame/distrust etc) are all effects. 
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larger scale, and that there are themes which transcend particular discourses. It also 
suggests that such reconstructed ideal-types are always to some extent simplifications of 
the actual use of discourse. They may be useful tools for summing up key stories used in 
talk, but they will always ignore certain aspects of those stories. 
What are some of the implications of the prevalence of this kind of talk about the public? As 
I have noted, it presents an essentially negative picture of the public, problematising them 
in their relations with science. Science itself is untouched and unconsidered. Interestingly, 
however, the concepts of passivity and manipulation allow something of a get-out clause 
from a portrayal of a morally culpable public. There is little sense of blame for their 
attitudes; rather they are viewed as helpless, at the mercy of more powerful others. They 
are morally neutral rather than malevolent. This narrative thus enables scientists to 
problematise publics without blaming them; to act to protect science from scrutiny while not 
alienating or demonising the public. (This also, of course, links in to the hints at a 
'manipulator' implied in our reconstructed narrative. ) 
This discourse also acts to maintain science's authority over the public. By problematising 
and presenting them as ignorant, the public are shorn of any ability to contribute to science 
or to control it: within this narrative, only scientific knowledge is valid knowledge. In 
addition, the discourse gives science explanatory power. The causal chain it presents - that 
ignorance leads to a bad attitude towards science - enables scientists to explain any 
science-society problems as being entirely due to an ignorant public. If the public are not 
blamed within this discourse, then science certainly isn't either; there is no sense that 
science could ever be culpable. Ultimately, then, this'discourse of deficit' acts to maintain 
existing power inequalities between science and its publics and to shore up scientific 
authority. 
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The deficit model and related negative characterisations of the public are, it seems, present 
in scientists' talk. However, more complex models of publics also appear and while these 
are primarily minority discourses, compared to the deficit model, some appear to be 
accessible and frequently used. Key themes are described below. 
The public are differentiated 
The public as diverse, rather than homogeneous, appears to be one of the key ways in 
which it is constructed by scientists and engineers. This is a strong theme which appears 
frequently, suggesting that it is easily accessible within the cultures under study. 
Gm:... so there's a difference between communicating to the absolute general public 
the man in the street, which is always going to be extremely hard, um (. ) maybe a 
slightly more practical angle would be to be able to (. ) communicate to the (kind of) 
the generally quite well educated person who wasn't a scientist... 
(Group 1) 
Am:... not everyone but you know some people are slightly mistrustful of () research... 
(Group 2) 
As the quotes above suggest, this differentiation often occurs within the context of talking 
about communication - audiences, as a type of public, are differentiated on various grounds 
(for example age, educational background, or interest in science). 
This differentiation is a particularly key point given that the homogeneity of the public, and 
its ensuing description as an undifferentiated mass, is an important part of the deficit model 
in canonical accounts. Thus the scientists and engineers in my study use at least one key 
discourse which is not only different from, but in disagreement with, the deficit model: 
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further evidence that scientists' talk does not only draw on this model of the public. Indeed, 
many interviewees explicitly rejected a model of a homogeneous public when it was 
presented to them, refusing to think in these simplistic terms and problematising the notion 
of a general public: 
Tm:... you know the general public isn't a single homogen- geneous entity either it has 
different people who behave in different kind of ways and do different things. 
(Group 3) 
We might note here similarities with Burningham et al's (2007) findings: though interested 
in a rather different population (industry scientists and managers) they also find 
acknowledgements of the plurality of publics and, at times, problematisations of the notion 
of 'the general public'. However, we also continue to find cases of the public as 
homogeneous mass in the deficit model tradition: some talk does refer to'the public' as a 
body which is identical in experience and ability. Such statements occur not infrequently, 
but they are balanced by talk of differentiated publics. Thus there is diversity in the use of 
the homogeneous/differentiated construction; diversity which may, in fact, occur within the 
talk of one individual. Take, for example, Tm within Group 3. As quoted above, he at one 
point problematises the concept of the general public by pointing out that it is not 
homogeneous. At another point in the interview, however, he is happy to use this concept 
to argue that "the public" has a wrong conception of science: 
Tm:... I think there's a perception in the public you know the fear bit of that is that 
there's some kind of conspiracy (some laughter) that (. ) you know- we are trying to 
make them do something which is not in their best interest... 
(Group 3) 
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Discourses of both 'the public' and 'publics' are present, therefore, and appear to be used 
by the same individuals at different points in discussion. 
The public are powerful 
This discourse is ambiguous rather than obviously positive or negative in its portrayal of the 
public. It constructs it as powerful, and in particular as having power over science: we 
might contrast this, perhaps, to the implied weakness of the discourses of passivity and 
impressionability that we have examined. Members of Group 3, for example, saw their 
entire subject as coming into being because of public pressure: 
Tm: Well to a certain extent it [the field] is a response to the political pressure of the (. ) 
early nineties, that () you know- that the issue- the issues around the environment you 
know er came up, and (. ) just as there is a- just as there is a green political movement, 
there's a green scientific movement () and (. ) so it's part of the same () debate. 
(Group 3) 
While this group claimed to view public power in a positive light, others were more 
equivocal. That the government would "bow to demands" (group 4) or that research could 
be "shut down" (group 5) were seen as negative things. There were, however, also a range 
of comments on how the public could be involved in science, in which a public role in 
science policy was viewed as a positive and even necessary thing: 
Om: I think they [the public] should have a voice. Maybe not-ma- well (. ) most of the 
research should be funded from taxpayers' money so it's (. ) yeah it's only right that they 
should be (. ) have a say in what- what it gets spent on. 
(Group 7) 
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Whilst there is therefore diversity in these discourses of public role in science, it is 
noticeable that in those cases where public involvement is - apparently - welcomed, there 
are generally limits placed around it: 
Am:... Public (in a sense) has to (. ) have some say in er what we don't wanna go this 
way we don't want to go that way but to then (. ) make that decision they need to 
actually have some (. ) general education to make an informed decision. 
(Group 5) 
Here Am acknowledges a need for a public role in science policy; he then, however, limits 
and modifies this statement by saying that they need to be able to make an "informed" 
decision. Thus decision-making is on science's own terms: technical knowledge is required 
and publics have to 'go along' with many of science's framing beliefs. These requirements 
and the sense of public participation being on science's terms do, of course, have many 
similarities with critical analyses of "dialogue' (Irwin 2001; Wynne 2002; 2005) and lead us 
back to both models of the public as deficient and to a naturalised view of science's framing 
assumptions. 
The Dublic as active and knowledgeable 
Discourses of the public as active - rather than as passive - in finding and using scientific 
knowledge and as a site of useful knowledge also appear, in contrast to the'public as 
passive' discourse of the deficit model. These more complex narratives may be broken down 
further: we find talk about the activeness of the public/publics; talk about the expertise of 
specific publics; and talk relating to useful lay knowledge of 'the (general) public'. 
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Public activity and agency is primarily related to a seeking out of or engagement with 
scientific information. In the language used this agency is, however, constructed as the 
exception rather than the norm. 
Lf:... there are people who- who don't have a particular science background but through 
interest or through it- (. ) there being an effect on them like say a family member 
affected by a disease will go out, and actually educate themselves about the topic and 
they can often have some quite specific questions... 
(Group 2) 
In Lf's quote some kind of motivation beyond the norm is required for agency to develop: a 
particular interest in science or a personal effect of science on their lives. The context is the 
discussion of a public rather than the public. But, given this motivation, individuals can be 
active both in gathering scientific knowledge ('educating' themselves) and in processing and 
responding to it (having "specific questions"). In this and similar quotes we thus see public 
agency acknowledged but limited to certain situations, groups or times. Similarly, narratives 
of lay knowledge are frequently limited to particular publics with ownership of what is 
viewed as relevant expertise to the science involved: 
Pf: Um:: you need (. ) pe- you nee- er to identify like (. ) interesting research questions 
you nee: d to talk to people that kno: w about the local area 
(Group 7) 
There is a strong sense of 'lay expertise' in Pf's comment, which argues that for her science 
to be most effective she needs input from publics. But the input is not general or random; 
rather, the expertise is not something that anyone can provide but derives from particular 
experiences or "local" knowledge (cf. Wynne 1992b). 
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However, we also find talk about the public which depicts them as generally having valuable 
knowledge in the form of perspective. This form of expertise is derived specifically from 
their being outside of science: 
Af:... you know the general public or laypeople (. ) are quite good at saying well why 
can't- y can't you do that ... they're quite good at taking a different perspective on 
things. So I think it's very valuable to have people of different training (. ) involved. 
(Group 2) 
Here, then, useful expertise is not limited to particular sub-populations but applies to 
everyone - to, in fact, "the general public". These three narratives of active and 
knowledgeable publics echo some critical literature on publics (Irwin 1995a; Layton et al 
1993; Wynne 1992b) which similarly differentiates different publics and different types of 
knowledge. Whilst such talk remains in the minority, it is present in scientists' language as 
competing discourses to the deficit model (and in particular its portrayal of the public as 
passive and ignorant). Its presence should encourage us that scientists"sociological naivety' 
is just one of a repertoire of approaches to the public. 
I have discussed the discourses above within two main categories - negative depictions 
with links to the "deficit model', and more positive and sociologically complex models with 
links to critical descriptions of publics. But not all talk about the public fits so well into these 
kinds of categories. To conclude I will discuss a range of discourses which are ambiguous in 
how they present publics, or so unstable that they can be used to create both positive and 
negative effects. Their (frequent) use suggests again the complexity of scientific talk and 
culture: there is not simply a two-way repertoire of positive and negative discourses of the 
public, but rather an entire spectrum of alternative ways of conceptualising publics. Their 
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range suggests that speakers can use a 'pick and mix' approach, using whichever types of 
discourse that are appropriate at the time. 
The public are/are not interested in science 
Discourses of public interest in science are so closely intertwined within the data (in the 
opposing forms the public are interested in science' and 'the public are not interested in 
science') that they have to be analysed together rather than as two separate narratives, if 
we are not to impose a false consistency on the data. Thus there are depictions of the 
public as not interested in science: a strong discourse and an image of the public that is 
frequently cited, but a highly unstable one. In other words, the 'public are uninterested' 
discourse is often modified, qualified or contradicted within a turn, and appears in its 'pure' 
form only relatively rarely. There are, for example, few cases where scientists state or imply 
that the public are categorically uninterested in all forms of science at all times. Indeed, the 
'public are uninterested' discourse often appears in conjunction with its opposite, the 'public 
are interested' discourse; with the two being held together in tension. The following 
segment, from Group 5, gives a taste of the way in which this 'public are uninterested' 
discourse is explained and modified: 
Dm:... physics is (not) () a very glamorous subject, because I:: tell people when I meet 
them I am a physicist, most people think oh god! (laughter) I did that- I did that at 
school and it was so- so difficult like I couldn't do it ... people don't really develop such 
an interest for it, because it's all very dry, unless you are really into maths and physics 
for some reason. But it's not for the general people, they just sit there and try to get 
through everything it's very difficult and a lot of (people don't like to do it), so we have 
to try and um sell it (. ) to the people, persuade them that it is interesting, they might 
want to give it a try and see if they like it- 
(Group 5) 
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Dm limits what he is saying to physics (implying that the case for other sciences might be 
different), he relates uninterest to bad experiences to school, and, while he acknowledges 
that many people don't "develop. .. an interest 
for" physics, he also argues that physicists 
have to try to "sell" their subject and that they may, through persuasion, convert uninterest 
into interest. Thus he manages to acknowledge a lack of interest from the public without 
blaming or problematising either science (as physics) or the public. Similarly, Af - in the 
quote below - argues that public uninterest is not 'real', but due to a lack of understanding 
of the relevance of science. It is not, therefore, that science is intrinsically uninteresting, but 
rather that the public require obvious relevance to "everyday life" in order to be interested. 
Af: But I- I also think that it's not that they're- they appear not interested () um, or I 
think they appear not interested, but probably because they don't actually see the 
relevance between (. ) research and (. ) everyday life. 
(Group 2) 
The'public are interested' discourse, then, frequently appears in combination with the 
opposing 'public are not interested' narrative. In particular there is one overwhelming 
modification of this narrative, which is that the public are interested in science primarily or 
only as it relates to them. Whilst there are expressions of a more general interest in science, 
these tend to be limited to particular subsections of the public: 
Dm: I would think that some- I think that some people- yeah some people are genuinely 
interested in science for its own sake 
(Group 1) 
Overwhelmingly, however, when scientists talk about public interest in science, the interest 
is modified to be in terms of personal relevance - the'what does it mean for me? ' factor. 
- 107 - 
So, for example, life sciences are seen as of more interest than what one interviewee called 
the more "mundane" aspects of science like "proper chemistry and physics" (group 2). 
Am: I think in a way I dunno to some extent yeah I think biology is seen as a bit more of 
a exciting science it's a bit easier to (. ) because you're (generally) talking about some 
things directly affecting the human body it's bringing it back to the disease kind of state- 
people are going to be much more in tuned into that 
(Group 2) 
Narratives of public interest in science, then, are extremely flexible: they can be used to 
depict the public as anywhere along a spectrum from profound interest to profound 
uninterest. 
The public as other/the public as self 
A further unstable discourse concerns the relation of 'public' and of science to self. In 
reviewing literature relating to science and identity, I noted that this is a complex but 
largely unexplored area, in particular with regard to how scientists negotiate their dual roles 
as members of 'the public' and of 'science'. Some research, however, suggests that they can 
switch between different roles as a rhetorical resource (Michael and Birke 1994a; 1994b). 
Similarly, my data shows scientists both identifying with and removing themselves from the 
public. In this context, however, it seems that the 'public as other' discourse is particularly 
strong. Much 'deficit model' language - or indeed any generalising statements about the 
public - implicitly assumes a separation between scientists and the public, as the speaker 
positions themselves as outside the public in order to comment on it: 
Dm: I think scientists have probably had a bad press with certainly things on BSE, and 
certain other er:: (. ) scares and scandals over the last few years so I think that (. ) the 
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public tend to distrust scientists. 
(Group 2) 
Here the separation between scientists and the public is clear: "the public... distrust 
scientists". In contrast, however, there are also times where speakers class scientists and 
the public together, in the same category, and where scientist/public roles are seen to 
overlap. There are also a limited number of occasions where science is classed as'Other'; 
where the speaker disassociates themself from science or reflects on their dual role: 
Lf: I think it's interesting that there's- there's this perception of that there are scientists 
and there's general public and these are two completely separate entities (laughter) and 
there's no interaction at all, but scientists are part of the general public as well. 
(Group 2) 
These discourses of identification appear particularly unstable within talk. It is worth 
studying a slightly longer stretch of discussion in order to see this, and to examine the 
functions of the identification/separation discourses as they are used: 
I: I wondered how you as individuals respond when science is in the news. 
(2.5) 
Kf: When it's anything other than biology we're generally a layperson I suppose so 
(laughs) It has to be- I suppose if you're saying biology and even (. ) that gets narrowed 
down to ecology (for a lot of us! ) (laughing) so I mean (. ) there's a- obviously if you just 
say science that's (. ) a broader field where most of it we're laypeople too, if you see 
what I mean (laughs) 
I: And so would you say you- you respond in the same way as- as the general public? 
Tm: I think probably not. Well it depends what-what the general public is but (. ) because 
(. ) of- of the experience that we've got how some of our stuff is portrayed, I would 
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imagine that we're more sceptical. 
Several: Mmmm 
(Group 7) 
The initial question draws forth a statement from Kf which positions the group alongside 
laypeople, in terms of their response to science in the public domain in which they have no 
expertise. Here, then, they are identified with the public and science is constructed as a 
matter of knowledge: scientists are laypeople for areas of science which they have no 
knowledge of. Scientific expertise is highly specialised and science is differentiated - rather 
than being a scientist you would, in effect, be an ecologist or a physicist. In the next turn 
the interviewer clarifies this with a question. Tm responds - with agreement from others in 
the group - by rejecting the interviewer's restatement and arguing that scientists, whatever 
their area of expertise, will in fact be different to laypeople in their responses to science. 
They have experience that will make them more "sceptical". 
A similar process of renegotiation of statements of identification occurs in other groups. 
Scientists are differentiated from the public by being "a bit more cautious, a bit more 
critical" (Group 2). This, of course, relates to the deficit model discourse that we have 
already seen, which constructs the public as'uncritical' - in comparison, it seems, with a 
critical science. Thus identification discourses appear to be ultimately limited: if the 
identification becomes too complete, and the scientist likely to be viewed as 
indistinguishable from a layperson, then the discourse collapses and the distinction is 
reaffirmed. Science is ultimately kept separate by means of a critical/uncritical boundary. 
It appears, then, that we cannot fully understand talk about the public without also 
considering that about science: the two things are frequently co-constructed (as many of 
the extracts above will have indicated). Before moving on to consider in more detail science 
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within the group interview talk, however, I want to briefly summarise what we have seen 
about the ways in which the public is constructed. My key point is that there is diversity in 
these constructions: we certainly find a complex of negative discourses (passivity, 
ignorance, lack of critical ability) which link to the deficit model of PUS literature, but we 
also see publics characterised in ways which are similar to critical authors' own descriptions 
of them (activity, knowledge, diversity). 'Sociological naivety', then, is not the only 
repertoire available to scientists. In addition we have seen flexibility, particularly in 
discourses relating to public interest in science and in the negotiation of science/public/self 
divides. Talk about publics does not involve a choice between just two repertoires, deficit or 
'complex', but rather is constantly modified, negotiated and switched to create a spectrum 
of different kinds of depictions. 
Policing the boundaries of science: science in scientists' talk 
Scientific constructions of science were not a major focus of this research, and the group 
interview discussion questions were not designed to specifically draw forth talk around this. 
As I note above, however, science was almost inevitably co-constructed along with the 
public, albeit in ways that were perhaps more amorphous and unstructured. There was also 
less talk around science - due, arguably, to the fact that the interviews did not encourage 
reflection around this topic. However, it is also possible that discourses of science are 
generally less accessible to scientists than other, more strongly formed and readily available 
narratives (such as the deficit model of the public). The limited amount of talk, and rather 
disparate nature of the constructions, suggest that narratives of science are not a strong 
theme within scientific cultures. In addition we might note that both talk about science and 
- at times - talk about the public is frequently marked by hesitations, hedges and slow 
responses. I would suggest that such hesitations and delays in talk implies that some, at 
least, of these discourses are inaccessible and poorly formed. This point can perhaps be 
made most strongly by comparing the occurrence of these narratives of science with those 
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of the media (also not a focus of the interviews and, indeed, a topic that was at times 
actively avoided by the interviewer). Talk about the media - as I will discuss briefly later - 
is frequent, strongly coherent, and falls into very particular narratives and patterns. In 
contrast, talk about science is far less coherent, suggesting, as I have said, that discourses 
of science are less accessible and formed than those of the media or the public. 
Given these overall patterns there are also some key ways in which science was 
constructed. I will discuss these themes briefly below. 
Science is differentiated 
Science, in scientists' and engineers' talk, is constructed as differentiated rather than 
homogeneous. While there are times when 'science' is discussed as a single category (in a 
way similar to discussion of 'the public'), more frequently scientists are keen to acknowledge 
variation within science. In terms of their own research, they describe themselves not as 
'scientists' but as specialists in a particular area: 
Elf: Um my group's kind of on the- () partly ecologists and partly kind of environment 
economicsy people conservation people. Simon's lot are mostly (. ) you're real biologists 
mostly aren't you? (laughter) 
(Group 7) 
Science was often differentiated not just in terms of disciplines or specialisations, but also 
by how interesting (or not) it was perceived to be: 
Km:... It's not- science is a very wide subject I mean (. ) there are interesting science 
there are boring science, even to scientists I think ... It's- it's not (. ) one single subject or 
one single class 
(Group 4) 
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Km differentiates science in terms of how interesting it is: he argues that, even for 
scientists, some parts of science are more interesting than others. This way of 
differentiating science links, of course, back to our previous discussion of public interest 
in science and the argument that'the public' are more interested in some (relevant) 
parts of science than others. 
Science is truth 
I also found a constellation of related themes constructing science as providing truth, 
helping people or society, and affecting everyone (and thus being important). The language 
used in this discourse is particularly interesting: constructing science as an ideology or 
complete belief system, it often becomes mystical or moralistic: 
Dm: Er:: yeah what- (. ) I mean what is mankind actually good at I mean who- what do 
we do like one of the best things we do is to understand (. ) er how things work and 
what nature is about and that is (. ) and communicating that makes people (. ) happy. 
(Group 1) 
Sf:... you know there is lies in the- in the scientific literature () you know we've read 
papers that are (. ) not true... 
(Group 3) 
Thus Dm's statement makes universalising claims about overarching purpose: science 
becomes a system for knowing "what nature is about" and brings fulfilment and happiness. 
Sf's talk of "lies" relates to the idea that science should produce truth, but uses strongly 
moralistic language to emphasise her point. This, and similar language, constructs science 
as ultimately important and as powerful. Failings (such as reporting things that are "not 
true") demand moral censure. 
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Bounding science: Science (and scientists) are critical, and other boundaries 
The narrative of science as critical does, of course, relate closely to discourses of the public 
which I have already discussed. In particular it is constructed alongside discourses of the 
public as uncritical. These narratives are therefore linked and - given that they frequently 
colocate - seem to gain meaning from each other: science is critical because the public is 
not. Each entity is understood by its opposition to the other. 
Am: I think generally I'd say we were probably a bit more cautious a bit more critical. 
(Group 2) 
Dom: I think (. ) scientists are much more likely to be critical of what they hear, rather 
than just taking what they're told (on face value. ) ... Whereas (I think the public) will 
just (. ) like accept what they've discovered as (. ) the truth. 
(Group 5) 
While the word 'critical' seems to be particularly key for defining and bounding science and 
non-science, there is also a network of related terms within this "science is critical' 
discourse. Such concepts include being sceptical, questioning, analytical, and being able to 
discern good and bad information: 
Sf:... I think yeah- I think you- as a scientist you're- you're generally just going to- to 
question things more because it's what we're supposed to do. 
(Group 3) 
The critical/uncritical boundary is, then, a key way that scientists can do boundary work: 
they control the boundaries of science by stating that science is a critical enterprise and that 
the public are uncritical, and therefore of necessity as outside of science. Alongside this 
coherent story of the science/non-science divide there are also, however, a mass of other 
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narratives about what makes science different. These discourses are less structured and 
developed, but may also be used to police the borders of science. Interestingly, there is 
considerable diversity and at times contradiction within this kind of talk. The main themes of 
these further discourses of science are below. 
Access to information bounds science 
Within this type of talk it is that scientists have access to, or already know, scientific 
information which sets them apart as belonging to "science'. This discourse is commonly 
used in conjunction with discourses of science as permeable, or open, or of publics as part 
of science: publics, it is argued, now have increasing access to scientific information and 
therefore can be part of science in terms of knowing the "real facts". 
Am:... you know it comes back to that whole kind of like scientists in their ivory tower 
thing, and I don't know how much that's true anymore, but that's like breaking 
down, gradually, just because there's more information available, more interaction with (. ) 
people... 
(Group 2) 
Process bounds science 
Other talk bounds science by giving only scientists access to, or understanding of, a special 
"scientific process". The details of this are frequently omitted but it can be linked to 
discourses of science as critical, and is viewed as different to knowledge of scientific 
information or facts and, therefore, differs from and to some extent contradicts the 
bounding discourse above. 
Dm: Well you- cos I mean lets face it science degree you don't learn that much science 
you sort of like () learn some facts. 
Gm: Cos you don't actually do the science. 
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If: [Mmmm 
Dm: [Yeah you don't actually learn about (. ) science () the process and what it means 
and how we came to those facts- 
Gm: Hopefully you would do. 
Dm: You might do a bit. But you mainly learn facts. 
(Group 1) 
As these comments from Group 1 demonstrate, there is a linked concept that knowledge of 
this process relies on direct experience: it cannot be taught but is something you have to 
"do" (see Gm in turn two). Science is thus a practical, material and experiential process and, 
at least within this stretch of talk, is actually notabout learning "facts". 
Language bounds science 
There is a further discourse which constructs science as being about language and which 
therefore excludes those who are not familiar with or proficient in this language: 
Tm:... most of the time- most of the time on most subjects we have no more expertise 
than () the- the non-scientists in the public, except perhaps we're familiar with the 
language 
(Group 3) 
These discourses are merely the primary ways of doing this kind of boundary work: there 
are, in the data, a number of other ways of describing science by excluding non-scientists 
(including the experience of doing science, as well as knowledge of the culture of science, 
and training). The main point I would like to make here, however, is not to emphasise any 
of these bounding discourses themselves but rather their diversity. While bounding science 
is clearly an important linguistic process, there is not one strong narrative of how this 
should be done. Scientific talk, while generally coherent in terms of the need to exclude 
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others from 'science', is not coherent in how this exclusion should be performed, and there 
are a variety of ways of defining science - of talking about what science is - which limit 
inclusion. While these bounding discourses are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they do 
not always sit easily with each other - the information and process discourses described 
above being examples of this. This diversity and disjunction suggests that scientists have 
access to a repertoire of bounding discourses and, again, that context is important in which 
one they choose. 
Communication as protecting science 
We might also note here that, in addition to work being done in talk about science to 
protect science's borders, communication is also constructed in such a way as to act to 
protect science. Here the bounds of science's control are expanded so as to include the 
domain of science communication. This is demonstrated most strongly in talk which 
discusses the importance of expertise in communication: 
Saf:... the stuff that people get a lot through the media it's all- (. ) it's not done by () 
experts it can be a bit misleading... 
(Group 6) 
Only technical experts, it seems, should be allowed to communicate technical information, 
lest it be "misleading". Public communication is implicitly constructed as being about 
'correct' facts and information and thus science is given authority over it; non-experts are 
excluded from the communication process. 
Bound ina/DermeabiIity: disjunctions in whether science is bounded 
I have noted above that scientific talk generally excludes others from science. While 
boundary work is clearly important in talk about science there are, however, times when 
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science is constructed as open and its boundaries as permeable. Similarly to discourses of 
identification and separation with the public, then, there appears to be flexibility in whether 
boundary work is performed or not. At times the boundaries around science are dissolved so 
that non-scientists can enter into and participate in science: 
Om:... well a lot of the (. ) data that people use for um looking at bird populations is 
collected by (. ) non-scientists, they're- they're enthusiasts I spose they're-they're 
birdwatchers. But they-they're not you know paid research scientists or anything but 
they contribute (. ) er records er of well it's not just birds it's other animals as well but- 
and plants. 
(Group 7) 
Similarly, science can be constructed as continuous with other domains: here the 
differences between science and non-science are collapsed so that science - or some 
particular aspect of it - is viewed as the same as another part of society: 
Tm:... You know it's (. ) for (. ) it's for people to be empowered to be able to make those 
decisions and you know here we are today on, you know fifth of May, we're making 
decisions about all sorts of stuff, the future of the economy, I've just done that I'm not 
an economist, erm you know the future of peace in the world you know there are all 
sorts of decisions that are being made where- where (2) you know (. ) you're not, 
technically expert in the field but you- those things people feel that they can make their 
decisions and they can have opinions but I think quite often when it gets to the scientific 
side people just retreat from it, and they just feel that they have no right to have an 
opinion... 
(Group 3) 
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Tm is talking about engagement in the political process by voting. Speaking on the day of a 
general election, he argues that people constantly make decisions where they have no 
technical expertise and that the case for science should be no different. Science, as an 
expert domain, is therefore conflated into other expert domains such as economics or 
foreign policy: these areas, as Tm describes them, share the same essential characteristics 
with regard to public opinion on and engagement with them. Science loses - for this 
segment of discourse - its essential property of 'different' and becomes rather'the same' as 
another domain. 
Of course, at times the opposite linguistic trick is also performed. As well as the bounding 
discourses described above, there are cases where science is compared with other domains 
of society and is constructed as different to them: 
Gm:... You see I think there's a () there's a problem that something like a debate about 
economics and how much tax and how much you spend and this kind of thing, there are 
going to be people who are experts in that and have (. ) more opinions because they're 
experts but it is also something that anyone can engage with, um the question of 
whether (. ) um (. ) whether you should have the triple vaccine or not () you-you- it's not 
something where everyone's opinion is equally valid... 
(Group 1) 
Interestingly, Gm uses one of the same examples as Tm - that of economics - but comes to 
the opposite conclusion: science is different. He argues that science has a different kind of 
expertise to other domains, and therefore that this expertise is required in order to have a 
"valid" opinion on science. 
These discourses - of science as bounded and different, and science as continuous with 
other domains - appear to be unstable in the same way that some other discourses I have 
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discussed are. Speakers can switch between them rapidly, and they frequently colocate with 
each other. 
Science as subjective 
The discourses of science I have discussed so far largely present science as an 
unproblematic entity: it is diverse but important, straightforwardly provides "truth', and is 
most frequently bounded from the rest of society. There are, however, hints of another 
discourse of science, one that constructs it as subjective and which is more willing to 
problematise it. At times scientists' talk contains constructions of science as competitive (as 
in the extract below), non progressive or subjective: 
Am:... I think Lola's right, I think a lot of- because a lot of scientists are a bit (laughs) 
we're always competing for funding and like you know getting up one above the other 
and stuff so you need () just regular people there to kind of like (. ) keep it all on the 
same level you know... 
(Group 2) 
Scientists may also be problematised, particularly in terms of their ability to communicate: 
Dm: I think in the past people have become disinterested in science because scientists 
haven't been able to put it in across in a way that grabs their attention. 
(Group 2) 
However, this more reflective talk is comparatively rare within the data. It does not come 
close, for example, to sociologically complex discourses of the public, both in terms of 
frequency of occurrence and in coherence. Given that science was not the primary focus of 
the interviews, however, the fact that any such competing discourses appear is 
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encouraging, and suggests that further research may reveal more about these minor 
discourses. 
In sum, then, what can we say about the ways in which science is constructed? Firstly, most 
talk about science within these interviews is involved in various forms of boundary work. 
The ways in which science is constructed defines the nature of science (such as being 
critical) as a contrast to other domains (such as the public): talk simultaneously creates a 
character for science and polices its borders. This is not surprising, given the context: the 
discussions were around topics of communication and public reaction to science, areas 
where it is imperative for science to assert its separateness and authority. In addition, a 
further important point is that there is not, in fact, one strong narrative of science present 
in scientists' talk. We have seen that there are diverse ways in which science is constructed 
and that there are therefore different ways of bounding it. Rather than one key story of 
science - such as the Popperian ideal that Mulkay and Gilbert (1981) identify - being used, 
this data indicates that there are many narratives present, from science as truth to science 
as language. Scientists and engineers appear to have a repertoire of ways in which they can 
talk about their subject and affirm its separateness from the surrounding society - as, 
indeed, Gieryn's work on 'boundary work' (1999) would suggest. Finally, as with discourses 
of the public, we have also seen flexibility in discourses used. Just as the public may be 
described as interested or not interested in science, or as including or not including 
scientists, we have seen that science may be described as bounded or as continuous with 
society at different points in an interview. The key themes of complexity, contradiction and 
flexibility that we identified in talk about the public thus continue within talk about science. 
Constructing the media: a default discourse within scientific culture 
I have already noted that talk about the media, while not a focus of study and at times 
avoided in the interviews, is extremely common within this data. Indeed, discussion of the 
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media often colocates with other kinds of discourse and can be involved in the construction 
of the public or science. While this kind of discursive work is not my primary interest - 
especially given that scientists' opinions on the media are relatively well documented (see 
Hansen and Dickinson 1992; Hilgartner 1990; MORI 2000; Young and Matthews 2007) - 
given the theoretical stance that important issues should emerge from the interviews and 
transcripts themselves rather than being imposed by the researcher, this is clearly 
something that requires some consideration. 
The frequency of talk about the media - no other topic external to the main discussion 
points and unmentioned by the researcher is so common in the data - suggests that this 
discourse is readily accessible and common in scientific culture. The hesitations and slow 
responses which are characteristic of much of the talk about the public or science (implying 
that some, at least, of these discourses are inaccessible and poorly formed) do not appear 
within talk about the media, and depictions of the media are remarkably coherent. It 
appears that there is just one strong discourse of the media and that this is readily 
accessible. 
This discourse of the media is overwhelmingly negative. Media communication of science is 
constructed as inaccurate, superficial and misleading: it is, in fact, the previously unnamed 
'manipulator' of our deficit model discourse. Concerns about this are strong and - unlike 
much talk about the public - there is also a strong discourse of the media's moral culpability 
and of blame. While the public were viewed, in the deficit model, as passive and helpless 
and therefore not to blame for their wrong attitude towards science, the media are seen as 
holding moral responsibility. The following quotes give a taste of this kind of talk about the 
media: 
- 122 - 
Af: I do agree with Ian as well that it is the scientist's responsibility to project the 
importance of a particular finding, and to extract the relevant points, because otherwise 
if we don't do it, it'll be done by someone else in the media, and then you just get 
complete misrep-misrepresentation. 
(Group 2) 
Mm:... what depresses me (. ) is I think it's this dumbing down in there's things are never 
treated in any depth I think the public are:: (. ) it's assumed that the public are wanting 
entertainment only, and things are never therefore explained at any level that actually 
explains anything beyond something visually graphic... 
(Group 5) 
Clearly, even within these few quotes, there is a high degree of intertextuality within this 
discourse. I have already mentioned connections to constructions of the public; we also see 
boundary work being performed in the necessity - for Af, in the first extract - of it being 
experts who communicate. This media discourse is thus one which frames and enables 
other discourses to be expressed as they are: it explains and justifies many of the 
assumptions that we have already seen. 
It also, I would like to argue, could be viewed as a default discourse in scientific talk on 
communication. Its accessibility, coherence and strength means that when other discourses 
(such as of the public) are inaccessible it surfaces: it is what scientists find easiest (within 
these interview contexts) to talk about. As an example we could examine one typical stretch 
of talk, from Group 1: 
I: Well maybe if we just talk quickly about the last discussion point which is um just 
thinking about how you respond as an individual when science is in the news er and I'm 
thinking science that isn't your particular area of expertise, so physics, or chemistry. 
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Dm: Usually I'm extremely critical of it, er usually it's like- 
Jf: Yeah 
Dm: =oh no, what are they doing, where's the- usually I get irritated by the er 
overemphasis on style and lack of substance in anything that happening on- in most (. ) 
media outlet. Scientific American is a- different I-I do think that that's quite- that's 
alright. Although even that sometimes I think that they pick () things to write about that 
are (. ) playing to the (. ) the perceived wish of people to be- to get practical information 
rather than °(fundamental scientific) information. I mean definitely the Christmas 
lectures there's been a big swing towards much more style er the last one I think it was 
the last one where they they- it wasn't really a lecture they kept going to film footage of 
people doing stuff in Antarctica with animals and whatnot and it was () a big 
disappointment to see that they're even losing information in that. () I me- Robert 
Winston's programmes as well, comple- really gone downhill... 
(Group 1) 
The question, from the interviewer, is about personal responses to science. Dm responds by 
talking about having a critical attitude - something which Jm agrees with - but then moves 
quickly on to present his analysis of different kinds of science in the media, arguing, as a 
common theme, that it is too superficial. This discussion then continues for another 22 turns 
(involving the whole group), in a discussion of different programmes, sites and media of 
science communication. Talk about personal responses to science outside their discipline -a 
potentially dangerous area in terms of boundary work - is more costly to maintain than the 
more accessible discourse of assessing and critiquing media presentations of science. 
Talk about the media, then, is an important part of scientific discourse around public 
communication. It functions as a readily accessible discourse to'fill in' gaps in interview talk. 
More significantly, it could also be argued that it performs the function of being an easy 
receptacle of blame. Explicitly blaming the public - rather than merely implicitly 
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problematising them - for poor relations between science and society could isolate science 
and create unwanted connotations of it as arrogant. It is in science's interests to appease 
the public and the deficit model does, to some extent, function in this way by giving the 
public moral neutrality: they are an object of sympathy rather than blame. The media, as an 
amorphous institution, provide a place for that blame to go. They are constructed as 
powerful and blaming them is socially acceptable: the institution rather than individuals are 
named, blamed and shamed. Young and Matthews (2007), discussing similar findings of 
experts' negative portrayals of the media, argue something similar: that such portrayals are 
more to do with deficit understandings of publics than media coverage itself. Science and 
the public have a common enemy, and - it appears - discussion of this enemy is always 
near the surface in scientific culture. 15 
The importance of context 
So far I have argued for the complexity of scientific talk: that discourses of science and the 
public are not homogeneous but rather diverse, shifting, and frequently contradictory. While 
I have identified some of the key themes within these discourses - the presence of both 
deficit and other models of publics; science being bounded through being defined -I have 
up to this point said little about where and why these discourses occur. Are we to conclude 
that scientists and engineers are simply hopelessly inconsistent, saying one thing one 
moment and contradicting themselves the next? On the contrary, I want to argue that 
actually the talk within these interviews is carefully managed. In particular, the use of 
narratives seems to be highly dependent on context. Here I discuss the importance of 
context for the use of particular discourses on two levels: the macro (situating the interview 
as a whole) and the micro (examining the immediate context of talk). 
's And, indeed, in other cultures as well. Experience tells us that politicians, laypeople and even some sections of 
the media make use of this discourse. 
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The importance of context 1: The research group/department/discipline 
At a broad level the importance of context is clear in looking at the differences between the 
seven group interviews from which my data is drawn. Each interview is a social encounter 
and is situated in a very particular social space; not just in terms of the context of 
'interview/discussion' but also in the discipline, department and indeed in the individuals 
who compose the research group. The power of these factors in shaping the narratives 
drawn upon should not be underestimated. Group dynamics, carried over from previous 
encounters, can shape the way in which the discussion goes. Dominant individuals - such 
as, but not always, the group leader - can at times forcibly define the 'right' way of looking 
at things. And particular shared or group experiences can affect which discourses are 
chosen. 
These factors ensure that the data from each interview is extremely specific to that context. 
In analysis, each group has a unique 'feel' and contains a particular mix of discourses and 
ideologies. While there is always diversity and contradiction within group interview 
transcripts (no group, for example, makes use of just one discourse of the public), there are 
also contrasts between the different groups. Particular discourses dominate particular 
interviews or appear in varying frequencies in different sites. 
This is, of course, not entirely unexpected. Methodological theory (see p. 67; also Cameron 
2001) leads us to expect and to acknowledge the importance of context in interviews and 
the shifting, situated production of discourse. Similarly, Karen Knorr-Cetina (1999) has 
discussed the differences in 'epistemic cultures' between scientific disciplines. Her fieldwork 
within high energy physics and molecular biology laboratories detected deep-rooted 
variations in culture, imagery and epistemology. Based on such research we might suggest 
that there may well be key differences in conceptualisations of entities such as the public as 
well. Similarly, Waterton et al (2001) found differences in how scientists from different 
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disciplines talked about science (the focus of their study), as well as some variations 
between senior and junior, and male and female, scientists. In their report they argue that 
at least part of the cause of these differences between disciplines was "complicating factors" 
(p. 9) such as connections to policy (in the case of climate change scientists) or of a high 
media profile (in the cases of BSE and GM scientists). They find a mixture of empiricist and 
contingent repertoires (cf. Gilbert and Mulkay 1984), but argue that, in the case of GM 
scientists at least, "scientists, sensitised by media attention, seem to actively adjust the way 
that they employ concepts such as uncertainty and responsibility in their discourse" 
(Waterton et al 2001: 24). Thus they suggest that the public profile - how publicly 
controversial a subject is - of a scientific discipline affects the way that scientists construct 
science. 
I would like to suggest a related 'complicating factor' from my own study. This is that access 
to, and work with, lay publics seems to produce an increased use of more complex 
discourses of the public. Thus while competing and more complex discourses to the deficit 
model appear within all of the groups I studied, they appear to be particularly predominant 
in groups 2 and 7 (and, to a lesser extent, 6) - the groups which also had the most 
frequent and extensive contact with lay pubiics16. These groups extensively discuss lay 
expertise and the usefulness of this to science; importantly, this seems to be based on their 
own experiences: 
Pf: Um:: you need (. ) pe- you nee- er to identify like (. ) interesting research questions 
you nee: d to talk to people that kno: w about the local area I think like (. ) it's (. ) a 
matter of um () being in touch with the subject that you're studying, which is usually 
involves people that (. ) know a lot about different aspects of it. You go out and talk to 
16 Group 2 are funded in part by a medical research charity and, as a result, have frequent contact with interested 
laypeople; Group 6 also carry out medical research but have much lower contact with patient groups; Group 7 is a 
large, environmental science-based group with extensive experience of working and cooperating with publics 
internationally (through long term fieldwork in sites around the world). This compares to Groups 1,3,4 and 5, 
whose communication experience varied but whose research involved little or no contact with lay users. 
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them (. ) so like say your research topic is to do like some (. ) model on (. ) like some 
species that (1.5) you think is having an effect on something (laughs) and then you go 
to the place and you find out that actually you know (. ) that's not the major problem so 
you- if you talk to people they cause you to reprioritise your research questions a bit 
more. 
(Group 7) 
Dm: ... certainly from people's own perspective of their own illness (. ) you know they can 
put across um what it is like to be a Alzheimers'? person and things like that, or you 
know they can ask ermm:: questions which probably scientists have often overlooked or 
suggest things or different links, you know we often talk to these patient groups about 
Alzheimers and they suggest- you know they say well has anyone looked into this, you 
know () you know it can give you some clues. But also it can make you actually think 
about the actual structure the design of your experiments, you know is it actually 
worthwhile 
(Group 2) 
In the quotes above, Pf talks generally ('you'), but the detail of her description suggests a 
direct lifting from personal or group experience (and the next turn from another group 
member contains an affirmation of what she has said). Dm talks more specifically about the 
particular disease he works on: his discussion of lay knowledge includes not only 
experiential expertise ("what it is like to be Alzheimers person") but also a sense of 
perspective, insight and even value ("is it actually worthwhile"). In contrast, it appears that 
those groups who have had least contact with publics are the most strongly wedded to the 
deficit model, the deeply insular group 4 being the key example here. An engineering group, 
they had the least public communication experience and were often extremely negative 
towards the public - for example: 
17 Note that this disease name, along with all personal names transcribed, has been changed to protect the 
anonymity of the group. 
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Am:... If the public has a say [in contributing to science] in- a say in we would go 
backwards. 
(Group 4) 
It is interesting and, I think, significant that groups 2 and 7 have had their contact with lay 
people not just in the context of science communication activities. They do not have the 
option of structuring the interested publics that they have worked with as passive recipients 
of scientific information: public collaboration and support is actually essential to their 
research. (Group 2 would not survive without charity funding, necessitating close contact 
with the charity, its supporters and related patient groups; group 7 could not carry out 
fieldwork without local agreement and support. ) Respect for their publics is already present; 
public involvement is already an essential part of their work. As a result - we can speculate 
- lay expertise is more easily identifiable and its significance for their science obvious. As a 
contrast we could take group 6; working on a similar topic area to group 2, and with a wide 
range of communication experience, but without such close public involvement. While at 
times they acknowledge the value of public perspective ("sometimes the most brilliant ideas 
come from someone that just know a little bit-"), this has never been solidified by 
experience and therefore seems to remain less coherent as a discourse. 
We might speculate further, then, that the development of these more complex discourses 
of the public may depend not only on contact with lay people, but on that contact being 
sustained and in-depth. More traditional science communication activities, such as open 
days or lectures, while to some degree helpful in widening perceptions, may not provide this 
in-depth experience of relevant public knowledges. Exactly how this experience can occur 
remains an open question. 
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The importance of context 2: the interview micro-context and 'reflective discussion' 
I have discussed the importance of 'external' context - the discipline, department, and 
group - to the interviews. We have seen that there are differences in availability of 
particular discourses, and that though we cannot generalise these to patterns within 
particular disciplines, I have suggested that they may link to differences in epistemologies 
or experiences (by comparing with Knorr-Cetina 1999 and Waterton et al 2001). 
But there appears to be another level of context that is also important in shaping talk: what 
I am calling the internal or micro-context. This is the discursive surroundings of a particular 
segment of talk (Bakhtin 1999). It is this level of context - the type of talk that is going on, 
turn by turn - that I want to look at in more detail here. In the previous section I briefly 
touched upon what seems to be the importance of personal experience in increasing the 
accessibility of more complex models of the public. Talk about these kinds of experiences, 
then, tends to demonstrate more of these more sociologically sophisticated narratives: 
extracts (such as those from Dm and Pf above) which describe experts' own experiences in 
dealing with publics seem to draw on more complex models. Similarly, Stf, in the extract 
below, describes dealing with a knowledgeable public at an open day. This public - in 
contrast to models of deficit publics - is "easy to talk" to. 
Stf:... Urn (1.5) yeah, most of the people that we talked to on open days knew () not 
quite as much as us but almost as much so it was easy to talk- to talk to them. 
(Group 6) 
Talk about particulars - often in the form of personal experience - rather than 
generalisations, then, would seem to be one possible way of drawing out complex models 
and narratives. However, I want to explore in more detail one other context that seems to 
favour the appearance of complex models of the public, and to argue that this context - 
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what I will call reflective discussion - can also be used to draw forth these complex 
narratives. 
Before I start to do this, however, I need to acknowledge the existence, in the data, of a 
type of talk which I have so far not touched upon and which could be called discourses of 
complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty. These describe an uncertain and largely unknown 
world and therefore may link to the more complex models of publics and science in that 
these acknowledge diversity: however, these discourses of uncertainty differ in that they 
frequently describe or conclude nothing at all. Uncertainty is explicit rather than implied. 
They are not simply hesitations in the flow of the interview - which, as I have argued, seem 
to indicate the inaccessibility of particular discourses - but are questions, disagreements 
and the acknowledgment of the unknown. The use of such discourses is linked to this type 
of reflective talk, and indeed could be said to be a key marker of it. As an example of these 
types of discourses, and of the value of reflective discourse, I am reproducing - at some 
length -a section of group interview 1 below: 
1: I: Something that I think's been mentioned several times is this um- the fact that er 
the- science gets presented, say in MMR and and the public can't really critically analyse 
the- the different opinions um, the different viewpoints. What do you think the solution- 
a solution to that might be? 
(5) 
2: Gm: It's very difficult. 
3: Dm: It's not- but it's not very difficult it's simple I mean the media are stupid right so 
the- like Geoff said you can't have the media giving equal weight () to people. [I mean- 
the media have to- have to know= 
4: Gm: 
do you stop them 
[But how 
5: Dm: =have to understand what it's about and they have to (. ) look at the data and () 
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realise that- 
6: Gm: This is the problem with the- the journalist who talked to the PhD students in the 
course I mentioned at the beginning of the interview. So how= 
7: Dm: Hmmm 
8: Gm: =she basically came and said look this is our position you have to fit to us and of 
course I'd like to say this is our position you have to report it but the two camps could 
just (. ) argue away like that forever and never- 
9: Dm: No no totally right it's obvious that the media have to report science not science 
has to mould itself to some kind of= 
10: ]f: Mmmm 
11: Dm: =bitesize piece of information. So I'm right- I think you're right it's fine. 
12: Gm: But how can you achieve that? I think it is a genuine problem, that the (. ) 
individual journalists are (. ) in a situation where they're looking for the biggest story and 
(. ) they may not want to be irresponsible, they- they might sometimes, but they- even if 
they don't want to, all the time they're (. ) they're under pressure to come up with a 
sensational story that's how they build their career. () And it's very difficult to work 
against that. () Without kind of like having censorship having (. ) any article that's 
vaguely to do with science checked by a () someone with a science degree before it's 
allowed to be printed, or aired on TV or whatever. 
(4) 
13: Dm: Yeah. I mean, yeah, it's just about the integrity of the journalist isn't it I mean 
you're under pressure to make a break through discovery it doesn't mean you're gonna 
(. ) sensationalise some dodgy figure (Gm laughs) that you did in- (more laughte) in the 
lab right, you're going to still do it rigorously and hopefully you will make a- an important 
discovery but (. ) so it's down to the journalist, they've gotta just [(be)- 
14: Gm: [So- so it has to be the 
(. ) So what influences the journalist is how (. ) kind of °popular (they are), so you have 
to (. ) maybe have more public condemnation of when journalists (. ) overhype stuff. 
(Group 1: Extract 4.1) 
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This rather lengthy segment -I have numbered the turns for clarity - shows several 
interesting features. We can observe the discourses of complexity and uncertainty that I 
described above: Gm, in particular, makes use of these in turns two and 12 in 
acknowledging the complexity and 'difficulty' of this issue. But while Gm uses this language 
of uncertainty immediately (although, it is worth noting, this segment comes approximately 
halfway through the one hour interview and therefore draws on - as turn 1 indicates - prior 
discussion), Dm in turn three draws on more typical discourses of the media, blaming them 
for problems between science and society. He argues against complexity, saying that "it's 
simple.. . the media are stupid". 
Thus by turn three we have disagreement within the group and a contrast set up between 
the two points of view. The rest of the segment deals with the resolution of this contrast 
and is a two-way discussion between Dm and Gm (with If only interposing to indicate 
agreement, in turn 10). It is this resolution that is interesting: the discussion proceeds 
rapidly, with both speakers responding to what the other has said (hence the frequent 
overlapping in the talk, the latching, and phrases such as "But... " (turns 4 and 12) or "No no 
totally... " (turn 9) which refer directly to the previous turn). Within this rapid exchange we 
see a negotiation of previous positions and the creation of new meaning; the endpoint (of 
this artificially constructed fragment, at least) being the conclusion that the responsibility 
lies on "the integrity of the journalist" (turn 13) and that "public condemnation" is necessary 
(turn 14, from Gm, who clearly has little faith in the integrity of journalists). 
Without examining the course of the argument and the renegotiation of the original 
statements in detail, we can see that there has been a development in the discourses being 
drawn on, certainly on the part of Dm and, I would argue, in Gm as well, between the first 
and final turns. We move from the language of certainty and blame (from Dm in turn three) 
- straightforward and readily accessible 'default' discourses of the media - to a more 
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developed argument that responsibility lies on individuals (from Dm in turn 13)18. The 
discussion, and in particular, I would argue, the presence of disagreement, has resulted in 
the development of particular stories and the increased use of more complex discourses. 
This could be supported further by a quote from Dm some 33 turns later: the discussion 
around this issue had continued and neared its conclusion with this comment: 
D: It is hard to know, you look at basically the differences in opinions in newspapers 
even about the same political event () they do write about it in quite different ways- 
(Group 1) 
Here we find Dm, whose talk we saw earlier as marked by certainty, drawing on discourses 
of uncertainty and ambiguity. He acknowledges - as Gm did in our earlier segment - 
complexity and that "it is hard"; even his language here is modalised and hedged 
("basically", "quite"), allowing for uncertainty and a difference of opinion. In the context of 
the discussion we could even argue that this comes close to an identification with the 
public, given the framing (by the interviewer in turn one, above) of public inability to cope 
with different viewpoints in the media: we thus have a shift from the use of deficit 
narratives to those of identification. 
It is important to note that I am not arguing that Dm has experienced a sudden epiphany in 
his understanding of the media, and that his language use will therefore permanently shift. 
We cannot, of course, know whether this is the case, but it seems unlikely (particularly in 
the context of the rest of the interview: deficit discourses continue to be used). The key 
point is that it appears that this kind of reflective discussion appears to aid the development 
and use of more sociologically sophisticated discourses of - in this case - the media, but 
18 Dm's statement does, however, remain one that we may not agree with and which would certainly bear 
examination. The point is that there is a development from a 'knee-jerk' discourse to a more developed one, not 
that the development has taken us to the final and correct analysis. 
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also, arguably, of the public, science, and other concepts19. Examination of a further 
segment, from group 6, may help to support this claim: 
1: Stf: I suppose I (??? )- I suppose going back to you know (. ) when you meet families who 
do have say a genetic disease, they are so interested in it, and are so (. ) up to date with- 
with what's going on that (. ) it- it just seems to me (. ) to be a shame that () they don't- 
they only learn it when it becomes a problem [for them 
2: Saf: [Yeah 
3: Suf: And it's a small small percentage of the whole population- 
4: Stf: Yeah 
5: Suf: But they have something like (. ) the rest of the population lacks, they have the 
motivation to (. ) learn, they are very interested in learning, so we just need to () [(????? it) 
6: Saf: [But why is 
it somebody who it's not important for, why should they be interested, [how can you make 
them interested? 
7: Mm: [Yeah 
8: Saf: =They're not bothered, it's not gonna- () [affect their life 
9: Stf: [But presumably their- their chances are 
that they are- that they have got some genetic predisposition [(to these diseases)- 
10: Saf: [Chan- Yeah but I mean tell 
them that they've got a one in (. ) four hundred () 
11: Stf: Yeah. But that- but that's on its own, what about you know (. ) the various [cancers- 
12: Saf: [Yeah 
sure, but the majority of people that are affected by () genetic disease I know they could 
be, there's every potential that () 
13: Stf: Er- Well I think if you look in every family- 
14: Saf: There'd be some- 
15: Stf: There'd be- you know (. ) my family have diabetes, Iate-onset diabetes that's a 
19 This is, of course, the concept on which deliberative democracy is based - see Cooke 2000; Davies et al 2006; 
Warner 2002. 
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[genetic- () Um () [I'm sure- 
16: Saf: 
[(Okay) () [But then a lot of people wouldn't know that would they. [(Cos I-) The-] 
I wouldn't (laughter) 
17: Stf: 
know] (laughs) I see what you mean yeah 
18: Saf: I didn't know what it meant until (?????? ago) 
19: Stf: But I don't know how you get it to people. 
(Group 6: Extract 4.2) 
[Maybe I don't 
Again, we have a complex stretch of discourse: in this case we have three (female) main 
speakers and an even more rapid exchange of views. Turns are brief, and overlapping in the 
talk frequent. The context is a discussion of science communication: talk about the best 
ways to do public communication have led into a more general debate. Stf here is starting a 
slightly new topic, and she draws on her own experience to argue that it's "a shame" that 
publics only find out about science when it impacts them. Although her turn acknowledges 
public ability to deal with science, it also implies that understanding of science is an 
un problematic 'good' which everyone should have. While Saf and Suf are, in turns two and 
three, supportive of this statement, Suf then goes on to problematise it by arguing, in 
effect, that the groups that Stf has had experience with are different in that they have a 
special "motivation" to learn about science. This is, of course, a version of the 'public are 
interested' discourse that we discussed in an earlier section: the public are only interested in 
what is directly relevant to them. 
The talk from turn six onwards further expands and renegotiates these ideas. It draws on 
interested/not interested discourses and on the language of separation and identification: 
turns six (where Saf forcibly states the need for personal relevance) and 16-18 (where she 
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identifies directly with publics in her lack of knowledge and therefore interest) are 
particularly noteworthy. This talk acts to problematise Stf's original statement and its 
implication that scientific knowledge is unquestionably a 'good': in sum the arguments 
respond to turn one by asking why should people make the effort? Saf's identification with 
the public in turns 16 and 18 effectively demolishes Stf's argument (that genetic science is 
relevant to everyone, in the renegotiated form of turns 13 and 15) and she is forced to 
withdraw, to some extent, with her "I don't know" in turn 17. 
In this discussion, therefore, we again see relatively straightforward talk of science and the 
public being problematised and negotiated. The talk has functioned to increase uncertainty 
and to allow in the complexities of the real world: Stf has shifted from the use of dogmatic 
discourses to those which are ambiguous and confused. The segment finishes with 
uncertainty, and the final four turns all contain language of negative knowledge C'I wouldn't 
[know]", "I don't know", "I didn't know"). In this case the dissonance has not been as 
marked as in the previous segment: there was no overt disagreement, and Stf and Saf 
actually cooperate throughout turns 10-15 to create the argument that Saf then rejects. 20 
As before, however, we have a very particular type of talk: discussion and the construction 
of new meanings through interaction. 
This discussion form - when it works effectively, as a 'dialogue' - does, then, seem to 
encourage the use of sophisticated discourses. Those sections of this data where this form 
of talk takes place provide contexts where more complex narratives of science and the 
public are used at higher frequencies than in other places. It appears that the immediate 
context of the type of talk used can affect the narratives drawn upon, and, in particular, 
that "reflective discussion' is particularly important in affecting this. 
20 The difference may be in part due to the gender of those interacting. Some studies (see Green 1998; Holmes 
1992) have indicated that all-female conversation tends to be more cooperative than all-male. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
So far, then, we have seen that scientists' talk is complex and not easily reducible down to 
particular themes or narratives. There do seem, however, to be some discourses which run 
through all of the groups and which appear to be part of scientific culture, and I have 
attempted to reconstruct these from their traces within talk. We have surveyed the 
constructions found of the public and of science, and identified a mass of different 
narratives, some more coherent and dominant in the data than others. Importantly, we 
have identified frequent disjunctions between the discourses used. Deficit discourses, for 
example, compete with more complex models of the public as active and knowledgeable; 
and there are narratives of science as both strictly bounded and as continuous with other 
domains. The "expert discourse" of the "expert community" (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998: 26) 
does not, in this data set, present a unanimous view of the public or even of science. In the 
generalised context of these group interviews there is diversity and disjunction, indicating 
that, though some discourses may be more accessible and fully formed than others, 
scientists have access to a repertoire of narratives which they can use for particular 
discursive purposes. In addition I have argued that talk about the media can be used as a 
'default discourse'. Finally, I have shown that scientists' talk, as well as being complex and 
at times contradictory, is also highly context-dependent. Both "external' (group discipline 
and experience) and 'internal' (talk about personal experience or reflective discussion) 
context is key in drawing forth particular kinds of narratives of the public and science. 
There have been similarities and links between many of the kinds of discourse that I have 
described. Discourses of science as authoritative knowledge were implied, for example, by 
deficit discourses of the public and were more fully constructed in what I called the 
discourse of science as truth. The unstable discourses of public interest and 
identification/separation could also be seen as about essentially the same issue: both, it 
could be argued, boil down to a theme of alienation from science (the details of the 
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discourses being about who is, and who isn't, alienated). The question thus arises of 
whether we can construct meta-narratives; competing stories which sum up all the different 
themes and discourses we have tracked so far. Is this possible? The suggestion of such 
meta-narratives will be an effective way of summing up my findings but will - it is also 
important to note - ultimately remain a simplification (see Law 2004). Inevitably, such 
'summing-up' stories will map part of the data well while other parts are left out. 
Discourses of separation and identification 
Given this caveat, I would tentatively suggest that we could talk of overarching themes of 
separation and identification. Within this framework we would see the data as ultimately 
being about boundaries: who is in science and who isn't. Discourses of separation maintain 
the borders and keep the domains of science and public distinct. Time after time within the 
data we see this boundary work being done: science is protected while the public are 
separated from it and problematised. Deficit discourses of the public do this; as does talk 
about science which highlights its boundaries and its status as powerful knowledge- 
provider. But we also find the competing - if minority - discourses of identification, in which 
science and society are intermingled, and knowledge is dispersed throughout both. Thus 
those discourses of publics which acknowledge their agency and knowledge, and those 
discourses of science which remove its boundaries or see it as subjective act to produce an 
identification between science and society. 
How would the discourses of separation act within talk? I have already briefly discussed 
how deficit discourses work to problematise publics and protect science (p. 99). The other 
discourses of separation - such as talk about science which works to strictly bound it - also 
act to heighten the gap between science and the public and to raise and emphasise 
science's authority. They function to bolster its status as different, separate, special. Valid 
knowledge is localised only within science, and science is therefore powerful - as, indeed, it 
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is today within our society. Discourses of separation therefore maintain existing power 
structures: science keeps its authority and status. 
The discourses of identification act rather differently. They erode science's special status 
and authority by acknowledging other knowledges and blurring the distinction between 
science and the rest of society. They are radical in that they act against the boundary work 
that most scientific discourse works to maintain (Cook et al 2004; Gieryn 1999). Given this, 
it is surprising that they exist in scientific talk at all. While we have seen that they are 
modified, limited and used for scientists' own purposes, it remains encouraging that they 
are present as competition to the discourses of separation. Scientists do have access to and 
use complex models of publics and science: having seen this, the next step is to work at 
increasing their use, drawing them nearer to the surface of scientific culture, and enabling 
their dominance over - or at least equality with - those discourses that work to keep 
science and society separate. 
In conclusion: the surprising complexity of scientific talk 
The question that I posed at the start of this chapter - do all scientists subscribe to the 
deficit model in an uncomplicated way? - has now been thoroughly answered. Scientific talk 
is not tidy and smooth, but complex and full of disjunctions and contradictions. The deficit 
model is not the only narrative drawn upon, but one of a repertoire, and we have seen the 
presence of a similar repertoire in the construction of science. This complexity - while 
expected, given other studies which have shown us the sophistication both of normal 
conversation (Gumperz 1999; Heritage 2001; Sacks 2001) and of public interactions with 
and negotiation of similar concepts (Irwin and Wynne 1996; Wynne 1992b) - is surprising in 
the context of a literature that can be read as suggesting a scientific community with a 
homogeneous stance on these issues. This study therefore speaks to this literature and 
argues that scientists' talk about science-public interactions is, in fact, no less complex than 
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public talk on this topic. Similarly, other studies which have been interested in 'scientific 
understandings of publics' (Burchell 2007a; Cook et al 2004; Frewer et al 2003; Young and 
Matthews 2007) have generally been unable to fully map the complexity and diversity of the 
constructions of publics which may be used, but have been forced to sum these up into one 
or two frameworks. In contrast this data has highlighted the wide range of models of 
science and publics which can be utilised at any particular moment by those in scientific 
communities, adding to that literature which has noted the context-dependency and 
variability of scientific uses of "the public" (Michael and Birke 1994a; 1994b; Michael and 
Brown 2000; 2005). 
In particular we have seen the use of competing discourses to the deficit model (and similar 
types of narrative): discourses with a greater degree of sociological sophistication and with 
similarities to much sociological analysis. The presence of such sophisticated narratives 
should encourage us that scientific communities are not unreflective but that they do have 
access to a range of stories about science and the public. Finally, I have suggested that we 
might - if we wished to sum up some of the complexity that I have shown - talk of 
discourses of identification and separation between science and the public. These broad 
meta-narratives link the talk in these group interviews to wider questions of power and the 
role of science in our society; framing the discourses as those which act to sustain or to 
some degree renegotiate science's authoritative status. I will be returning to these kinds of 
questions in more detail in my analysis of science in the process of 'dialogue' with society. 
Having sought to elucidate answers to my first research question, then, and examine 'the 
public' in scientists' talk, I move on to look at data from science-public dialogue processes in 
my next chapters. I will be seeking to understand how this concept of 'the public' is 
negotiated in such spaces but also - more broadly - to map and understand the interactions 
present within them. 
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Chapter 5 
The Rules of Engagement I: Mixed messages in 
event framing and setting 
I have already briefly discussed the ways in which my analysis draws upon ethnography of 
speaking techniques (chapter 3). In the next three chapters I apply those techniques in 
detail in order to produce an ethnography of communication at the Dana Centre, using 
Hymes' "fundamental notions" for description to direct analysis (1974: 45). Hymes (1974; 
see also Cameron 2001) discusses a substantial list of features of communication - 
'fundamental notions- that are of interest to ethnographers of speaking. These range from 
the concept of a 'speech community' to 'speech acts' and the norms of interaction21, and, as 
Cameron notes, are better used as an "aid to being systematic than ... a sort of recipe" 
(Cameron 2001: 57). 1 have used the most relevant of these to shape my account of 
communication at the Dana Centre, with particular Hymesian 'notions' acting as starting 
21 The list may be - approximately - summed up by the mnemonic SPEAKING (see chapter 3). The letters stand for 
setting, participants, ends, act sequence, key, instrumentalities, norms of interaction, and genres (Hymes 1974). 
Hymes notes that this is an aide memoire rather than a definitive list of points for analysis: he demonstrates that a 
similar list, drawing on the same 'fundamental notions', can be created around the French word PARLANT. 
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points for description and analysis. In this chapter I start by examining some more general 
descriptive points, providing an introduction to the structure and nature of Dana Centre 
events. I then move on to discuss the Hymesian category of 'setting', arguing that the event 
space acts to construct itself in several different ways and to give, to visitors, mixed 
messages about its nature. 
'Communicative competence' at the Dana Centre 
Hymes and other ethnographers of speaking (see Bauman and Sherzer 1974) seek to 
understand 'communicative competence' within particular communities. A child, Hymes 
notes, acquires not just a system of grammar from its social surroundings, but: 
also a system of its use, regarding persons, places, purposes, other modes of 
communication, etc. - all the components of communicative events, together with 
attitudes and beliefs concerning them. ... In such acquisition resides the child's 
sociolinguistic competence (or, more broadly, its communicative competence), its ability 
to participate in its society as not only a speaking, but also a communicating member. 
(Hymes 1974: 75) 
Speaking is a "cultural system" (Bauman and Sherzer 1974: 6); it occurs within a mesh of 
meanings and rules. These meanings and rules must be explicated in order for an outsider 
to understand the 'speech community': those who share "knowledge of rules for the 
conduct and interpretation of speech" (Hymes 1974: 51). Communicative competence and 
the notion of the speech community are thus tightly bound together, the one defining the 
other. These concepts form an overarching framework in the ethnography of speaking. For 
my purposes here, I am assuming that those who attend Dana Centre events are part of the 
same speech community, and I am seeking to understand what makes up communicative 
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competence in this community: to understand, in other words, what rules of speaking are in 
use. 
If the concept of the speech community is the overarching framework, Hymes also 
describes other levels on which analysis may take place. There is the 'speech situation' - 
"ceremonies, fights, hunts, meals, lovemaking, and the like" (Hymes 1974: 51). We might, 
from our knowledge of Dana Centre literature such as its "About us' webpage (Dana Centre 
2007), say that the speech situation is "dialogue event' or'debate about science'. Both terms 
are used in what we might call the formalised institutional framing of the event and are, 
moreover, part of the broader cultural movement that we are interested in (see Davis 2004; 
Lehr et al in press; Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2001; 2006; RCUK 
2002; Reich et al 2006; Smallman and Nieman 2006). This would certainly provide us with 
one definition of the speech situation, one which seems culturally valid and institutionally 
endorsed. But it may also prove productive to turn directly to data from Dana Centre events 
in order to look at interna/definitions and the way in which the events - our speech 
situation - are framed from within. 
The first striking thing, as we do so, is that there is in fact a lot oftalk doing this. Talk 
framing the event is one of the richest coding categories in event transcripts: talk of this 
kind is, relatively, a frequent occurrence. A surprising amount of work seems to be 
committed to saying, clarifying, stating, or constructing in other ways the process that is 
going on. 22 A second key point is that there is diversity in how events are framed. Here, we 
can helpfully examine one segment in detail: while this does not show all the different 
framings that are present in the data it illustrates some key points. 
22 Surprising, because relatively unusual in our day to day experience. Consider Cameron's (2001) example of a 
family meal as speech situation: little discursive work is done in defining the situation. We do not find it necessary 
to say'We are eating together' or 'We are having a meal as a family'. 
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1: F: Good evening. Welcome. We've got a um looks like pretty much a full house tonight, and 
2: we're looking forward to a very thought provoking evening. We still have some seats up in 
3: the front (pointing) if anyone (. ) wants to move forward um how many of you have been 
4: to the Dana Centre before for one of these one of these talks? (. ) (Hands are raised in 
5: audience. ) Okay. So you know that Q basically this is not the kind of event where (. ) our 
6: eminent experts (. ) sit here and expound and you receive. This is the kind of evening 
7: whe: re (. ) what makes it fun what makes it interesting is that we have an engagement (. ) 
8: so we'd like to see an engagement between audience members a: nd we'd like you to feel 
9: free to express your views with the speakers and the speakers may even be expressing 
10: views with each other. So it's very open, and um I'm sure we're going to have a really good 
11: time. 
(Event 1, Transcript: Extract 5.1) 
The segment, which is part of a long turn by the facilitator, occurs at the start of the event 
- where, in fact, it is common to find concentrated sections of 'framing' talk. The section 
does a particularly large amount of work to construct the space and process participants 
find themselves in. We are, for example, told that there is almost a "full house", and it 
appears that latecomers are directed to the few remaining seats "in the front": such 
language connotes the theatre, with its overtones of performance from some and passivity 
from others. Similarly, the speaker asks if anyone has attended one of "these talks" (line 
four) before. The implication is that they - her audience - will not be talking; one goes to a 
talk to listen to someone else. This interpretation is borne out by the description of the 
invited experts as "speakers" (line nine; contrasted with others present as "audience 
members"). Their role, as summed up in this description, is to speak, and it is left to the 
'audience' to listen. However, this is also mixed together with language that argues the 
very opposite: the evening is to be about "engagement" (lines seven and eight), 
"expressing views" (lines eight and nine), and being "open" (line ten). We are told 
emphatically that it is "not the kind of event where our eminent experts sit here and 
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expound and you receive". There are therefore at least two ways of framing the evening 
(the "event" -a suggestive word in itself) present in this segment: as a 'talk', where the 
emphasis is on information provision; and as an interactive debate where both audience 
members and invited speakers "express views" with one another. In addition, there is other 
talk which defines or shapes the event: it is to be "thought-provoking", "fun", "interesting", 
a "really good time". 
This analysis is borne out by the rest of the data. In particular, there appear to be three key 
frameworks used in talk about the event process: 
0 Information p/us a question and answer session (a public lecture format). Talk relating 
to this framework is close to a traditional PUS framework: the event is about giving 
information, and audience participation is framed as their having "questions". 
0 Interactive debate. Hence talk about "participation", being "provocative", having "lively 
debate", and "dialogue". The audience is - as in the segment above - encouraged to 
"comment" or "express views". 
0 Adversarial 'competition : This framework constructs the event as a traditional debate: 
the speakers are in competition and seeking to "persuade" their audience to their point 
of view. 
This final framework, not present in the segment above, is often found in talk relating to the 
'voting' process. For example, the quote below introduces a vote at the end of an event. 
The long pause in the middle (27 seconds) is the period that visitors are voting, via 
handheld electronic boxes: 
F:... How do we deal with the UK drug problem these are the same questions as before 
obviously. (2) So vote now let's see if anyone's changed their minds. (27) Ye::: s. Well 
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there you can see you're winning hands down here James cos they're also voting for 
better treatment... 
(Event 2, Transcript) 
Here the event becomes about one speaker "winning" - measured by how persuaded the 
audience is to their point of view - over the others. 
However, having identified these frameworks it is important to point out that - as in extract 
5.1 - they appear within the data as mixed together rather than distinct. In practice, this 
means that our speech situation, as defined by internal evidence, is continually shifting. In 
addition - again as exemplified by the longer segment above - they are not exclusive. 
There are a mass of other ways of constructing the experience of being within the event. 
Frequently used ideas include being fun, interesting, lively, and social (for example as 
spaces for "networking" or "conversation"). We can further argue that the title "event" 
constructs the space in a specific way, bringing about certain expectations and connoting 
particular things (such as activity): in particular we might note that its connotations are 
different to that of a 'lecture' or 'talk' and that work is being done to define Dana processes 
in contrast to more passive formats. A further common theme, which perhaps draws all of 
the 'frameworks' and many of the descriptions together, is the sense that this is an 
intellectual space. Lectures, participatory processes, and debates are all focussed on the 
provision and negotiation of information; similarly, information is required in order to talk of 
something as "interesting" or "thought-provoking". Much of the work that goes into framing 
Dana events, then, narrows it down to a space that is about intellectual knowledge. 
Whatever this speech situation might be, it is not constructed as, for example, an emotive 
or spiritual space. 
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Speech situations provide social context for linguistic performance, and their description 
therefore involves non-linguistic features (in this my relatively brief analysis above will be 
supplemented by my later description of setting). Hymes' next two levels of analysis, 
however, are entirely linguistic. They are the speech event (for example: conversation, 
interview, lecture) and act(for example: greeting, asking a question, stating) (see Bauman 
and Sherzer 1974; Cameron 2001; Hymes 1974). The difference is primarily one of scale: 
the speech act is the lowest level for analysis, and cannot usefully be broken down any 
further in analysis of this type. Speech acts, then, are utterances, and speech events are 
collections of utterances that form a coherent unit. Cameron (2001) points out that 
speakers often have metalinguistic understandings and terms for speech events, citing 
'chat', 'telling off', and 'argument'. Hymes also notes that: 
the same type of speech act may recur in different types of speech event, and the 
same type of speech event in different contexts of situation. Thus, a joke (speech act) 
may be embedded in a private conversation, a lecture, a formal conversation. 
(Hymes 1974: 52) 
'Act sequence' is one of Hymes' categories for analysis. While I do not intend to list every 
speech act in the events I have studied, this would, I think, be a productive place to 
describe in more detail the structure of Dana Centre events, using the language of speech 
events and acts. 
Dana Centre events are held in the evening, and are usually stated - on the website and 
other publicity material - to last from 7 to 8.30pm. My fieldnotes indicate, however, that 
events start at least five minutes late and can finish up to twenty minutes late. The events 
that I have attended and studied generally fall into the following pattern of major speech 
events: 
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0 Introductions. The initial section of the event tends to be made up of a series of speech 
events which could be termed 'introducing'. Several different participants may be 
involved; for example, in Event 2a Dana staff member introduces the facilitator, who 
then takes the floor to introduce the event format, the subject matter and, later, the 
invited speakers. 'Introducing' events frequently include speech acts of thanking, 
directed at various people or institutions (the invited speakers, a sponsoring body). In 
total, these introductions will take perhaps five minutes. 
0 Voting. While an important part of the event process, it is unclear whether'voting' is a 
speech event proper, given that it is composed of both linguistic and technical elements. 
All of the Dana events do, however, have an initial voting phase (using its electronic 
voting system, operated by participants using handheld boxes), often interspersed with 
the introductions. In fact, it could be argued that "voting' is merely a particular act 
within the 'introduction of the topic' speech event, given its linguistic framing as a way 
of introducing the topic (for example, ""we're going to start off with a few questions for 
you to get you thinking" (Event 2)). 
0 Speaking. Taking my cue from the title given to invited experts - 'speakers' -I have 
termed the next type of speech event'speaking' rather than the perhaps more common 
idea of 'lecturing'. Invited experts take the floor for between five and fifteen minutes 
each in order to talk on the topic of the event. 
0 Questioning/commenting and answering/responding. Again, I take my terminology for 
this set of speech events from within the events themselves. These speech events are 
focussed in the period after "speaking' has taken place, and may involve any of the 
participants - invited speakers, audience members, or the facilitator. Mostly, though not 
entirely, speakers perform 'answering/responding' acts while audience members 
'question/comment'. This period is generally the longest of the event, lasting around an 
hour in total. This is, however, including a 'break' of around ten minutes (see below). 
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0 Conversation/networking. The presence of this type of speech event has not been 
formally documented by myself - in terms of transcripts - but rather comes from the 
framing of what occurs during the break (for example: "so we have um a ten minute 
break network talk and um come back to engage", Event 1). This type of talk is thus 
constructed as different to what goes on within 'questioning/commenting and 
answering/responding' events, and as belonging to a separate temporal domain (the 
'break' rather than the 'event' itself). 
0 Last words. In some events, speakers are given the floor at the end to give what are 
termed 'parting' or 'last words'. These turns of a few minutes are identical to 'speaking' 
events in terms of structure: they are performed by speakers to the audience and allow 
a 'summing up' of their position. 
9 Voting. Further votes may then be carried out. The results from these are compared 
with those from the earlier vote. 
0 Finishing. This speech event, performed by the facilitator, may overlap with the final 
'voting', and incorporates acts that work to conclude and then close the event. 
"Finishing' events frequently include information on future Dana Centre events, thanks, 
and 'housekeeping' information such as the time that the bar closes. 
These categories are broad and in practice frequently run into one another - for example, 
`introduction' events may be interspersed with voting, speaking or questioning ones. In 
addition, I have categorised major types of events only. In between these categories - as 
they flow chronologically - the facilitator may speak to further introduce, instruct, or 
explain. Given this, we might note that there is some degree of flexibility within the 
structure that I have described: while the majority of the speech events described above 
are present in all dialogue events attended, their order and nature may thus be slightly 
different from event to event. A good example is Event 4 of my detailed data set, which 
used a slightly different format to the other events studied. Here the speech events are all 
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present, but are performed to different audiences: 'speaking' events, and some questions, 
are given to small breakout groups. The interval followed immediately, and further 
'Questioning/commenting and answering/responding' events then took place with the 
audience back together in one group. Thus while variation and negotiation does occur, the 
speech events listed above seem to be the basic components of a Dana Centre event. 
Interestingly, it appears that where there is deviation from the pattern given above, this is 
brought about either by Dana staff or the facilitator. Their ability to do this is an idea that 
we will be returning to at a later point. 
Setting: the politics of space 
I have used Hymes' concepts of speech situation, event, and act to give some background 
to Dana Centre processes. However, it will have been noted that my description of the 
speech situation was relatively limited, focussing on the discursive internal framings of the 
events. In this section I add to this by examining the physical setting of Dana Centre 
events. 
Hymes is not unique in recommending an interest in the surroundings of that which we 
study. Silverman (2001) urges ethnographers to use their eyes as well as their ears, arguing 
that the type of space in which social processes occur will impact on those processes: think 
of the difference between an undergraduate class in a large formal lecture theatre and a 
small classroom (see Akerstrom 1997; Kotnik 2005; Stimson 1986 for further examples). 
The spaces in which we find ourselves connote certain things, going some way towards 
defining norms of behaviour. Meanings are encoded in design and architecture and physical 
constraints are placed on our behaviour (it is impossible to turn somersaults in a broom 
cupboard). 
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I will consider the Dana Centre physical layout, but also features of its design and 
environment which might suggest it to be a particular 'genre' of space to those who use it. 
This will, of course, be my own reading of the space, but I will supplement these readings 
where helpful with interview data. Given my interest in power relations within dialogue 
events, I will also discuss what these features might suggest about the way in which power 
is allotted to those within the space in order to produce an analysis of the 'politics' of the 
Dana Centre space. 
A'thick' description of physical layout 
As noted earlier, Dana Centre events take place in the evening, within a dedicated event 
space on the lower ground floor of the Wellcome-Wolfson Building23. The timing of the 
events is already significant in terms of what kind of 'event' these will be: an evening 
timeslot suggests that this is not for a family audience; the relatively early end time (9pm), 
however, places the event as outside the category of a 'big night out' - as does the 
concentration of events during the midweek rather than the weekend. 
Having come in through the main entrance on Queen's Gate, the visitor encounters first 
security personnel - black-suited 'bouncers' - and then a Science Museum or Dana staff 
member who checks their name off against a list of those who have pre-booked (free) 
tickets. Having negotiated these interactions they descend a short flight of steps to enter 
the left hand corner of the event space. This space, approximately 5m by 23m, is long and 
relatively narrow, with the wall facing the visitor as they arrive being composed almost 
entirely of glass. 
23 Both of these statements are something of a generalisation. Occasionally there may be all-day or all-weekend 
events held at Dana; for example on 15-16th October 2005 the Dana Centre hosted the UK citizen's panel for the 
European-wide 'Meeting of Minds' deliberative project. In addition some events make use of the'studio' space on 
the first floor. These are, however, exceptions to a general rule; all the events I have transcribed and studied in 
detail adhere to this general pattern. 
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Figure 5.1: The Dana event space from the gallery above (running along the right hand side). Visitors enter the 
space from directly below. Note the glass wall on the left: during daylight hours this gives a view over a small 
patch of grass and the back of the Science Museum. 
At either end of the space there is a double set of projector screens; data projectors for 
these hang from the ceiling amidst lighting and other technical equipment (and can be seen 
at the top of Figure 5.1). As the visitor turns to the right they will encounter doors leading 
to toilet facilities, and then the bar. The space contains tables and chairs; the exact layout 
of these varies between daytime and evening use, and from event to event. 
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Figure 5.2: Field sketch from event on 10`h November 2005 (not to scale), showing how chairs and tables were 
laid out and the position of the bar. Small tables are clustered towards the centre, larger ones are further back. 
This event was webcast and the cameras are also marked on the plan, as are the positions of audience members 
who spoke during the event. 
Figure 5.3: The event space from the opposite end to the main entrance, including the bar on the left. Note that 
these photographs were taken during the day, when the space is in use as a cafe-bar, and therefore show a 
different arrangement of tables and chairs to that used during the evening events. 
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This description of the space immediately raises some questions as to possible physical 
constraints on Dana Centre events. The room is an unusual shape: long and narrow, with 
no easily discernable 'front'. My fieldnotes and sketches indicate that during evening events 
a "front' is created by the use of a platform and/or chairs in the centre, next to the glass 
wall. Tables and chairs are staggered around this centre point, which then becomes the 
focal point for the event, with much of the 'action' taking place from there. Participants, as 
they enter, naturally sit down facing - and ideally with a clear view of - this focal point. 
Significantly, this space and layout do not suggest equity. Some participants will be nearer 
the focal point than others; some may have a restricted view. It is relatively a large space: 
this might suggest to us that there may be difficulties in participants freely interacting with 
one another. Even more importantly, I would argue, the layout is already creating a 
distinction between invited speakers and public participants. The invited speakers and 
facilitator sit or stand within the focal point, often on a platform so that they are raised up 
above the rest of those present. Their position suggests that they are to be the centre of 
attention; even - given the 'stage' they are on - that they are there to perform. In contrast, 
there is no real distinction between public participants. They are a'mass' of people on the 
same level and - from the physical way they are positioned - with the same interest: what 
is going on at the 'front'. 
It is also important to note that this is very obviously an imposedor constructed layout for 
the space. While the physical dimensions of the room - 5x23m - do impose some 
constraints on the layout, it is not the case that the one used is the only one possible. The 
central focal point, which defines the'front', could, for example, have been located at one 
end of the space. The layout used does not spring 'naturally' from the space but has been 
created through decision-making processes. Indeed, the photographs above of the daytime 
'cafe' show a very different layout, with the tables and chairs arranged evenly around the 
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space. Evening events take a layout which is relatively equitable, then, and appear to 
deliberately rearrange it so that it becomes hierarchical. 
This evening layout -'speakers' at the front, audience around them - will be well known to 
us all but it is worth dwelling on exactly what it connotes. It is familiar to us from formal, 
educational or academic contexts (such as lectures, classrooms, panel debates or television 
programmes such as the BBC's Question Time), where it tells us that the speakers - the 
focus of attention - are there to speak, and the audience are there to listen or question. 
Immediately, then, with this layout, we are given a sense of some formality. We are not - 
for example - present at a dinner party or speed dating event. We are given a sense that, 
in some way, those on the platform or at the front are'special': they are to be the focal 
point and their words are important - even if we are then given the opportunity to disagree 
with them. (The Question Time parallel is perhaps useful to us here: even if a panellist's 
words are carefully ripped apart by the interviewer or fellow panellist, the very fact that 
they are there, on display, indicates to us that in some way they are important, and that 
their words are weighty. The panels are not composed of you, or I, or randomly selected 
members of the public; they are present - and important - because they are different to 
us. ) 
Even the fact that there is such a disparity of numbers between those within the focal point 
(four or five at the most) and those out of it (up to 70 or 80) may be suggestive. While it 
could be argued that those in the majority hold the power within the space, simply by virtue 
of numbers, this seems questionable at best when we consider the various situations within 
our society in which it is the minority that holds power (a classroom is a good example). It 
seems possible that this very disparity works again to reinforce the special status of those in 
the minority, and to emphasise that they are'not like us'. While I will discuss genre of 
interaction at a later point, it is also worth mentioning here that this layout already suggests 
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particular styles of interaction. It is a formal layout, as I have already noted, and is 
reminiscent of classrooms, debates, or lecture halls. It seems likely that these connotations 
could shape the interactions and expectations of those involved in the space. Indeed, 
audience members do in interviews refer at times to the event as a 'lecture': 
M2:... It's different to normal lectures. 
M1: Yeah 
Fl: I wish all lectures were like that! 
(Event 1, Interview 2) 
As noted earlier (p. 150), the layout shown in figure 5.2 is not the only one used in Dana 
events. While this pattern was closely repeated (with small variations) for three of the 
events which underwent close analysis, the fourth used a slightly different event format in 
which there were four smaller 'breakout' groups around the room. Figure 5.4 shows the 
field sketch for this event. 
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Figure 5.4: Field sketch from event on 22nd November 2005. 
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As the sketch shows, the main difference is the limited number and specific position of the 
large tables. These became the focal points for breakout groups, with one speaker at each 
table and a group of public participants clustered around them. However, at the beginning 
and end of the event the focal point reverted to the centre as normal; given this, and the 
miniaturised version of the same structure that was created in the breakout groups, this 
alteration in format does not appear to mark a significant shift in the hierarchies encoded in 
the physical layout. 
The 'genre' of space: the implications of contextual features 
Having looked at the layout of the Dana event space, then, we are left with concerns that 
power is already being tilted towards a few individuals. But a space is constructed by much 
more than its physical layout: a McDonald's and a Michelin-starred restaurant may have 
exactly the same layout of tables and chairs, but they are very different kinds of spaces. 
Stimson (1986), in his analysis of the space in which General Medical Council deliberations 
take place, says: 
This is a room in which serious matters are discussed: the room has a presence that is 
forced upon our consciousness. This is a room that, even when unoccupied, impresses 
on the visitor a solemn demeanour and subdued speech. 
(Stimson 1986: 643) 
Physical space, then, will normalise particular kinds of behaviour. Social space, we could 
say, is constructed in part by the entire physical environment: not just by language use but 
by what we see, hear, touch, smell, and taste. I turn now to consider the whole experience 
of being at Dana; how its design and other environmental features might link it to a 
particular genre of social space and enable or disable particular behaviours. 
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The design of the Dana event space will clearly be a key factor in this. It is - as the 
preceding photographs will have indicated -a large, bright space with a high ceiling and 
gallery. Part of its brightness comes from its design features. It has white or bright orange 
painted walls, a pale wood floor, and the enormous window that makes up one wall. There 
is also plentiful artificial lighting for outside of daylight hours, with a professional-standard 
light rig hanging from the ceiling. Chairs are of a bright orange plastic, while the large 
tables have white surfaces printed with the same patterns of words and phrases that appear 
on the window. 
Figure 5.5: The window of the Dana Centre event space, during the day. Note the writing printed onto it; a key 
design feature which also appears on the tables. 
The space as a whole is striking: the design is unusual and the bright colours refreshing. 
Clearly - we intuit - this is an different kind of place to the offices, cafes, or lecture theatres 
in which we usually spend our time. In particular it is a different kind of space to the ones in 
which science is normally discussed (or which we believe science is discussed in). It is not a 
lab, or a formal lecture theatre - such as the Faraday lecture theatre at the Royal Institution 
- weighed down by history. Rather this is an informal space; a- as the Dana Centre 
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website claims -'stylish' space. If it suggests expertise at all, it is of a very different kind - 
that of the arts or media. Indeed, the space, with its starkly bright colours, might run the 
risk of appearing a little childish if it weren't for the repeated motif of fragments of text. 
That which can be read is intriguing, conversational, and at times provocative (the rhetorical 
question "Do numbers explain anything? "; or the fragment "My father stopped listening 
when I mentioned the word 'Antarctica'... "). This design feature intrigues us and, more than 
that, suggests that this is a space that is discursive. Language is important here. 
The suggestion of informality is enhanced by the presence - within a key location in the 
room - of the bar area. The cafe-bar serves a range of meals and snacks as well as 
alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks: the Dana Centre website states that the "d. cafe boasts a 
well-rounded wine list and a wide variety of home-made cakes, hot dishes and daily 
changing specials to tempt your taste buds while you broaden your mind" (Dana Centre 
2007). Food is served throughout the day until 6pm; the bar theoretically remains open until 
9pm on event nights (although my fieidnotes indicate that it often closes earlier). The menu 
- which states that the cafe makes every effort to avoid genetically-modified foodstuffs - 
includes bistro-style dishes such as "'Salmon and spinach fishcake served with lime creme 
fraiche on a bed of mixed leaves" or "Vegetarian spring rolls with sweet chilli dip" (Dana 
Centre 2007). Both the pricing and language suggest quality; a place where food is to be 
enjoyed and socialised over rather than merely ingested for refuelling purposes. Again, the 
presence of the bar and the type of food served subtly links the Dana space to particular 
social groupings - adults, for example, or those who use bars (rather than, say, pubs, or 
those who don't drink). 
Moreover, this message is reinforced both by the behaviour of those visiting Dana events 
and the language of those who are given control of the space. The bar is a central part of 
visiting Dana: the majority of event participants will buy something from the bar at least 
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once during the evening. There are frequently queues waiting to order, and visitors are 
often encouraged to buy drinks: 
F:... And meanwhile the bar is open I think till nine o clock? Yes the bar is open till 
nine o clock so please stay er and discuss informally... 
(Event 2, Transcript) 
In this case, and in others, use of the bar is tied to discussion. The products purchased are 
assumed to encourage social interaction; at another point the facilitator suggests that 
participants will be "more forthcoming" after use of the bar in the interval. 
This is not to claim that there is some kind of 'hard sell' of the cafe-bar's products going on 
with the Dana Centre; this is certainly not the case. But it does indicate, I would argue, that 
food and drink are integral factors in the social process of attending a Dana Centre event. 
Dana is a space for eating and drinking - and, as I have argued, a space for a particular 
kind of eating and drinking. The double function of the space as bar and event venue could 
be seen as mixing genres of space together; after all, it is not usual to be able to eat a meal 
whilst attending a scientific lecture or debate. While the concept probably derives from the 
Cafe Scientifique movement (Cafe Scientifique 2006), it remains innovative in that it 
remains surprising to the visitor, as the extract below demonstrates. (Note also the framing 
of the event as a 'lecture' by M1 and F1, albeit one that is "different". ) 
M2: I do like the fact that you get er get food and (. ) drinks as well. That's quite 
(????? ) (laughter) It's different to normal lectures. (F1 laughs) 
Ml: Yeah 
Fl: I wish all lectures were like that! 
(Event 1, Interview 2) 
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What are the implications of this kind of mixing of spaces? It is to be expected that there 
will be some transference of types of behaviour from one space to the other; from the cafe- 
bar to the formal event. One thing that marks out public eating and drinking spaces in our 
culture is that they are social. They are relational; about talk and interaction. They are also 
informal, casual: they are venues for conversation rather than monologues. The key role 
that the bar plays in Dana events might, then, be expected to help construct the event 
'social' space in this way, and to encourage these kinds of informal behaviour24. We might 
also suggest, however, that just as the cafe-bar enables some kinds of behaviour, it also 
helps exclude individuals not comfortable with such behaviour or spaces. By framing the 
space in a way that helps some to feel at home, it of necessity turns others into - possibly - 
unwelcome Others. 
The sense of being in a social, informal space is heightened by the use of music in the event 
space. Before events start, during the interval, and at the end, music is played over the 
sound system. This is loud enough to be heard, and noticeable -I was able to recognise 
particular tracks - but not so loud as to intrude on conversations. Again, we are transported 
to a particular kind of social space by this: we are not, say, in a nightclub, where the music 
is the main feature; but we are also not in a silent, drab, meeting room. The type of music 
played is also significant: although this varied it included indie, 'chillout', and jazz. (The 
music thus links to the 'stylish' decor: both suggest a certain kind of relaxed urban 
chicness. ) The sense produced is, once again, that we are in an informal and sociable 
space. Music is a key feature of bars, in particular; and its use in Dana heightens the impact 
of the cafe-bar in constructing the space. 
24 The situation is, of course, somewhat more complex than this, and deserves further analysis. Much could be said 
about the type of bar that Dana mimics, and the audiences for whom this is designed to appeal. In addition, 
certain behaviours that are normalised in other eating and drinking spaces (such as: tipping waiting staff, large 
amounts of interaction with strangers, drinking to excess) do not appear to occur with the Dana space. 
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To sum up, then, how might we describe the work done by the features - decor, cafe-bar, 
music - discussed above? We can say that the Dana event space is constructed as sociable, 
casual, relatively informal, and what we might call - for want of a better term - stylish. This 
reading does appear to be backed up by participant experiences. Indeed, their 
understandings of the Dana event 'atmosphere' frequently link to pleasure and surprise: 
F2: I like the fact- the fact that it's an informal it's- (. ) it's informal isn't it it's not 
you're not all sat in a lecture theatre- 
F3: It's not intimidating. 
(Event 3, Interview 1) 
Fl: Er: I like- I think I like the way that it's all set out kind of the fact you know I-I 
thought that I was just going to be sort of an auditorium I thought it was going to feel 
like I was at college. But straight away... felt it was quite relaxing- (laughs) 
(Event 3, Interview 3) 
There are, however, other features that have an impact on the'atmosphere' in Dana and 
the way in which the space is subtly constructed. We might also argue that the event space 
is one which is professional- in particular, that it is a professionalised 'media' space. I have 
already mentioned the professional-standard light rig which can be used during events to 
produce diverse high-quality lighting effects. In addition, there is a variety of other technical 
equipment present, to the extent that one could view the theme of "state-of-the-art" 
technology as one that runs all the way through the Dana Centre experience. 
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Figure 5.6: Light rigs and other technical equipment hanging from the ceiling of the event space. 
Note also the visitor working on a laptop - the Centre offers free wireless connection. 
This concept is certainly one that appears important in the Dana Centre's self-presentation. 
Its'About us' webpage highlights its "digital facilities" and the fact that those in the Centre 
can communicate with others "on the Internet and everyone with a mobile phone" (Dana 
Centre 2007). Technology - in particular media technology - is present not just in the 
surroundings (the open ceiling hung with equipment, the screens on which video, 
powerpoint slides, or Centre and event information are displayed, the internet lounge on the 
upper ground floor); but throughout the event. An electronic voting system is used at the 
start and end of the events, with results being displayed immediately on the screens. 
Several times a month events are webcast live (two of the four events I studied fell into this 
category), and those watching online can participate by emailing or texting in questions. 
Occasionally events may feature live link-ups to other parts of the UK or world. The sound 
system is also important throughout the event, with - as I shall discuss more fully later - all 
speech needing to be microphoned: speakers and facilitators wear headsets while a hand- 
held microphone is passed around the audience. In addition, the space is 'wired', and offers 
free wireless internet access to those with laptops. 
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Visibly and invisibly, then, media technologies pervade the Dana space. While the impact of 
this may be more subtle than the studied informality of the design, I would argue that it will 
still be a significant factor in the framing of the social space in which events take place. This 
is not, for example, an 'amateurish' space where votes are cast by a show of hands or the 
focus is slavishly on the small-scale and local. Rather the space connotes modernity and 
sophistication of function: it is in touch with the current and the cutting-edge. This is not a 
place for those who are too young, too old, or too hidebound to be familiar with the 
technology on display. In having the "state-of-the-art", the best of everything, it suggests 
professionalism. And this - as with the cafe-bar reading of the space - may well work to 
validate certain kinds of social interaction while rendering others obsolete. 
This reading is, of course, speculation. While such factors may work to position visitors in 
particular ways or to limit certain individuals' involvement in the event, it is almost 
impossible to test this. There are, however, more concrete aspects of Dana Centre events 
that will work to exclude certain people or to shape participants' understanding of the event 
process. I have argued that the Dana Centre event space works to construct itself as 
informal and sociable, and that it is a professionalised space; I would also like to comment 
on the fact that it is a gated space. As I noted earlier, visitors to the Centre are greeted first 
by dark-suited security staff at the door (who act as 'bouncers'), and then must give their 
names to a Science Museum staff member, who checks that they are on the list for the 
event. Admission, therefore - while free of charge - must be booked in advance, through 
email or over the phone (Dana Centre 2007). While it is clear to see how this might limit 
participation (it is not easy, for example, for someone to simply walk in off the street and 
take part in an event), it is also important to consider the connotations of these gatekeeping 
structures and how they might affect the 'feel' of the event for those inside the Dana space. 
The presence of 'bouncers', for instance, links to the conception of Dana as bar space and 
perhaps helps create an understanding of the space as regulated: those who disobey the 
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rules will be refused entry or ejected. The fact that'tickets' (even virtual ones) are required 
pushes the genre of space away from - is even diametrically opposed to - the work that 
has been done in creating a relaxed and informal environment. You do not need a ticket to 
get into a bar or restaurant; you do, however, for a scientific lecture, television debate, or 
other formal 'cultural' event. In particular, I would argue, this double gatekeeping works to 
challenge the conception - suggested to us by its website and the cafe-bar - of Dana 
Centre events as open and public social spaces. Can there be equity of access when access 
is so tightly controlled? We might further suggest that this control - the sense that visitors 
are let into the space upon sufferance - could frame the space in such a way that power is 
shifted away from visitors; as, indeed, we have already seen in my discussion of the 
implications of the layout. 
In sum, then, it seems that there are multiple messages in the setting of Dana Centre 
events. I have argued that the space signals a particular hierarchy through its layout, and 
that this may act to connote formality and to concentrate power in those in the front or 
`focal point'. However, we have also seen that other aspects of the event space work to 
construct it as informal: the decor, cafe-bar, and use of music, in particular, serve to create 
a relaxed and sociable space. In contrast again, the "double gatekeeping' of the event 
implies regulation and denies access to some. Thus it appears that there are mixed 
messages: is the event formal or informal? Open and relaxed or regulated? 
These themes link in with my earlier discussion of the ways in which the speech situation of 
'Dana Centre event' is framed. Here we also saw diversity: events were, almost in the same 
breath, constructed as a question and answer session, interactive debate, or adversarial 
competition. From this first analysis of the framing and setting of Dana Centre events, then, 
we might suggest a common theme of mixed messages. There is uncertainty about, and 
multiple readings of, the nature of the space and process. I go on to develop these 
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concepts further in the next chapter, as I examine in more detail the purpose and genre of 
Dana Centre interactions. 
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Chapter 6 
The Rules of Engagement II: Flexibility and 
uncertainty in event ends and genre 
Having examined the mixed messages of the framing and setting of Dana Centre events, I 
turn now to look at the ends (purposes and outcomes) and genre of these communicative 
events (Cameron 2001; Hymes 1974). 1 look in more detail at the ways in which the 
purposes of the event process are constructed, and examine the different genres of 
interaction that are drawn upon. For both of these things I continue to find diversity: if the 
main theme of the previous chapter was that of mixed messages, that of this is flexibility 
and uncertainty. As I close I argue that this uncertainty can be problematic for participants, 
and support this with an examination of 'problems' and 'mistakes' in Dana Centre events. 
Purposes and outcomes: Learning, winning, sharing, and having fun 
"Ends', as Hymes (1974) describes the term, can refer both to the purposes or goals of a 
speech event and its actual outcomes. Both senses of the word can be somewhat vexed 
analytical categories: there are, for example, problems with trying to identify the 'true' 
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purpose behind a statement or act (cf. Mulkay 1981). In addition, a detailed analysis will 
focus on the ends of particular speech events. While this approach is productive, it appears 
more pertinent to this study of dialogue processes to widen analysis to the entire 'event'. 
What can we know about the purposes of Dana Centre events, from internal evidence? To 
answer this I will briefly survey the ways in which the language within events constructs the 
purposes and desired outcomes of the event process. 
Not surprisingly, we find a range of different purposes - both explicitly stated and implicitly 
constructed - given for events. We can in fact already discern some of these from our 
previous analysis: there are clear links between the framing of the speech situation 
(discussed in chapter 5) and what the purposes of that speech situation are constructed as 
being. Thus we can infer that a framework of a PUS-style lecture will have the purpose of 
providing information, while an adversarial framing will produce the expectation of 
disagreement, debate, and one speaker 'winning'. And, indeed, these are all ideas that we 
find in the data: 
F: (nods head at someone) what brings you here? 
(Indistinguishable speech without mic) 
Af5: (now with mic) =learn something and um form some views about race specific 
medicines. 
(Event 1, Transcript) 
Mm:... I think this is something on which the- the three speakers the three-we are 
probably in pretty close agreement! (laughs) 
F: Right we'll have to find something else to get them to disagree on then. 
(Event 2, Transcript) 
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In the first quote, we find an audience member stating their own purpose in attending: they 
want to "learn" and "form some views". Information transfer is thus a key purpose behind 
the whole event. We see this, as well, in the frequent emphasis on 'questions' in connection 
with audience participation: audiences are expected to be seeking clarification or further 
information from speakers. It is also interesting that this view, in this case, comes from an 
audience member (though it also appears in talk from speakers and facilitators). We 
therefore cannot argue that this view is imposed on a powerless audience by more powerful 
'framers' of the event; rather, it appears to be the case that audience members are 
complicit in the production of this 'PUS', information provision framing of Dana Centre 
events. 
In the second quote we see Mm's surprise at speaker agreement (indicated by his lifting 
tone and laughter), and the facilitator's statement that "we'll have to find something else to 
get them to disagree on then": agreement is thus not the norm or desired outcome, and 
disagreement is constructed as a "good'. The event is framed as a space for argument 
rather than agreement. In addition to these, we find other purposes or outcomes for the 
event constructed within data from transcripts. Participation from the audience, for 
example, is frequently seen as a good within discourse (linking to the'interactive debate' 
framework discussed earlier), and a substantial amount of work is done in encouraging this: 
F:... But- [but before I let you carry on I will come back out= 
ISm: [But- 
F: =to the audience and I've seen a couple more hands but is anyone who hasn't spoken 
yet (. ) like to say something (2) Come on don't be shy cos we will run out of time! And 
then you'll be kicking yourselves 
(Event 2, Transcript: Extract 6.1) 
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This quote comes from within the 'questioning/commenting' stage of the event. ISm, one of 
the speakers, has been talking in response to a question and - as we can judge by his 
attempted interruption - does not feel he has completed his turn. The facilitator, however, 
ignores his interjection and re-opens the floor to the audience, prioritising coming "back 
out" to them over letting ISm "carry on". In particular she seeks to let someone who "hasn't 
spoken yet" talk before they "run out of time". Thus in this segment audience participation 
is constructed as an unalloyed good: 'shyness' is the only reason audience members may 
not want to contribute and this will lead to frustration - "kicking themselves" - at a missed 
opportunity. Participation is also constructed as needing to be fair. The facilitator seeks new 
speakers from the audience and wants to prevent domination of the floor by one or two 
participants (the "couple more hands" she observes). 
We find similar talk constructing audience participation - whether in the form of 'questions' 
or'comments' - as a desired outcome throughout all of the events. The emphasis, primarily 
from facilitators but also at times from speakers, is frequently on 'sharing', 'expressing your 
views', being 'interactive' or having a 'debate'. Interestingly, there is little distinction in this 
type of talk between types of contribution from the audience. The facilitator in the extract 
above exhorts the audience to "say something". Similarly, the facilitator in this extract from 
Event 1 encourages a particular group to speak: 
F:... Now I also saw a lot of discussion at this table with all th-all the women. So come on 
you can't all the women I know someone has a question has a comment (standing) (. ) 
I'm standing up I'm giving you some energy (gestures) (JAf laughs) (Some laughter from 
audience) Okay we're coming back to this table though. 
(Event 1, Transcript) 
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Again, participation is a simple good: if there has been a discussion within a small group 
(the segment comes directly after the interval), there is no reason "a question.. .a comment" 
from that discussion should not be shared with all of those present. There is no 
acknowledgement that individuals may have reasons not to 'share' or that there may be 
social problems with doing so. The aim, in fact, is to get audience members to speak (in the 
format 'question' or 'comment') within the event forum: that is the desired outcome, rather 
than a particular kind of talk being valued above others. 
Finally, we also find that enjoyment is constructed as a desired outcome. Events are meant 
to be'fun' and 'fun', like participation, is seen as a good: 
F:... I think it's going to be a fun I think this is goingto be a sort of a equivalent of a sort 
of intellectual equivalent of Pop Idol (. hhh) I think tonight cos we're going to be (. ) 
effectively (. ) looking at Einstein's theories a: nd you:: the audience are gonna decide (. ) 
which you think is his greatest theory so:: there's gonna be a lot of er (. ) learning along 
the way and er hopefully a lot of fun and if the speakers are anything to go by that's um 
definitely gonna be the case. 
(Event 4, Transcript)25 
There are several purposes implicitly constructed within this segment: learning is a stated 
outcome ("there's gonna be... "); there is a final vote by the audience to decide a "greatest 
theory"; and, with marked emphasis, the event is going to be "fun". This concept can be 
viewed in conjunction with a constellation of related terms of impact on the individual 
("thought-provoking", "interesting", a "really good time") and perhaps could be summarised 
by saying that a desired outcome of Dana Centre events is the entertainment of those 
present. 
25 It will have been noted that almost all of the quotes within this section are from event facilitators. This is, of 
course, significant in terms of who has power to frame and shape the event process, and will be discussed more 
fully at a later point. 
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We could, of course, compare these desired outcomes and purposes from internal data to 
more formal aims and objectives (from the Dana Centre website, for example (2007; see 
p. 74), or NMSI Visitor Research Group 2001a; 2001b; 2004). But this is not an evaluation of 
whether Dana Centre events meet their stated aims or not (to some extent such evaluations 
already exist; see NMSI Visitor Research Group 2004; Simonsson 2006), and a detailed 
examination of whether the purposes of internal and institutional data 'match' is beyond the 
scope of this study. However, it is worth noting here that the desired outcomes constructed 
during the event itself - which do, as I have shown, vary - are entirely related to process 
('sharing' or'winning') and to impacts on the individual ('learning' and 'having fun'). None of 
the talk within the event refers to, for example, more formal or large-scale outcomes. 
Genre as flexible and uncertain: Education, tabloid talkshows and news 
interviewing 
Just as we saw a variety of event framings and internal definitions, then, we have also 
observed a similar range of talk about the purposes of the event. The shifting nature of 
Dana Centre events is thus becoming a key theme, and one which will remain as I turn to 
examine the rather more complex concept of genre in Dana events. I will first spend some 
time surveying this concept in the literature before turning to consider its use for 
understanding the interactions within Dana Centre events, arguing that once again we see 
diversity and flexibility in the genre used within an event. 
For Hymes (1974: 61), genres are simply "categories such as poem, myth, tale, proverb, 
riddle, curse, prayer, oration, lecture, commercial, form letter, editorial, etc". Drawing on 
the work of scholars of folklore such as Ben-Amos (1969), his genres are relatively fixed and 
distinct structures marked by particular characteristics (although he does note that certain 
genres may be used in unusual situations in order to provoke a particular effect, such as 
humour). Similarly, Bakhtin (1999: 121) talks of 'speech genres' as "relatively stable types 
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of... utterances". Swales, in a key text surveying interdisciplinary notions of genre (1990), 
argues that it is "communicative purposes" which define genres: these are recognised by 
those familiar with the genre and "constitute the rationale for the genre" (p. 58). 
A genre, then, is socially and culturally embedded: it relies on those participating in a 
communicative process (from watching a film to being interviewed) being familiar with its 
norms. Indeed, Monin and Monin (2005) argue that the power of a genre increases with its 
familiarity and that it is, by definition, an intertextual device (cf. Fairclough 2003). Other 
authors have focussed on the detailed structural features of particular genres, including 
medical consultations, talkshows, and 'first day at school' literature (see Dunmire 2000; 
Gregori-Signes 2000a; van Leeuwen 1993). Bhatia (1993), writing in the context of 
'professional' genres, somewhat lengthily defines genre as: 
A recognisable communicative event characterised by a set of communicative purpose(s) 
identified and mutually understood by the members of the professional or academic 
community in which it regularly occurs. Most often it is highly structured and 
conventionalised with constraints on allowable contributions in terms of their intent, 
positioning, form and functional value. These constraints, however, are often exploited 
by the expert members of the discourse community to achieve private intentions within 
the framework of socially recognised purpose(s). 
(Bhatia 1993: 13) 
While we may wish to take issue with how "structured" and 'constrained' some more 
informal genres are, Bhatia's definition contains two key points for our understanding of 
genre. The first is that - as we already know from Hymes and the other authors discussed 
above -a genre will be composed of particular structural 
features that mean it will be 
recognisable. Whether we are reading a fairy story (Monin and Monin 2005) or participating 
in a radio phone-in show (O'Keeffe 2006) we will be, as Monin and Monin write, "coaxed by 
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familiarity to respond to the... text in a particular way" (2005: 513). Genres (whether of 
interaction or of more static texts such as films) thus enable us to structure our discourse 
and interactions in particular ways; they enable or disable certain behaviours, and carry 
with them particular norms. Competent language-users are able to read genres correctly 
and to act according to the norms encoded in them (cf. O'Keeffe 2006). 
The second key point from Bhatia's definition is, however, that these norms may also be 
"exploited" by those familiar with them. Participants are thus not entirely constrained by 
generic forms but can subvert, negotiate, and mix them: there is a balance between 
'structure' and 'activity' (0'Keeffe 2006). The extent to which this "generic dexterity" is 
possible depends, O'Keeffe notes, on an individual's familiarity with and mastery of a 
culture's linguistic features (2006: 27-28). Such mastery enables creative and subversive 
genre mixing, blending, and negotiation. This type of creativity in language use is also an 
emphasis for Bakhtin (1999), who argues that a speaker's will and choice is firstly 
manifested through genre choice, but also in the mixing and manipulation of different 
genres and parodic mixing of genres from different types of situation. Again, however, 
Bakhtin emphasises that mastery of a genre must be present in the language-user before 
this type of creative genre-use can occur. 
What can we take from this brief survey of thinking on 'genre'? Firstly, as Swale (1990) 
notes, the concept can be a hard one to pin down. Various authors describe genre in terms 
ranging from fixed and stable categories to a flexible continuum (O'Keeffe 2006). For the 
purposes of this study, however, the key points are that genres are (and have) recognisable 
structures, that they can also be subverted and manipulated, and that any such subversion 
requires pre-existing competence in the genre. From this loose definition of the notion of 
genre I wish to examine the genre of Dana Centre communicative processes, and will argue 
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that there are in fact a range of genres drawn upon in the language and interactions in this 
site. 
Formal education 
Firstly, it appears that genres of formal education are adopted at points throughout the 
events. Formal education is currently - despite attempts to change this - overwhelmingly 
marked, in terms of discourse patterns, by what is known as the Initiation-Response- 
Evaluation (IRE) framework (Lefstein 2006; Mehan 1985). This pattern is self explanatory: 
teachers initiate (by lecturing or asking questions), pupils then respond (usually briefly), and 
teachers evaluate these responses. The floor is dominated (in terms of talking time) and 
controlled by the teacher. Discourse patterns of the IRE type are frequently found within 
Dana events, with the facilitator generally taking the 'teacher' role. Let us examine one such 
segment in more detail, taken from just after a vote in the early stages of the event: 
1: F:... that's very interesting who voted no (. ) who's going to be a brave person and put their 
2: hand up and say I was in the minority. Why: do you say no... 
(several lines omitted as microphone is taken to Am1) 
3: Aml: Um because there'll be a good reason why they're illegal um: [I 
4: F: [Okay- 
5: Aml: =just have enough faith that the people making the decision are informed enough. 
6: F: Fair comment. Okay who voted yes who thought that we were losing valuable medical 
7: advances by having drugs illegal. Most of you obviously. Would you like to say why? 
8: Aft: Because it's obvious and-al- already evidence out there that some drugs can be used 
9: therapeutically for example MDMA in cases of um you know er trauma (. ) post traumatic 
10: stress disorder, and we're not using them therapeutically we're giving them to criminals. 
11: F: Marvellous. 
(Event 2, Transcript: Extract 6.2) 
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There are several interesting features of this segment which link it strongly to interaction 
genres of formal schooling. Firstly, there is the IRE pattern led by the facilitator: she 
initiates (lines 1-2), asking for further explanation from those who voted no, allows 
responses from Aml and Aft, and then comments on what they have said in lines 4,6 and 
11 C'okay", "fair comment" and "marvellous"). The facilitator thus draws out and evaluates 
comments from the audience. As well as structural features of the discourse drawing on 
schooling, there are also aspects of the content which we can place in educational genres: 
the phrase "who's going to be a brave person" (line 1), for example, links to the language 
we use to children. Finally, it is worth our noticing that the facilitator controls the 
interactions by asking people to "put their hand up" (lines 1-2). While we may raise our 
hands in other contexts, the one most familiar to us is of schooling. Raising our hands in 
order to receive permission to speak immediately connotes the classroom, and there is 
certain lack of dignity to it; it is hard to imagine, for example, MPs in the House of 
Commons putting their hands in the air rather than standing in order to signal their desire 
to speak. 
Of course, it could be argued that while the structural features of the interactions draw on 
education, much of the content is actually very different to what we might expect in a 
classroom. The facilitator does not seem to be evaluating a right or wrong answer, or 
seeking to elicit what audience members have 'learnt' - as indicated by her relatively similar 
evaluations of very different points of view. Rather, her positive evaluations seem to be 
linked to the fact that audience members are contributing at all: she is not commending the 
'rightness' of their answers but their participation in the event; that, in fact, they are being 
"very brave" people. This is suggested in particular by her response in line 11. Her comment 
of "marvellous" here does not naturally follow on from Af2's comments ("we're not using 
them therapeutically we're giving them to criminals"), which would actually naturalise a 
negative response ('yes, that's terrible'). The situation that Af2 describes is not, in fact, 
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'marvellous', and the facilitator's evaluation only makes sense in the context of her 
commending Af2's desire to contribute and her explanation of why she voted as she did26. 
This, I would argue, leads us back to the model of formal schooling again. While it may be 
more common for teachers to elicit and commend responses of 'facts' (though cf. Alexander 
2005; Lefstein 2006) participation at all remains something to be encouraged and affirmed 
in the classroom. By saying, in effect, 'well done for speaking', the facilitator takes on the 
role of the encouraging adult in the encounter and infantilises the audience. 
If the generic structure of speech events at the Dana Centre at times is that of formal 
education, it also veers at other points to more "adult' interactional genres. In particular I 
will argue that at times it draws upon the genres of the 'tabloid to/kshoW (Gregori-Signes 
2000a; 2000b; Livingstone and Lunt 1994) and what I am calling the aggressive, or 
political, news interview (Clayman and Heritage 2002a; 2002b; Heritage 2002; O'Keeffe 
2006). 
The tabloid talkshow 
While the 'tabloid talkshow' is a complex and itself disputed blend of genres (Dixon and 
Spee 2003; Livingstone and Lunt 1994), Gregori-Signes (2000b) describes such shows 
simply as daytime audience discussion programmes centred around particular issues (rather 
than personalities). Such shows, as Dixon and Spee (2003) note, frequently draw upon 
therapeutic discourses, and are also marked by a high degree of audience participation 
(including 'spontaneous' applause), and a quasi-conversational style (Gregori-Signes 
2000b). Many of these features can also be found in Dana Centre events. For example, 
26 This links back to my previous discussion of'sharing' or 'participation' as a desired outcome of events (see 
chapter 5). Again we have the sense that participation in and of itself is a good: the actual content is relatively 
unimportant. 
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there are points where discourses of therapy are heavily drawn upon to construct a space 
which is about 'sharing' and personal experiences: 
Af9: Hello er: my name's Irene (I just ?????? ) I've suffered from depression most of my 
life I'm on antidepressants now (. ) a:: nd- 
F: Can I just ask you to stand up? [Do you mind? 
Af9: [(Stand up? Yeah. ) Er:: I have been in hospital half a 
dozen times I've had electroconvulsive therapy several times (. ) er:: I have lost my job 
because of health problems (. ) er:: I am taking them erm:: I'm also taking anti-diabetic 
medication (. ) it's not a cure it controls the symptoms (. ) er::: and um again lots of 
people commit suicide (. ) erm:: you know because of mental health problems and if it 
helps (. ) um you know it's worth taking you know taking the pills. 
F: (Mmm. ) Thank you very much for sharing that. 
(Event 3, Transcript: Extract 6.3) 
While all genres are collaboratively constructed through interaction (O'Keeffe 2006), there is 
a marked difference between how this is done in the educational genre we have just 
examined - where the facilitator did most of the work in imposing the genre, with audience 
members acquiescing in it - and the talkshow style here, where we find audience members 
actively positioning themselves to adopt the structure and language of the genre. Here Af9 
and the facilitator collaborate to produce a speech event strongly reminiscent of tabloid 
talkshows: Af9 stands (on request), gives her name, and tells a deeply personal story, to be 
thanked by the facilitator for "sharing". Both the structure and the content of discourse 
draw upon ideas of 'therapy' (Livingstone and Lunt 1994). That AN states her name as she 
starts to talk - something that, interestingly, only some audience members do - draws our 
attention to her ownership of what she is about to say and heightens the personalisation of 
her story; it also reminds us of Alcoholics Anonymous and similar support groups. Similarly, 
her standing position - again, something that does not happen all the time within these 
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events - draws attention to the fact that this is herstory, herexperience, and highlights the 
tension of a private narrative made into a very public event. The facilitator's thanks, in the 
final turn of the segment, can be understood as a reward or affirmation of both what she 
has 'shared' and the confessional position she has taken up. 
Affirmations of such positions are seen at other points through spontaneous applause from 
the audience, another feature carried over from tabloid television (though also present in 
other genres; cf. Heritage and Greatbatch 1986). The segment below is a good example: 
Afl:... And the second thing is I was encouraged by this lady at the front here (cos 
actually-) (. hh) I was in intensive care at the beginning of October last year having tried 
to kill myself for the third time (. hhh) (. ) u: m and almost succeeded I was plugged into 
just about everything with a central line in my neck... 
(Several lines omitted) 
The holistic approach is the way and if drugs are part of that and that helps a lot of 
people then I agree with it. 
Mf: Thank you very much for sharing that. Okay. (Applause from audience) Okay. 
(Event 3, Transcript: Extract 6.4) 
While applause is relatively frequent through the events, it is more unusual for it to be 
initiated by the audience rather than the facilitator and for it to occur at points other than 
certain set places during the event (after 'speaking' speech events, for example, or at the 
very end of the event). Here its `spontaneous' appearance seems initiated by the personal 
stance taken by Aft: again, the fact that she has "shared' seems to require reward. Taken 
together, these structures and discourses work to mimic the tabloid talkshow genre and to 
create a space of 'pseudo-intimacy' (O'Keeffe 2006). 
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While the IRE generic structure placed the emphasis on the facilitator in terms of both 
agency and time on the floor, this talkshow format emphasises the role of the audience. It 
is very apparent, in educational genres, that the facilitator or expert has power to control 
the audience; tabloid talkshow formats at least appear to be more actively co-constructed 
by audience members (although we might note that the facilitator, in the extracts above, 
maintains control, for example by requesting an audience member to stand). The final 
interactional genre I want to look at in detail is different again in that it is primarily 
constructed through the talk of just two individuals: it is the "political', or aggressive, news 
interview (Clayman and Heritage 2002b; Heritage 1985; 2002; Hutchby 1996; O'Keeffe 
2006). 
The aggressive news interview 
While talkshows may attempt to mimic 'normal' conversation (Gregori-Signes 2000b), 
interviewing, with its focus on questioning, abandons pretensions to this and becomes a 
distinctive genre of its own. A key feature is the assumption of neutrality on the part of the 
interviewer, who takes on the role of eliciting information (through questions, probes, re- 
formulations of previous statements, and other devices) for an overhearing audience 
(Heritage 1985). Our own experience of news interviews will tell us that this elicitation is 
often aggressive, and indeed interviewing frequently uses devices which would be viewed 
as confrontational in normal conversation (Clayman and Heritage 2002a; Heritage 2002; 
Hutchby 1996). 
This type of aggressive questioning is present in Dana Centre events, in various negotiated 
forms, and it seems that the genre of news interviewing is being drawn upon and used as a 
resource for organising talk. We see this primarily in segments where there are two 
participants involved in a sequence of talk and one takes the role of eliciting - or 
challenging previously given - information from the other: 
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1: Am9: (Several lines omitted. Addressing Jaf) ... Cos at the end of 
the day, the drug is there 
2: it's been developed it works in this community are you going to deny that community 
3: access to that drug because you don't want to (. ) step on racial toes? And (. ) actually meet 
4: with (. ) on political correctness? There's a danger on both ways it swings both ways. 
5: JAf: Absolutely. Can I just? - 
6: F: Yep. 
7: JAf: Absolutely I'm not denying that and I thought I had actually said that two of my 
8: concerns were... (Several/fines omitted)... As a as a er person of African origin I have 
9: always to be concerned about () you know uh: innovation is great (. ) medical innovation is 
10: great but does it get to the people that it needs to get to? 
11: (2) 
12: Am9: Yeh? Um but then (. ) would you agree your issue's not with a racial drug it's with 
13: health policy in the United States. 
14: JAf: Well health policy in the United States is based on racial (. ) grounds. 
15: Am9: But i- you- but that's the hea- that's the health policy (. ) not the racial drugs. And 
16: you say [(you're confusing those two issues. ) 
17: JAf: [Chicken and egg. Which comes first. 
18: (2) 
19: F: Wh- what? [Would you like to (talk more about your-) 
20: Am9: [Well obviously the health policy comes first because we've only just 
21: starting getting racial drugs now so obviously the policy came first and that's what you're 
22: concerned about. 
23: JAf: Yes. 
24: Am9: Thank you. 
(Event 1, Transcript: Extract 6.5) 
I have omitted several lines of two more lengthy turns in the segment above giving more 
details of the speakers' arguments, but the interactional features remain clear. Am9 and JAf 
are the main speakers, with the facilitator only briefly interposing to grant the floor (lines 6 
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and 19). Am9 is the questioner in the interaction (asking direct questions in lines 3,4, and 
12-13, while JAf asks only a broad rhetorical question in line 10), with JAf in the weakened 
position of having to respond to his questions (Hutchby 1996). Rather than trying to elicit 
further information from JAf, Am9 seems to be challenging the rigour of the position she 
has taken: his aim is to force her to concede that what she has previously said is actually 
untenable (again, this type of attack will be familiar to us from political interviewing). After 
the brief pause in line 18 - when it appears Am9 is awaiting permission to take the floor, 
granted in line 19 - he continues to challenge JAf's position, this time through a direct 
statement of 'facts' and a reformulation of her position rather than a question. His 
reformulation forces agreement - and attending loss of face - from JAf in line 23, and Am9 
then finishes this sequence by thanking her, in line 24. 
Several features of this segment, then, link it to news interviewing, with Am9 taking on the 
role of interviewer. He positions himself as neutral: nowhere does he say 'I' or talk about his 
own views. Instead, he constructs himself as concerned with the facts' of JAf's position and 
how these can be challenged. He uses an aggressive form of questioning which 
distinguishes his talk from that which might be used in everyday conversation. We can 
perhaps see this more clearly if we examine two of the questions he asks in more detail. 
are you going to deny that community access to that drug because you don't want to 
step on racial toes? 
would you agree your issue's not with a racial drug it's with health policy in the United 
States. 
(His second question, in lines 3-4,1 have omitted because it is not entirely clear what he 
means. His hesitation within it, and the fact that it comes directly after his first question, 
suggests that it is a direct parallel with the first question added for rhetorical purposes but 
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not fully articulated. ) Both questions are suggestive of negative interrogatives (Heritage 
2002): questions that start with 'isn't it... ', 'shouldn't you... ', or similar frames. While Am9's 
questions do not fit into the strict framework that Heritage uses in his discussion of the use 
of negative interrogatives in news interviewing, they are similar in that effort needs to be 
done to contradict the statements implicit within them. The questions naturalise and 
assume that the correct answer is'no' (to "are you going to deny... ") and 'yes' (to "would 
you agree... ": the question is what we could call a positive interrogative). Their aggression 
thus stems from having their correct answer already built in; they allow the questioner to 
assume a mantle of neutrality and simultaneously to persuade the overhearing audience to 
their point of view. In addition, Am9's second question is actually tonally ordered not as a 
question but as a statement. Speakers use a rising tone to complete a turn that asks a 
question - transcribed using a question mark - while statements tend to end with a slight 
fall in tone (Atkinson and Heritage 1999; Ochs 1999). Here Am9's flat ending further 
suggests that he is a stating a fact - that JAf's "issue" is actually with health policy - rather 
than asking her a question. 
The end of the segment is also suggestive. Having forced )Af into a face-losing position 
(having to admit "yes" to his aggressively reworked and narrowed-down version of her 
position), Am9 thanks her. What for? She has not complimented or otherwise 'gifted' him. 
His thanks can only refer to her acknowledgement of his correct argument and implied 
retraction of her position; he is, in fact, thanking her for submitting to him. His ending also, 
however, connotes the end of the political interview and the convention that, however 
viciously an interviewee has been treated, and however little the interviewer is in their debt, 
an interviewee is thanked for their participation. His statement of thanks therefore finishes 
the argument (ending the natural turn sequence), emphasises his control, and underscores 
the point that he has won. 
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This segment draws particularly strongly on the conventions of political interviewing, with 
Am9 in the interviewer role of tackling a recalcitrant expert. Interviewers - such as those on 
the BBC's Question Time- do not generally sit in an audience but chair a panel, however; 
they take, in fact, the role of the facilitator. A key feature of this extract is thus that the site 
of the 'news interview' has shifted to involve the audience rather than merely the panel. 
Indeed, within the talk in Dana events that does draw on this genre, sites for particular 
roles are by no means fixed: facilitators, invited speakers, and audience members may all 
take on the "interviewer' role in order to further interrogate another participant. Similarly, 
the way in which the genre is used is relatively fluid, and there may be deviations from the 
norm - as there is above, where both JAf and Am9 are dependent on the facilitator for their 
access to the floor. The frequency of this style of aggressive two-way interaction within the 
transcripts suggests that, while the genre is negotiable, it remains a key resource within the 
Dana site. 
In sum, then, I have described three genres which are drawn upon in Dana Centre event 
discourse: those of formal education, tabloid talkshows, and aggressive news interviewing. 
This is not an exclusive list, and further analysis would doubtless reveal nuances of genres 
from other discursive domains. Indeed, one can be identified with relative ease; 'speaking' 
speech events, for example, frequently fall into the "lecture" genre. This, and the three that I 
have described more fully, do, however, appear to make up the bulk of the discourse. In 
addition I would argue that those I have looked at in detail are especially analytically 
fruitful, both because of - to varying degrees - their incongruity with the way in which the 
Dana Centre presents itself, and the differences between them. We have seen, for example, 
that the focal points for interactions - who is in control, and who predominantly has the 
floor - differs in the different genres we have looked at (and will again, for the'lecture' 
genre). Importantly, these genres are not present merely in isolated events, but can all be 
found - again, to varying degrees - in all of the events studied. Thus we can argue that the 
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genre of interactions within Dana Centre events is not fixed, but shifting, variable and 
uncertain. Genre - and the norms that are encoded within genre - is open to negotiation 
and may be imposed or co-constructed by various actors at various points throughout the 
events. 
This generic uncertainty is coherent with much of what we have already seen: we have 
observed diverse framings of the event (p. 146), 'mixed messages' in the layout and style of 
the Dana space (p. 166), and that the purposes of the events can be constructed in several 
different ways (p. 168-173). Drawing these strands together I would like to argue that Dana 
events are currently overwhelmingly spaces of uncertainty, whose nature and style (and 
with them, the roles of participants) shift from moment to moment. Participants at one 
point are required to read the space as a classroom, and to behave accordingly, obeying the 
facilitator; at another they must understand what is going on as part of a talkshow where 
their contributions of personal narratives are vital. The norms by which they are expected to 
behave change continually: is it permissible or not to question aggressively? Does one 
behave as if in a bar or a lecture? Should or should one not stand when speaking? What 
kind of behaviour should be applauded? We can infer that great skill in reading the current 
interactions - and in constructing genre oneself - is required to understand what is going 
on in the space and to remain socially 'normal'. 
Why are dialogue spaces so flexible and uncertain? While we can, at this point, only 
speculate, we might suggest that it is in part because these are new kinds of spaces. We 
know how to behave when we go to the cinema, or are in a classroom: these knowledges 
are embedded in our culture and we have learned familiarity with them. We are aware of 
their purposes, what they are held to be and to mean, and the social norms that go with 
participating in them. Most of us have been to the cinema or participated as students in a 
classroom. Relatively few, however, have attended science-society dialogue events. These 
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are new social spaces, and their norms and communicative features have not yet become 
fixed or bedded down within our social consciousness. The majority of those attending Dana 
events, for example, have not been there before (Brehaut and Simonsson 2006). The 
newness of the experience, the diversity in the expectations of participants, and a lack of 
clear guidelines may all work to make dialogue events spaces whose norms are up for 
grabs. This is further supported by a point in the previous chapter; that, relatively, there is a 
lot of talk describing the nature of the event (see p. 144). I argued there that this talk is 
diverse - and at times contradictory - in how it frames the event process. It seems likely 
that so much work needs to be done in attempting to define the speech situation because, 
as a new type of social space, it is not clear to participants exactly what they are involved 
in. 
A fixed genre is thus impossible to find because - as we have seen - genres are socially and 
culturally embedded: we cannot obey norms when those norms have yet to be defined and 
learnt. Such spaces become flexible and open: when nobody knows the rules, nobody can 
enforce them, and they are - arguably - open to interpretation by anybody present. In such 
a situation, participants reach for familiarity and draw upon genres that are known and 
already learnt. Genres from other domains - such as television or the classroom - are used 
and applied in a new and unfamiliar site. But one genre alone does not ideally'fit'the Dana 
Centre situation; thus, as we have seen, we find a constant shift from genre to genre in 
order to make use of whichever fits the current communicative events best. 
Davies et al (2006) make a similar point in their analysis of a UK Citizens Council. They 
describe four 'discursive styles- some of which are markedly similar to the genres I have 
discussed - that were drawn upon within deliberative fora, noting that the four styles they 
examine are not an exhaustive account. As I have done, they argue that the unfamiliarity of 
the dialogue process results in a mix of discourse styles being used: 
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.. for the members of the Citizens Council, the question of how to deliberate is pre- 
eminently a practical rather than a theoretical problem. Little was known in advance. 
What would be appropriate? How should a Citizens councillor behave? 
In working out how to deliberate, members of the Council drew on habits of social 
interaction derived from their communities, workplaces and families, combined with 
models and patterns derived from other sources such as watching debates on television. 
(Davies et al 2006: 148) 
The suggestion that it is the newness of these kinds of social spaces that causes their 
uncertainty and flexibility leads us to ask whether, in time, they will settle down as 
discursive sites; whether their genre will in fact become fixed. This in turn leads us to a 
much broader question: what is a 'normal' use of genre? We saw earlier that various 
authors have argued that genres are actually constantly being negotiated and blended 
(p. 175; O'Keeffe 2006); this would suggest that the flexibility of genre in the Dana site 
should not concern us. Perhaps this type of genre shift is normal for social situations; 
something which we are used to and skilled at creating and dealing with. Livingstone and 
Lunt (1994), for example, argue that television talkshows are themselves 'intergeneric' 
pastiches, blending genres such as romance and therapy. Similarly, Davies et al (2006) do 
not find the mix of discursive styles in the deliberative process they examine to be 
problematic. Perhaps many cultural structures will show generic flexibility and uncertainty in 
this way, and have no need to settle into a fixed genre use. 
There are several counters to this argument. One is to recall the emphasis that many 
authors laid on the necessity for users to have familiarity with and mastery over particular 
genres before they can blend and subvert them (Bakhtin 1999; Bhatia 1993; O'Keeffe 2006; 
Swales 1990). It seems unlikely that all of those attending Dana Centre events will have this 
competence in all the genres drawn upon. Another is to note that certain genre blends 
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themselves become familiar to us, until the blend is in itself a genre: talkshows may draw 
on different genres, but they remain instantly recognisable to us in and of themselves. I 
would also, however, like to explore more fully the notion that current genre use within 
Dana Centre events is indeed problematic for those participating, and to argue that we can 
link generic flexibility to certain points at which things 'go wrong' during events. In this 
case, at least, the way in which genre is used does appear to cause problems for 
interaction. 
What `goes wrong' in events: generic instability and other problems for 
participants 
As a participant in Dana Centre events, it is clear that there are points where things'go 
wrong' - not least because these points are frequently acknowledged by other participants 
such as the facilitator. Delays, hesitations or miscommunication may occur, leaving breaks 
and snags in the otherwise smooth surface of the event process. These are points, in other 
words, where we can find out what is meant to happen by examining what is not. My 
analysis indicates that problems or breaks in the flow of the events tend to stem from just a 
few key factors, one of which is, indeed, difficulty and confusion over genre. I will mention 
the others briefly before examining this in more depth; all of these factors are, however, to 
some extent interlinked. 
Firstly, then, the form of the interactions that take place are to a large extent shaped, and 
at times constrained, by the physical space. The size of the space results in the need for 
microphones and problems with all participants being able to hear and see what is taking 
place. The space can be both too quiet - so that speakers without microphones cannot be 
heard - and too noisy (when there are break-out groups, for example, noise from one 
group may disrupt the others). I wish to consider the use of microphones as a 'rule' for 
interaction in more detail in the next chapter; briefly, however, this rule is frequently broken 
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and can lead to delays in the flow of talk, and confusion over who has the floor. The use of 
microphones also links to a further key cause of delays and confusion: the technology used 
in Dana Centre events. I have already briefly described this (p. 164): as well as the sound 
equipment, it includes the electronic voting system, live link-ups, webcasting, and the data 
projection screens (which may be used for powerpoint presentations). My fieldnotes and 
transcripts indicate that this equipment is a frequent cause of delays in the events, due to 
both technical problems and confusion over how the technology should be used. In 
addition, webcast events are given an extra layer of complexity by their dual audience: 
interactions must take into account both those physically present and those participating via 
the web. This dual audience presents problems for those controlling the event (frequently 
the facilitator) in terms of how the different types of interaction should be managed. 
Both the physical space and the use of technology link to the problems that stem from 
genre use by imposing certain constraints upon the interactions that take place. In 
particular, many of the delays, hesitations, and confusions that occur derive from the 
mismatch between a socially imposed ideal of 'conversation' and the actual possibilities for 
interaction within the space (both physical and social). Thus, for example, most of the 
genres we have examined rely on relatively rapid exchanges of talk, whether between two 
(in the case of the news interview) or more individuals. The necessity for microphones, 
however, severely limits the possibilities for this. 
Am22: (several lines omitted) ... there's no point reducing it to to moralistic arguments 
there isn't a leg for you to stand on in that respect. 
F: Okay II did- I did nod and I had said that I would take this question. (points over to 
left) 
(8) 
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Af24: I don't- I don't think that it was the fact the drug was a second class drug... 
(several lines omitted) 
(Event 1, Transcript) 
The segment above comes from towards the end of Event 1, and, although I have omitted 
the bulk of the arguments given by the participants in order to highlight the interactional 
structure, Af24's comment is in direct response to what Am22 has been saying. Her 
participation in a debate, conversation or interview with Af22 is, however, extremely limited 
by the constraints imposed on their talk: not only must she wait for permission to speak 
from the facilitator and for a microphone to be carried to her (the reason for the eight 
second delay), but, after she has spoken, Am22 is not given an opportunity to respond back 
to her. They are therefore precluded from using - should they have wished to - the news 
interview genre: their interaction is shaped by the constraints placed upon it. While I have 
argued, then, that these flexible and uncertain generic spaces give scope for participants to 
choose and use different genres, this is not entirely true: at times participants are limited to 
particular types of interaction. 
Generic flexibility, then, is somewhat deceptive. While genres of interaction do shift, it 
appears that not all participants have equal power to control them. This tends to put the 
onus on audience members to'read'the genre currently being used by more powerful 
actors, and to cope with delays in the talk such as the eight second gap in the extract 
above. A further genre mismatch which causes problems for participants is that between 
the conversational (or pseudo-conversational) ideal, which is constructed through internal 
framings of the event as open debate and which is implicit in some of the genres drawn 
upon, and the realities of the actual social situation. A conversation' is actually almost 
impossible to achieve, given the physical and social space. The extract below demonstrates 
this, and some further problems, more fully: 
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1: F:... We have three (. ) very eminent presenters this evening, and the first will be Dr Simon 
2: () 
3: RTm: °Unwin 
4: F: Unwin on my left um () Simon is a senior research fellow at the institute for the study 
5: of genetics, biorisk and society at the university of oswestry (. ) a: nd he'll give us a brief 
6: history of how the drug bidil27 came about, how it needs to be distinguished (. ) and he'll also 
7: look at the issue of using ethnicity to characterise people and other rela- related issues such 
8: as gender. 
9: (1.5) 
10: RTm: Okay shall I start? 
11: F: You're on! 
12: RTm: Okay. 
(Event 1, Transcript: Extract 6.6) 
The tabloid talkshow genre, as I have discussed above (p. 178), is pseudo-conversational 
(Gregori-Signes 2000b): it mimics everyday conversation in order to help create a situation 
of pseudo-intimacy (O'Keeffe 2006) where personal stories can be shared. Conversational 
genres are, however, difficult to impose where the social situation is markedly different to 
that in which normal conversation takes place. The facilitator's lack of certainty as to the 
speaker's name - she hesitates in line 1, and must be helped by the speaker, who tells her 
his surname in line 3- creates not only an embarrassing pause, but instantly transforms the 
discursive situation away from 'conversation' (where participants are generally known to one 
another) and towards a more formal encounter where participants do not know one 
another28. The reason for this - and other similar lapses throughout the events - is, of 
27 I have transcribed drug names and other technical language phonetically throughout. In this case'bidil' 
corresponds to the US drug BiDil. 
28 Contrast this extract, for example, with its formal introduction of the speakers in general and RTm in particular, 
with O'Keeffe's (2006) analysis of the construction of pseudo-intimacy in radio phone-in shows. She finds that 
intimacy can be created and sustained through the use of various devices, including the simulation of co-presence, 
inclusive use of pronouns, opening 'small-talk', and the construction of the presenter as an 'ordinary' person. 
Facilitators in the Dana space do not make use of these devices, and, indeed, at times act to destroy intimacy 
through formal language. 
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course, that the participants do not know one another. Their social situation - as strangers 
meeting together - is in conflict with the conversational ideal that genre use constructs. 
'Conversation', and the genres that draw upon it, is thus limited both by social and physical 
aspects of the Dana Centre space. It is, for example, marked by equal access to and use of 
the floor (see Cameron 2001; Heritage 2001), which - as we have already seen - is not the 
case in this space due to the constraints of the space and the need for microphones. 
The extract also brings to our attention another key problem: confusion over the rules of 
speaking. As the facilitator finishes her introduction (in line 8), there is a brief pause before 
RTm asks her "Okay shall I start? " (line 10). He is clearly unaware of the norms of 
interaction of this situation: should he start talking or not? (He goes, after line 12, into his 
'speaking' section. ) He requires permission and guidance from the facilitator as to how to 
behave in the space. Such confusion is not uncommon. Participants may unintentionally 
interrupt each other, show surprise at the enforcement of rules (one audience member says 
"Oooh microphone! " when it is handed to her), or break the rules of the space. It seems 
that there is frequent uncertainty as to what the norms and rules are and how participants 
should behave. This brings us back to genre. I have discussed how genre encodes norms of 
behaviour and informs us of the rules by which we should interact. The lack of knowledge 
of these rules, and the interactional hesitations and problems that flow from this in the 
Dana space, leads us to infer that generic uncertainty is problematic for participants in that 
it leaves them without fixed guidelines as to how they should behave. Without a set 
reference point for the genre of interaction, those in the Dana space are frequently left 
guessing as to the norms by which they should orientate their behaviour. 
In conclusion, then, this chapter has continued to emphasise the flexibility of Dana Centre 
events: a variety of framings are present for the purposes and outcomes of the events, and 
an examination of the genre of speech events has indicated that this is also shifting. I have 
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suggested that a reason for this flexibility and 'mixed messages' throughout events is the 
newness of dialogue as a social process. Genre has not had time to become fixed, and it 
appears that participants draw upon particular genres which are known to them, using them 
as a resource to organise discourse. We might also link this to Alan Irwin's (2006) 
discussion of current efforts at public engagement as a blend between 'old' and 'new' types 
of scientific governance: what we are seeing here, it seems likely, is this mixing on the 
micro-level, as different frameworks are applied to dialogue processes. Finally, while 
acknowledging that in theory this flexibility in genre and framing allows a continual 
reinvention of the event by all participants, I have argued that generic uncertainty is in fact 
problematic for those present. Along with other factors, such as the event space and use of 
technology, it can cause confusion and difficulty in talk between participants. In particular I 
have identified a generic mismatch between a conversational ideal and the practicalities of 
the physical and social context. 
In my discussion I have linked genre with norms of behaviour: genre, I have argued, 
encodes particular norms, and the recognition of genre will enable participants to 
understand how they should behave. I now move on to consider in detail more fixed norms 
and rules of behaviour within the Dana Centre space, and to examine the roles and 
constructions of different participants. Within this next section of my analysis I will be 
bringing to the fore an issue which has only been hinted and implicit so far: the question of 
power within dialogue events. 
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Chapter 7 
The Rules of Engagement III: Power and 
authority in the Dana space 
We have seen so far that Dana Centre events are flexible and uncertain spaces, whose 
norms, as encoded in genre, seem to shift from moment to moment. I now wish to develop 
this further by examining in detail more fixed norms and rules of interaction within the 
space. Having done this, I will move on to look at the roles different participants play within 
events and the way in which they are constructed, before drawing these analyses together 
with a discussion of what they indicate about power and authority with Dana Centre events. 
How to be normal: Norms and rules of interaction 
Norms of interaction will include not only explicitly stated rules but also "proprieties" - such 
as whether or not one may interrupt, or how turns should be allocated - and norms of topic 
(Hymes 1974: 60). Analysis will therefore produce a description of what 'normal' behaviour is 
within a particular speech community. To some extent we have already examined these 
kinds of questions, through looking at genre in Dana Centre events; observing, for example, 
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that at some points it appears 'normal' to stand if you are speaking, or that the use of 
microphones is a key feature of the space. Analysis thus far suggests that norms of 
interaction encoded in genre are shifting and may be hard to pin down. While I will return 
to the point that norms are both variable and contested, I wish to examine here more 
explicit rules and broader concepts of 'normal' behaviour found in the Dana Centre. 
Norms of topic 
Norms of topic can be dealt with fairly briefly. In the event transcripts, talk is exclusively 
focussed around the framing topic for that evening (as defined by the event title and the 
way in which the facilitator introduces the event). All types of contribution - whether 
'speaking' events from invited experts, personal narratives, questions, or comments - are 
relevant to this broad topic. No-one, for example, talks (during the main dialogue event) 
about the price of petrol or the best way to knit: the discourse is instead focussed onto a 
narrow region of experience and knowledge (another difference, of course, between this 
type of discourse and everyday conversation). It is significant, given the strict focus on a 
topic that is kept throughout the event, that the facilitator appears to have a key role in 
defining this topic (and what is'relevant'to it) and in policing the focus on it throughout the 
event. Take, for example, these segments of the facilitator's talk from Event 2 (lines 
indicate long breaks in the transcript): 
F:... Er this is part of a series of events on drugs here (. ) er funded by the Wellcome 
Trust... 
(several lines omitted) ... I was 
doing a little bit of research this evening and apparently 
(. ) thirty percent of people in this country have taken drugs presumably illegal drugs, 
and ten percent have taken them in the last year. 
F:... So first of all we're gonne to hear from James Tarkin on the end there, who is 
professor of behavioural pharmacology (. ) at the institute of psychiatry, which basically 
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means he studies the behavioural effects of drugs by looking at exactly how they act in 
the brain. Concentrating on addictive drugs but interestingly the work he's best known 
for is on nicotine. Over to you James. 
Af13: Yeah I'm just interested in the whole ritalin ADHD thing. Erm: and are we giving 
ritalin to children just cos we can't manage their behaviour? Erm what are the- how does 
it work. 
F: Okay so that's- (prescribed) I should actually say before we go into a very long 
discussion of this point there's another event here on the tenth of November which is 
precisely about (. ) using er drugs to well to mend psychological disorders called pills to 
make you normal (. hh) so while I don't wantto kind of squash that as a subject of 
debate but er but there is going to be a whole evening devoted that. 
(Event 2, Transcript) 
The facilitator's talk here works to define the topic ("drugs"), what is relevant information to 
that topic (the statistics she cites), what is relevant expertise (in her description of the 
speaker's background), and what is notrelevant to the topic (in her policing of Af13's 
question which then gets dropped as a point for discussion). How powerful the effects of 
this framing and defining work might be can be seen if we consider what she does not say: 
how would the tone of the event have changed if she had started by talking about the role 
of drugs in prostitution, or by introducing the speaker as a parent as well as a scientific 
expert? We can only speculate as to this. We can however say from the quotes above that 
the framing given is, broadly, a scientific one. The facilitator's background information and 
her introduction of the speaker, in particular, construct the topic and the event as being 
about scientific questions, where scientific expertise is needed. The topic for discussion is 
thus narrowed down and then policed in a way that is not automatic (it is perfectly possible, 
after all, to imagine other ways of framing the topic'drugs'), and which may exclude or 
render irrelevant certain perspectives. 
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Norms of interaction 
The facilitator thus takes a key role in defining and policing the topic. They are similarly 
important in defining and enforcing the rules of interaction. These rules - which may be 
identified by their explicit statement, through observing their transgression, or by inference 
through examining behaviour in the space - fall into several key categories. Some of these 
can be dealt with reasonably briefly; it will be productive for us to examine others in more 
depth. 
One relatively trivial - but explicit - rule is that mobile phones should be put into silent 
mode during the event. Related to this, it appears that normal behaviour is to listen during 
the event - either to a speaker, or whoever else is speaking at the time. Disruptions are 
unusual and - apparently - frowned upon. My fieldnotes indicate that the majority of those 
present will focus on the front of the room, silently watching and listening; behaviour such 
as whispering or talking in groups is present, at times, but appears to be transgressive. This 
'listening' behaviour is also endorsed by facilitators: one tells an audience member that they 
"need to sit near someone [a speaker] otherwise you won't hear what people have to say" 
(Event 4, Transcript). Norms of politeness also apply in the events, to a relatively formal 
level: behaviour such as swearing is avoided - as in the extract below - and language such 
as'ladies and gentlemen' is used. 
PKm:... when you stop taking the drugs they stop having their effect I mean (. ) they're- 
(. ) sorry I was going to swear which I probably shouldn't 
(Event 3, Transcript) 
Such norms and rules are relatively standard and would apply to many other social 
situations. More extensive discursive and interactional work is, however, expended on 
norms related to gaining access to the floor. The key rule here, put simply, is that the 
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facilitator controls the floor. They grant permission to both audience members and speakers 
to take the floor, and also have the power to notgrant the floor to someone wishing to 
speak (who may have broken the rules, for example). We see this control in the segment 
below. (As non-verbal communication is important in these interactions, I have transcribed 
information such as gestures and gaze direction. ) 
1: F: Lots of food for thought. Before we throw the floor open for questions, um (. ) (turns to 
2: RTm) do you wanna answer any of Kim's questions? () (Looks up and at audience) And I 
3: want all of you to think about the questions that you wanne ask. 
4: (2) 
5: RTm: (RTm, who has been writing, looks up and at F then around space) Er well I dunno 
6: ma-maybe it's a good idea to (. ) hear from the audience [first I mean- 
7: JAf: 
8: looks over to her) 
9: RTm: Well I:: I- 
10: F: Go on go on 
[Ooooh coward (laughs) (RTm 
11: RTm: What question- okay I mean I suppose... (several lines omitted) ... I guess is 
12: something we- you know we wanna keep an eye on. (Looks at Fas he finishes) 
13: F: Okay. Who has a question? (Looking around the room. Looks at someone and nods) 
14: (3) 
15: Am7: (Words are indistinguishable as he speaks without a mic) 
16: F: Um (. ) (pointing) try to wait until we we give you the mic. 
17: Am7: Er it wasn't so much a question but... (continues) 
(Event 1, Transcript: Extract 7.1) 
The facilitator here clearly has the role of organising talk within the event: she is able to 
direct the speakers (granting RTm the floor in line 2, and then urging him to speak in line 
10) and to select an audience member and grant them the floor (through her invitations to 
ask "questions" in lines 3 and 13, and her indication in line 13 that Am7 can take the floor). 
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She uses both verbal and non-verbal communication to do this, using eye contact and a nod 
to indicate that Am7 can speak as well as spoken directions ("Who has a question? ", line 
11). Her control is further highlighted by the behaviour of RTm, who looks at her as he 
finishes his turn, despite the fact that he has been speaking in response to a question from 
JAf. His gaze indicates both a deference to her and the importance of letting her know he 
has finished speaking, so that she can organise the next turns. 
Of course, the norms attending access to the floor are more complex than the simple rule 
that the facilitator controls this. For audience members, there is in fact an entire sequence 
of actions to complete before their request can be granted. There must, firstly, be an 
invitation from the facilitator - or occasionally from a speaker - for the audience to speak. 
(We see this in the extract above: the facilitator signals that she is going to "throw the floor 
open for questions" (line 1) and then does so in line 13 by asking "Who has a question? ". ) 
Unsolicited contributions (for example during speaker's 'speaking' events) never occur. In 
contrast with many other types of public meeting (cf. Llewellyn 2005), then, there is no 
'heckling' or seizing of the floor by the audience. After the invitation, audience members 
must signal their desire for the floor by raising a hand, and then, as we see in the extract 
above, must be granted specific permission from the facilitator to take the floor. They then 
often must wait again in order to obey another key rule of the space: all talk must be 
spoken into a microphone. There are generally two "roaming mics' in the space, carried by 
members of the Dana staff team; the nearest of these to the selected audience member is 
brought across so that the audience member can speak into it. They are handed the 
microphone, hold it for their turn, and it is then taken back from them. 
The process of taking the floor is thus, for an audience member, a relatively complex 
procedure. Given that many of these rules are often not explicitly stated until they are 
broken (as we saw for speaking only with a microphone in the extract above, and as is also 
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the case for audience members only having access to the microphone for one turn), it is not 
surprising that there is frequent confusion as to what is correct behaviour. At times this 
becomes overt, as in the extract below. Am6 has just finished a short personal description 
of the effects of drug use: his uncertainty as what then to do with the microphone is turned 
to humorous account by the facilitator. 
F: Okay. So you just kind of retreated [into (. ) being stoned and didn't... 
Am6: 
F: 
Am6: 
let go of this now? 
F: You can let go of it now. 
Am6: Brilliant. 
[Yeah definitely yeah definitely. [Yeah:: 
[Okay. [D- 
[Can I- (. ) 
F: That's alright if you feel you can [I mean if (it's become a prop) 
Am6: [(Laughs) 
(Event 2, Transcript: Extract 7.2) 
'Normal' behaviour also includes that only one person should speak at a time. While there 
are overlaps and interruptions in the data, these are short-lived: one of the speakers retires 
and the other takes the floor. Apart from occasional bursts of applause, there is also very 
little whole audience involvement to interrupt the current turn-taker: Llewellyn, in contrast, 
in his study of local government public meetings (2006), finds behaviour such as 'buzzing' 
and cooperative heckling from the audience. More subtly, one norm - enforced by the 
facilitator, as controller of the floor - seems to be that speakers take priority over audience 
members in access to the floor. This is not only the case for the long initial turns that the 
invited speakers take (see chapter 5), but also seems to apply during later phases of the 
event. They have the opportunity to have the 'last word', to respond to all audience 
questions or comments (whereas audience members do not always get the opportunity to 
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respond in turn), and to successfully signal their desire to speak through a (norm-breaking) 
interruption, and have that desire granted. 
Despite this prioritisation of speaker's talk, there also seems to be a rule applying to the 
audience relating to fair access to the floor. Again, this is enforced by the facilitator, who 
seeks to encourage those who have not contributed so far and to limit domination of the 
floor by a few audience members. Thus at times audience members may be refused the 
floor on the grounds that they have spoken already: 
F:... have you ever had that feeling when you go someplace and you go home and you 
think o:: h (. ) why didn't I say it? () This is the time. Anybody who hasn't said anything 
(. ) have you not said anything? Good! Okay. 
(Event 3, Transcript) 
Here the facilitator deliberately opens the floor only to those who haven't "said anything", 
even going to the extent of double-checking this with the audience member she selects 
C'have you not said anything? "). She constructs a domain in which all in the audience have 
an equal right to speak - even if they are apparently at times not eager to do so. We have, 
of course, seen this idea of'fairness' before, in looking at the 'sharing-as-a-good' framing of 
the event (chapter 6). In the extract quoted there (p. 170), the facilitator again limits her 
invitation to the floor and ignores requests to speak from those who have already 
participated. This type of talk - originating almost entirely from the facilitator, as they 
organise and police the floor - both constructs speaking as a good, something which 
everyone present does or should desire ("you go home and you think o:: h (. ) why didn't I 
say it? "), and links to ideas about fairness and equality of access in dialogue that are also 
present in the academic literature (see Cooke 2000; Rowe and Frewer 2000; 2004). This 
fairness of access rule only seems to apply to the audience in the Dana Centre context; 
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speakers, for example - while they may at times be asked to complete brief turns to enable 
audience interaction - are never told that they can only speak once. 
The presence of rule- and norm-breaking behaviour 
The norms and rules that I have described are present at varying levels of explicitness. 
Taken together, however, they constitute a broad guide to behaviour in the Dana Centre 
space: follow them, and you will be acting 'normally'. But we have already seen (in extracts 
7.1 and 7.2 above) that in practice they are not followed perfectly. Perhaps because the 
rules are frequently implicit rather than explicit, mistakes are made in obeying them and 
they may also be deliberately flouted. Those rules to do with turn-taking seem particularly 
open to attack. As well as accidental overlaps or confusion over whose turn it is (one of the 
'problem' areas I discussed earlier, p. 193), participants may at times deliberately interrupt 
another speaker, speak without a microphone, or hold on to the microphone so as to allow 
themselves another turn. Both invited speakers and audience members may be involved in 
this type of rule-breaking behaviour, which we could understand as rejecting the facilitator's 
control of the floor. The relatively long extract below demonstrates this kind of deviant 
behaviour - from a speaker and an audience member - in detail. 
1: Am4: Okay. The most famous equa- equation is e equals mc squared. One (. ) thing that 
2: always (. ) gives me a problem (. ) with this equation is that I believe that mass (. ) is a 
3: physical entity and energy is a property. And (. ) I always have trouble believing that mass 
4: can be converted into energy (. ) why-if energy appears (. ) even by the law of mc squared, 
5: it must carry away with it some mass (. ) so conversion of mass into energy does not 
6: happen. 
7: (JPf takes mit from Am4. ) 
8: F: Er let's start with (. ) Paul here, and then Tom they're both sort of busting a gut to 
9: speak. (Yeah right you can go through. ) 
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10: PSm: Um (. ) if I understand- so you're saying that that-that mass cannot be converted 
11: into energy? () Well (hhh) I (. ) that I-I-I have to say I don't agree with that I think (. ) um 
12: (. ) all all the er all the nuclear devices that have been generated reactors bombs and so on 
13: they they make [it- 
14: Am4: [ (indistinguishable speech without mic) (JPf runs forward from the back 
15: and gives Am4 the mic. ) Sorry. I'm not denying that nuclear energy is real I understand 
16: the process I understand the principles, what I'm saying is (. ) there is no such thing as 
17: pure energy. Energy is the property of an object, and if [energy is (raises voice) 
18: transported, then it= 
19: BGm: [No-no oh- (Moves and 
20: gesticulates ) 
21: Am4: =it has to be carried away by mass 
22: F: Hold on I- I think [Charles is is gonna have a problem unless [he answers this 
23: BGm: [(Er-) [Champing at the bit 
24: there. Just a minor (??? ) bugbear of mine. I think that e equals mc squared () must be 
25: one of the most misunderstood (. ) equations in the world... 
(Event 4, Transcript: Extract 7.3) 
Am4, who has previously been granted the floor by the facilitator (after an invitation to ask 
"questions") begins 'correctly'. He has been given the microphone and speaks into it. He 
does, however, reject the immediate framing that has been given to his contribution: he 
doesn't ask a question but makes a statement ("conversion of mass into energy does not 
happen", in lines 5-6). Having done this, however, the interaction develops fairly normally. 
The microphone is taken from him (by a member of the Dana staff team), and the facilitator 
gives two of the invited speakers permission to take the floor in response (lines 8-9). PSm 
starts to comment but is abruptly interrupted by Am4, whose words are indistinguishable on 
the recording (and presumably to much of the rest of the space) because he is speaking 
without a microphone. Whatever he said - we can assume a version of his turn in lines 15- 
17, in direct response to PSm's comments - his interruption serves to mark his desire to 
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speak. Interestingly, his rule-breaking is not punished but rather rewarded: JPf returns and 
gives him the microphone. Now with the microphone, Am4 can speak 'effectively' in 
response, as his comment can be heard and it becomes permissible to respond to it. As he 
speaks, BGm now becomes involved in the interaction for the first time. His interjection in 
line 19 C'No-no oh-") signals his desire to speak further. In interposing it he interrupts not 
only Am4 - who continues speaking - but also PSm, to whom Am4's comment is directed 
and who could reasonably expect to take the next turn. In so clearly indicating his desire to 
speak, he is also usurping the facilitator's power over the floor: he rejects her organisation 
of turn-taking and makes it almost impossible, within the norms of politeness, for her to do 
anything other than grant him the next turn (as, indeed, she does). The facilitator finally 
becomes involved in line 22, to'rubber-stamp' BGm taking the next turn; as we might 
expect, given the norm of speakers taking priority over audience members, she tells Am4 to 
"hold on" and lets BGm continue. He does not seem content even with her involvement in 
rubber-stamping the turn-taking, however, and interrupts her twice in line 23, finally gaining 
unhindered access to the floor in line 24. 
In one burst of interaction, then, which lasts just over a minute, we have seen many of the 
rules and norms of the Dana space rejected or ignored. Participants talk without a 
microphone, speak at the same time, take more than one turn, and - perhaps most 
importantly - reject the facilitator's control of the floor. Indeed, we can see all the rule- 
breaking as aspects of this rejection: the rules stem from this role and are enforced by it. 
The facilitator's response to this is interesting. Her turn in line 20 can be understood as a 
reassertion of her control; she speaks to formally allow BGm to take the floor, even when 
she has no choice but to give it to him. But we might still be surprised she does not 
comment further on the behaviour of Am4 and BGm. Possibly she is too bound by norms of 
politeness: it could be hard for her to punish their rule-breaking behaviour without insulting 
their status as independent adults involved in 'dialogue'. Possibly, too, the various 
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interjections simply happen too fast for her to do anything about them. We can also note 
that to some extent the decision of how to react to Am4's un-microphoned speech is taken 
out of her hands. The Dana team member ]Pf brings the microphone back to Am4 without 
any verbal signal from the facilitator to do so. 
This type of reaction to rule-breaking behaviour is not the only one present in the events. At 
other times facilitators may simply ignore un-microphoned speech, or rapidly curtail talk that 
has interrupted another speaker or which has ignored their instructions on turn-order. 
Policing of the norms and rules of the space is present, therefore, and the interactions also 
generally self-police in that they keep to "normal' behaviour. But it appears that at certain 
times - such as this one - rejection of the complex rules of interaction of the Dana Centre 
space can be an effective device for both invited speakers and other participants. 
Constructing roles: Participants in Dana Centre events 
We move on now to examine the participants - those involved in communicative acts (see 
Hymes 1974: 56) - within Dana Centre interactions. From my descriptions so far we can see 
that there appear to be three key roles within the event: invited speaker, audience member, 
and facilitator. This is not entirely inclusive: Dana staff team members, for example, may 
participate in some interactions and may, as we have seen, be involved as'roaming mics'. 
The vast majority of talk, however, stems from these three roles. I therefore will examine 
each of these in more detail, briefly discussing relevant background information but 
primarily focussing on how they are constructed, framed and situated through talk in the 
Dana Centre events. Before I go on to do this, however, it may be useful to briefly note the 
numbers of participants involved. There are, on average, 59 public attendees to events 
(Simonsson 2006); my fieidnotes indicate variations around this average from 30 to 80 
people. In addition to public participants, there is always one facilitator, and three or four 
invited speakers. Perhaps more interesting to us than the number of attendees is the 
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number of audience members actually involved in speaking within the public forum: my 
fieidnotes and sketches indicate that around 12 of those sitting in the audience generally 
participate in this way29. 
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Figure 7.1: Field sketch from Event 3, showing the number and location of audience members who spoke. 
Thus though the field of possible participants can be very high, in practice only a few of 
those are involved in spoken interaction. Arguably, the number of participants in the 
Hymesian sense is limited to around 15, and others present are involved only passively, as 
observers" 
Z9 This figure is at slight odds with audience turns in transcripts, because it was impossible to distinguish, at times, 
where questions were from 'new' audience members and where they were from those who had already spoken. 
Thus the transcripts show more 'questions/comments' than there are participating audience members: as we have 
already seen (from the facilitator seeking to police over-use of the floor by a few individuals), some audience 
members will contribute - or seek to contribute - repeatedly. 
30 Arguably, because there are certainly some points, such as the voting stages, where the entire audience is - or 
is meant to be - involved. In addition, the language used by facilitators and speakers addresses the entire 
audience, not just an 'active' section of it. 
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Constructing the 'facilitator' 
The facilitator role, as we have seen, plays a key part in organising the running of the event 
and the interactions that take place there. Perhaps surprisingly, given the importance of this 
role, there is very little discursive work done to frame or explain it. The facilitator's part in 
the event seems largely to be assumed and their expertise is rarely explored. They are 
generally named as the "facilitator'- the word comes from within the data - and this seems 
to encode the entirety of the role, with further explanation being deemed unnecessary. 
Take, for example, the extract below, which is the most lengthy introduction of a facilitator 
in my data: 
)Pf:... Okay (. ) without any further ado I'm going to hand you over to our host for this 
evening Theresa Oliver. Theresa's currently writing (. ) science based dramas as part of a 
NESTA dreamtime fellowship (. hh) and she's a former science correspondent for the BBC 
(. ) and author of how to clone the perfect blond as well as one of our regular facilitators 
here so over to you Theresa! 
(Event 4, Transcript: Extract 7.4) 
]Pf has just spent six lines giving "housekeeping' notices: reminding people to switch their 
phones off and asking them to fill in feedback forms. In contrast, she takes just four lines of 
talk to introduce the facilitator, framing her broadly in terms of profession and background 
(all of which are related to communication in some form; from this being deemed relevant 
we might infer that the role is a communicative one). She also notes that Theresa is a 
"regular facilitator" at the Dana Centre: this is a role, then, that is filled by those external to 
the Dana Centre but who might be 'regulars' there. (In fact, two of the events I studied in 
detail were facilitated by the same person. ) My broader ethnographic research backs this 
up. While in science-dialogue events overall there is some variation, with some sites making 
use of internal facilitators, the Dana Centre almost exclusively uses external facilitators who 
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are paid to take part in the event. This is then a professionalised role: something else we 
might infer from the list )Pf gives of Theresa's professional communication background. 
While the exact role of the facilitator in the event is given very little flesh, we are told that 
they have ownership of it. JPf tells the audience that she is going to `hand them over' to 
their "host for this evening" and finishes by saying "over to you" to the facilitator. From this 
point on, it seems, the facilitator will own and control the event. They are the'host', whose 
responsibility it is to make things run smoothly and to keep all present happy. Throughout 
the events, facilitators demonstrate this type of ownership. They welcome people in, thank 
participants, decide when to stop for an interval and when to close. They own both the 
space ("welcome to the Dana Centre"; Event 2, Transcript) and the process C'I'd like to 
welcome you to another occasion for lively debate and dialogue"; Event 3, Transcript). 
Given this, and the resulting work they do in framing the event process and the other 
participants, we may be able to suggest one reason that there is little overt framing of this 
role. If it is the facilitator who does the majority of work in constructing the roles of others - 
whose role is, in some ways, to define roles - this leaves no-one to describe or define their 
own role explicitly. 
The only further point we can note about the facilitator role is that their part in the 
interactions and their role in the space of the Dana Centre constructs them as different to 
others in that space. This is, of course, not surprising, given that I have argued that they 
have a distinct role, but it is useful to examine briefly particular ways in which they are 
different. As well as their part in owning the event and controlling the floor, they are 
different in their allowable physical actions in the space. They stand or sit at the front (a 
different space to the 'audience'), but may move around during the event (as opposed to 
invited speakers, who generally remain static). They also act differently: their arrival in the 
space signals the start of the event, contrasting with the audience members who are 
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frequently in the event space early and must sit and wait for it to start. They do not vote, 
when voting takes place, but rather instruct others to do so. They are also introduced to the 
audience, as we have seen, in terms of their professional background, however little detail 
of their role is given in that introduction. To labour the point somewhat, talk and behaviour 
in the Dana space make it clear that they are not the same as the audience members or 
(though to a lesser extent) the speakers. 
Constructing invited 'speakers' 
What can we say about the ways in which those that I have been calling speakers, or 
invited speakers, are constructed in the space? The facilitator has a key role in defining this. 
They introduce the speakers, naming them ("presenters", "speakers", "experts") in such a 
way as to influence our perception of what their role is to be in the event, and giving them 
a background which both heightens our sense of their authority and works to shape the 
event itself as driven by academic expertise. So, for example, to take one such introduction 
from Event 3: 
F:... And (. ) our first speaker will be Dr Delia Thompson. Delia became a medical tutor 
and the first woman fellow of Exeter College in Oxford in 1982. At the University College 
London she's a- she was a lecturer in pharmacology, and is now a reader in 
experimental psychopharmacology. Delia is the current president of the British 
Association for Psychopharmacology. Her research concentrates on the neurobiology of 
mood and behaviour, and how nerve cell communication in the brain is modified by 
drugs used that treat psychiatric disorders. Please welcome Dr Delia Thompson. 
(Event 3, Transcript) 
The "speaker" is thus framed entirely in terms of her scientific achievements and expertise. 
Her role is to'speak', and she will, we infer, speak from the technical knowledge which is 
implied by the facilitator's listing of her professional qualifications and experience. Similar 
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introductions occur for all of those speaking, and are of varying length. (The source of these 
types of framings is, however, more complex than being simply the facilitator: they may be 
read out from background biographies provided by the Dana Centre staff team. ) As well as 
these formal introductions, facilitators also use other language that frames the speakers as 
authoritative and valuable to the event: they are "eminent and fantastic speakers", "very 
well informed people", or "experts". The speaker role, then, appears to be constructed - at 
least by the facilitator - as a kind of expert resource for the event. They are there to 
'present' or give information: there is no sense in which the framing they are given allows 
us to consider them as learning through the dialogue process. Their formal expertise is 
highlighted and the audience is frequently encouraged to ask "questions" of them in order 
to make use of that expertise. The very fact that they are each given long turns - during 
their'speaking' speech events - near the start of the event suggests that their knowledge is 
important and relevant enough to form the basis of everything that follows. Partly as an 
implication of this, they are also constructed as being differentto others present: the very 
emphasis on their technical qualifications implies that this is something unusual and that 
their words will carry more authority than those of others. 
As we saw for the facilitator role, this difference is not just created by the language used 
but also by speakers' movements in the space. They sit at the front, or at the centre of their 
own small break-out group audience, and they enter the space later than most others. 
Frequently, their entrance is attended by applause. Speakers - and often facilitators - have 
access to a 'green room' before and after events, where they are given dinner and drinks 
and in which they can leave their belongings during the event. They are shepherded down 
from this at the right point by a Dana Centre team member: their entrance into the event 
space, therefore, is stage-managed and controlled. They have specially designated seats, 
which audience members are asked to move from if they sit in. They are repeatedly 
thanked and applauded during the event (after their 'speaking', for example). Both they and 
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the facilitator use fixed microphones and therefore have no need to wait for access to a 
roaming microphone in order to gain access to the floor. The entire design of the event tells 
us that invited speakers are different to those of us in the audience: they are treated 
differently, and - we infer - their talk is valued differently. 
While facilitator talk and the physical layout of the space therefore tend to construct 
speakers in this strongly authoritative and technical expertise-driven way, the way in which 
speakers situate themselves can be more complex. At times, for example, they may reject 
these kinds of framings and use other roles: they may speak 'personally' about their own 
experiences, or talk of themselves as - for example -a brother or black person rather than 
a technical expert. These types of alignments are, however, shifting and in conjunction with 
more traditionally authoritative positions. There is thus some evidence for role-switching on 
the part of speakers: at times they may identify with their audience, constructing 
themselves as the same rather than different, and at times they may make use of non- 
scientific or non-expert roles. Such complexity might be expected, given the findings from 
the group interview studies performed - which suggested that scientific experts, as much as 
anyone, are capable of sophisticated understandings of sociological entities and processes - 
but appears in this data at least to not be fully or ideally realised. These more complex 
positions that 'experts' take are transitory, and the majority of expert talk does, indeed, 
construct itself as expert and authoritative. 
Constructing the 'audience': framings from event process, speakers and facilitators 
If the facilitator is the 'host' and the speakers are an 'expert resource', how is the audience 
framed during Dana Centre events? 31 We reach a further level of complexity as we turn to 
31 'Audience' is itself, of course, a loaded term, connoting passivity. I have chosen to use it (in conjunction with 
more general terms, such as 'participants') for several reasons: clarity and ease of use (it is obvious to which group 
of participants it refers to), its relative accuracy (the'audience' does, indeed, primarily listen), and, most 
significantly, its grounding in the data. In event transcripts and in interviews participants frequently use the term to 
describe those who are not invited speakers, facilitators or Dana staff. 
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examine this: it is shifting, diverse and highly contingent on immediate context. In addition, 
relatively little discursive work is done on positioning the audience, making it hard to track 
through the data. However, we can say that there is a generally positive depiction of the 
audience within Dana Centre discourse. We are, as the audience, framed as interested, 
informed, opinionated and active by facilitators' and speakers'talk. 
F:... Okay there you are this this shows you what a well-informed audience we have 
here and what a lively debate we're going to have. 
(Event 2, Transcript) 
The quote above - which comes from after some initial voting and comments in Event 2- 
demonstrates these type of assumptions. The audience is "well-informed", which seems to 
enable "lively debate"; activity is also implied by the ability to debate. Both points are 
constructed as good things: the audience are being praised or commended for their 
knowledge and their potential to debate or engage. On a similar note we might think back 
to extract 6.1 (p. 170), where we saw a facilitator assuming that the audience was simply 
being "shy" in apparently not wishing to participate: the implication there was not only that 
participation is an unmitigated good, but also that the audience are in fact capable of 
interacting and that their contributions will be valuable and interesting. We get a similar, if 
more detailed, picture from a speaker in Event 2: 
1: Ism: ... I 
hope that th-this evening this type of discussion between a- with a group of of 
2: seriously interested people will to something to enhance um our-our levels of understanding 
3: not just of the audience of course but those of us who are speakers, because having 
4: contact with a wider world outside the um rather limited academic community within which 
5: 1 normally work (we- I see something) as extremely valuable. So I (. ) look forward to 
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6: hearing what you have to say (. ) of course you may find I'm a little bit um resistant to 
7: accepting some of it, and vice versa but I think that's why we're here. 
(Event 2, Transcript: Extract 7.5) 
ISm's assumption is that his audience are, indeed, "seriously interested" (line 2). In 
addition, he assumes that they are different from him in that they are not scientists or 
"speakers"; they are part of a "wider world" which goes beyond the "academic community" 
(line 4). In being part of this wider world, he also claims that they have some kind of 
knowledge or experience or values - he is not particularly clear - which will make their 
interaction with the speakers "extremely valuable" (line 5). As he finishes, he emphasises 
the difference between speakers and audience again, anticipating differences of opinion and 
resistance to each other's views (lines 6-7). As an audience, we can feel extremely flattered 
by all this. ISm is constructing us as interested, knowledgeable (in some form), responsible 
and active: we are able to debate and interact and our contributions are valued. While we 
might be different to the "experts', in this segment, at least, our very difference is portrayed 
as a positive. We might also note that, though speakers and facilitators are frequently 
thanked both verbally and through applause, thanks are also extended to the audience. 
Throughout the events facilitators and speakers thank the audience for their participation 
generally, individual contributions, and for simply being there. We can again infer a positive 
view of the audience from this; we thank those from whom we have gained or who have 
given us an opportunity for something. 
When the audience are directly addressed or discussed, then, they are certainly framed in 
an entirely positive manner. They are different from the technical experts at the front, but 
they are interested and responsible and their opinions are valuable. Interestingly, they are 
also framed as being homogenous in this; as the layout of the space also implies (chapter 
5), the audience is not constructed as differentiated but as uniform in these positive 
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characteristics. If we read between the lines of the events a little further, however, we 
might hesitate to affirm this seemingly entirely positive view. I have already discussed some 
of the connotations of the general layout, and noted that speakers and facilitators are 
fundamentally framed as different to audience members. We might also query exactly how 
much the event process actually does value audience knowledges and seek to encourage 
the kind of exchange of views that ISm seems to want. While there are a range of ways in 
which we could do this - looking at speaker responses to audience participation, for 
example - for the sake of brevity I would like to focus on just one issue: that of the framing 
of audience contributions by facilitators. As I have already described (see p. 149), the bulk 
of audience participation takes place during a stage I have called questioning/commenting 
and answering/responding. The terminology for this, as I noted in my discussion, comes 
from within the data: facilitators frequently use these terms to invite participation from the 
audience. 
While'comments' may at times be replaced with a synonymous word such as'points', 
"questions" and "comments" does seem to compose the categories into which an audience 
contribution can fall. While we could argue that this in itself acts to limit types of valid 
contributions from audience members - it would seem to disallow, for example, 'stories', 
'memories', 'feelings' or anything else that doesn't fall neatly into the narrowly intellectual 
concepts of specific questions and focussed comments - it appears that, in practice, the 
'questions' category is the one that is most frequently assumed or imposed. So facilitators 
will often handle audience participation in ways such as these: 
F:... I hope you're feeling warmed up with lots of questions... 
(Event 2, Transcript) 
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F: There's a question over here and then I'd like to call on someone who hasn't spoken 
before. 
(Event 3, Transcript) 
F:... in case- if- a-any of you have um a few lingering questions cos I know there was a 
lot to get through and not everybody got a chance to (. ) erm question our- our speakers 
() I'm gonne have a quick q and a session before we do our final vote... 
(Event 4, Transcript) 
In each of these quotes, the facilitator assumes that potential or actual requests for the 
floor are "questions". While this move is subtle, involving nothing more than a slight 
discursive shift away from the more measured and deliberate language of 'questions and 
comments', I would argue that it will still have an effect in framing participants' 
understanding of what their contributions should be. It suggests that, while some of the 
surface language of Dana Centre events seems to encourage genuine audience engagement 
and two-way debate, many participants naturally slip into language that implies that the 
speakers are indeed merely present as an 'expert resource' and that audience involvement 
should be limited to asking them questions. With the loss of 'comments' as a frame for this 
audience involvement (however problematic the limitations of 'comments' itself might be), 
we lose sight of any sense that audience members bring knowledge or expertise to the 
encounter. Significantly, in terms of our discussion of the framing and construction of the 
audience, we find an implied deficit mode/of that audience rather than the positive model 
created by more deliberate language. At the very least, we have identified a disjunction in 
the discourse used to frame the audience which leads us to temper the overt language used 
to and about the audience with the knowledge that actual practice may suggest something 
rather different. 
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Constructing the 'audience': participants' self-positioning 
This argument - that in practice a model of the audience as deficient is used - is 
strengthened by looking at the ways in which audience members speak and situate 
themselves. While there is, once again, variation in this, we frequently find them taking the 
floor in a manner which is apologetic or which deprecates what they have to say. 
Uncertainty is highlighted and comments are highly modalised rather than stated as definite 
fact. Both questions and comments are frequently prefaced with phrases such as "Um I just 
wanted to... " or "Sorry I... ": the speaker apologises for taking the floor and makes it clear 
that what they are about to say is provisional and without authority. This is in marked 
contrast to the way in which invited speakers tend to talk. Although they may hedge and 
modalise what they say, we rarely find them apologetic for taking the floor or using words 
such as "just" to deprecate their contributions. This difference is especially clear in the 
following extract: 
1: Am7: Um (. ) (clears throat) is it possibly a situation where the prescription of er controlled 
2: drugs for people who have severe mental health conditions (. hhh) is actually created by the 
3: stigma () and the demand or the need for society to have a norm, and therefore the drugs 
4: get prescribed over and over and therefore psychiatrists are responding to the needs of 
5: society more than the needs of the patient themselves. 
6: PTm: Well the- this is a- aa um er a seductive argument which was first put forward by 
7: Rodney Lang years ago and erm (. ) i-i-it's just not true really. I mean the fact is 
8: schizophrenia really the literal translation of schizophrenia is shattered mind and if you have 
9: to treat these people as I have to do every day () seeing someone who's got schizophrenia 
10: and they're (. ) in a co- really (. ) ill state they're in their worst type of state (. ) you-you 
11: aren't dealing with someone (. ) who's got a problem with society you're dealing with a- a- 
12: a-a: a really shattered human being... 
(Event 3, Transcript: Extract 7.6) 
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Am7, as we can see if we read through his turn in lines 1-5, is actually advancing a 
particular argument: that the use of mental health drugs is based on the needs of society 
rather than those of individuals. He does not, however, make this claim directly but phrases 
it as a question ("is it... a situation... ", line 1). This dissociates him from that argument (he 
can take the role of a 'neutral' questioner rather than advocate of a particular position) and 
enables him to protect face: the answer to the question can be 'no' and he will not 
necessarily be embarrassed or insulted. His use of "possibly" further weakens his position 
and highlights his uncertainty; as does his hesitant start. He uses the filler 'um' to begin his 
turn, then hesitates briefly before clearing his throat and starting talking. Am7, we can say, 
is not certain or strident or confident in what he is saying: rather he is somewhat hesitantly 
offering up an argument for the examination of others. 
Contrast his approach with that of the invited speaker PTm. PTm takes the floor 
immediately, not waiting for permission from the facilitator, claiming the floor with his "well 
the-" (line 6) and hesitating only briefly before launching into his argument. He demolishes 
Am7's claim to originality ("a seductive argument which was first put forward by Rodney 
Lang years ago", lines 6-7), a move which weakens Am7's position by implying that it is an 
old one (and which also demonstrates his superior knowledge of the field). He then states 
categorically "it's just not true really" (line 7): this is a statement of fact rather a suggestion, 
making it extremely difficult to deny without rudeness. He backs this up further with a 
reference to the "fact" of the situation and then, in lines 8-12, uses his experience and 
expertise ("if you have to treat these people as I have to do every day", lines 8-9) as 
authority for what he has said. Where Am7 is hesitant in what he is saying, then, PTm is 
confident, and where Am7 suggests, PTm states as certainty. 
This difference in talk and, in particular, the way in which audience members seem to 
situate themselves as under the authority of the speakers, suggests that a model exists in 
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Dana Centre discourse in which audience members are in fact deficient: not as authoritative 
or important as invited speakers. While I have suggested that the language of speakers and 
facilitators may act to construct this model under a surface which affirms 'dialogue' (through 
slipping into the assumption of 'questions', for example), it also appears that it is co- 
produced - or at least accepted - by audience members, who situate themselves as 
hesitant enquirers of authority rather than confident producers of'facts'. 32 The way in which 
the audience are framed is thus rather more complex than perhaps an initial study of the 
language used about them would suggest. Indeed, it is even more complex than my 
analysis so far has shown. Audience members do not a/ways situate themselves in this way: 
they may accept the imposed view of themselves as deficient, but they may also reject or 
subvert these framings. This type of resistant behaviour will be discussed further in the next 
section. 
Constructing the 'audience': as different to 'the public' 
Before we move on, however, there is one other important way in which the audience is 
framed during Dana Centre events. That is that they are viewed as different to 'the public: 
This framing does not come from just one of the roles in the space, but rather appears to 
be co-constructed - or simply assumed - by all involved in the events. Thus we find 
audience members talking of 'the public', as in the extract below: 
1: Am 11: But then also I just wanted to make the point about the word gene. (To Bha- to 
2: Bhavesh um. ) Because a lot of people when you say about a breast cancer gene I mean I 
3: think a lot of people do have the breast cancer gene but it's only when it's defective that it 
4: causes breast cancer, and I think it's- in the media it's like (. ) if you've got a gene for this 
32 Compare also with my earlier comments (chapter 6, p. 169-170) on the use of a traditional PUS framing of Dana 
Centre events by audience members. In both cases it appears that audiences are complicit in the maintenance of 
'deficit' frameworks. 
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5: so you must have this or you must have that () and it's- and it's quite um quite confusing 
6: for the member of the public. 
(Event 1, Transcript: Extract 7.7) 
Am11's point is in response to the way in which one of the invited speakers has talked 
about'genes': he says that there is a difference between having the gene for a particular 
condition, and that gene being defective and acting to cause that condition. His reasoning is 
that sloppy language use about this is dangerous; "a lot of people" (line 2) will not 
understand the difference. More specifically, he argues that "the media" are guilty of this 
sloppy language use (lines 4-5) and that that is "confusing for the member of the public" 
(lines 5-6). This, of course, is a classic deficit model of the public, as examined and 
identified within scientists' discourse in chapter 4. Am11 views the public as ignorant (of 
genetic terminology) and as the passive victim of misleading media reports, leading to their 
being 'confused' by science. Others have previously identified versions of the deficit model 
of the public within lay discourse (see Michael and Brown 2005; Wright and Nerlich 2006); 
perhaps more interesting is that this kind of talk of 'the public' implicitly constructs this 
public as being elsewhere. 
'The public', then, are not present: this is assumed in Amli's talk, and in the talk of others. 
This enables participants to draw upon deficit models of "the general public" (Event 1, 
Transcript) and to make use of these in a way that would not be possible if this public was 
indeed present. (Am11, for example, can use a deficit public to demonstrate his own 
knowledge and authority: the concept becomes a rhetorical device. ) The Dana event 
becomes a separate and different kind of space, where "the world out there" (Event 3, 
Transcript) can be discussed from positions of non-involvement and superior knowledge and 
authority. Thus Amll can discuss a problematic public from a stance of understanding the 
issues that they do not: the deficit model, as I have discussed (chapter 4), seems always to 
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be connected to discourses of separation. The site thus defines itself by the expertise and 
knowledge present, and the outside world by its lack of those things. It is important to note, 
however, that talk relating to 'the public' is not particularly prevalent. For the most part the 
audience and their implied differences to the surrounding world are implicitly understood 
rather than overtly stated, and the site's relations in general with wider society are rarely 
discussed. 
Of the three main participant roles we have examined - facilitator, speaker, and audience - 
it appears, then, that that of 'audience member' is the most complex. To a far greater 
extent than the others, it is subject to diverse and shifting framings, so that (as analysis of 
genre and norms has already suggested) it becomes difficult to know exactly what the role 
involves. The only sustained feature appears to be its difference to that of speakers (the 
authoritative 'expert resource') and facilitators (the professionalised'host' of the event). The 
uses and functions of all of these framings, how they contrast with the other roles, and the 
rules and norms that apply: all of these have implications, which we have so far skirted 
over, in terms of the power structures that operate within the Dana Centre space. Having 
described in detail the participants and norms of the space, I turn now to consider these 
implications, looking more explicitly at power and authority in the dialogue space. 
Locating power and authority in the Dana Centre space 
In this section I draw together much of my previous analysis to examine where power and 
authority are located within Dana Centre events, and how they are constructed and 
negotiated. In my discussion of power, I should note, I am drawing on the writing of the 
critical discourse analyst Teun van Dijk (1993) who himself draws on Foucauldian ideas of 
power (see Hall 1997). For van Dijk, power "involves control, namely by (members of) one 
group over (those of) other groups" (1993: 254; italics in original). My analysis will therefore 
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be concerned with control in the Dana Centre space, how this control enables dominance, 
and how dominance is resisted. 
Firstly, then, I wish to argue that power is localised in the role of the facilitator. As we have 
seen, facilitators 'own' the events, hosting them and organising their flow (p. 198-200; 208- 
210). They control and police the floor, deciding who may or may not speak; and they are 
able to define relevant topics and expertise and to shape, through their talk, the very nature 
of the event. They are also able to direct audience members and speakers - telling them 
where to sit, for example, or instructing them to vote. The facilitator defines and imposes 
the rules of the event: they control, in theory, all that takes place. In addition, they are able 
to take up more powerful positions in interaction with other participants. As the 'host', for 
example, they are able to take up'second' position in talk, enabling them to scrutinise and 
(possibly) attack the views expressed in a 'first' position without necessarily committing 
themselves to a particular stance (see Hutchby 1996). In the extract below we see a 
number of these operations of power come together. 
1: F: ... Who would say they 
didn't say they didn't use any drugs either legal or illegal nothing 
2: that could be called a drug. Ri: ght somebody over there. Okay have we got a microphone? 
3: (Some laughter, both mic'ed and non-mic'ed) 
4: F: (Laughing) (He's spoiling my cheap trick there pick somebody else) (. ) nono this is very 
5: interesting because after what we were saying at the beginning about er caffeine and 
6: alcohol and smoking and so on, seemed that there's so many things that are drugs that are 
7: everyday would you say you don't use any of those. 
8: Am5: Okay I'm coffee addicted (???? ) otherwise I don't use any drugs. 
9: F: Okay so [coffee- 
10: Amy: [(?????? ) sorry 
11: F: And you said addicted you're addicted to coffee? 
12: Amy: Yes I am. () Okay (laughs) (Laughter) [I'm addicted to drugs 
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13: F: [Okay so we've eliminated you but all the 
14: same very clean living. And what what do you think about drugs do you think people use 
15: them too much? () Or is it just that you personally have never- 
16: Am5: Um I used to do a lot of sports when I was very young and so and got never in this 
17: kind of habit and s-sports is a kind of drug for me to be honest with you so (. ) yeah 
18: [(laughs briefly) 
19: F: [Okay so sports and caffeine keep you off the other stuff. 
(Event 2, Transcript: Extract 7.8) 
The facilitator is able to question the other participants present; in doing so, of course, she 
is acting to define the meaning and topic of the event. Perhaps more interestingly in this 
extract, she is then able to force the floor upon someone in order for them to explain and 
defend their views, directing the microphone to "somebody over there" who has raised their 
hand in response to her question (lines 1-2). There is some dismay over this: the laughter 
in line 3 and the facilitator's comments in line 4 suggest that the selected participant was 
unwilling to speak. The facilitator's talk in lines 4-7 ("this is very interesting... ", leading to a 
reformulation of her question but targeted directly at Am5), however, makes it very difficult 
for Am5 to continue refusing the floor. Accordingly, he speaks, in line 8, and appears to 
respond to her inclusion of 'caffeine' in a list of drugs in line 5. Having stated his position, 
he is open to further interrogation by the facilitator, which occurs in lines 11-12 and even 
more dramatically in lines 13-15, where he is asked an entirely different question and again 
has very little choice but to answer. That he is rather uncomfortable doing this - after all, 
another position statement may lead to further "second position' challenges - is suggested 
by his brief hesitation at the start of line 16 ("Um"), his avoidance of a direct answer to the 
facilitator's question ("what do you think about drugs"), and his tailing out and laugh at the 
end of his turn. As the extract ends we see a further example of the facilitator's position of 
power: she is able to reformulate Am5's position C'so sport and caffeine keep you off the 
other stuff"), thus setting an agenda for any further discussion (cf. Hutchby 1996). 
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The inequality in the way that the facilitator is able to force others to speak and to direct 
debate is perhaps best seen if we consider the unlikelihood of the exchange above occurring 
the other way round, with an audience member questioning and a facilitator responding. 
This type of exchange never occurs in the data: it is always facilitators that control and 
question, and audience members that respond. Power, in terms of control, is thus firmly 
located with the facilitator and directed away from the audience. This power can be 
exercised in strident ways, with the floor - as we have just seen - being forced upon 
unwilling participants or, alternatively, refused to others. 
While power is strongly located in the facilitator role, it also seems to be delegated to that 
role by Dana Centre staff. While the facilitator 'owns' the event as it runs, we have seen 
already (extract 7.4) that this ownership is conferred upon them by a member of the Dana 
Centre staff team, who introduces them and hands the event over to them. I have 
previously noted that facilitators may make use of literature (such as speaker biographies) 
provided by Dana staff (p. 211); we also saw, in extract 7.3 (p. 203-204), the role that Dana 
staff play in the provision of 'roaming mics' to audience members. To return briefly to that 
extract, we find that Dana staff appear to have an authority of their own to aid or deny 
access to the floor: JPf, who is holding the microphone, runs back to give it to an audience 
member who is speaking without a microphone without waiting for confirmation or 
permission from the facilitator. Thus at times the control of the facilitator and that of staff 
may clash. While power is exercised almost entirely through the person of the facilitator, 
then, its origins are more complex. It stems from the Dana Centre - as an institution - 
itself, and thus the framings that are imposed and the inequities that are enacted may 
derive from the Centre as well as from the facilitator. 
I have said that there are 'inequities' in the space, and it certainly seems to me that this is 
the case. There is inequality of power - to frame debate, control talk, and define norms - 
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which results, in practice, in sharp inequalities in terms of access to the floor and in the 
perspectives that can legitimately be aired. There is also, I would argue, unevenness in 
terms of where authority is located in the space, with authoritative talk primarily being 
located in the invited speakers. There are a variety of ways in which the analysis so far has 
indicated this: the layout of the room suggests that invited speakers are more important or 
significant than others present (p. 155-158), speakers are framed by biographies which 
emphasise their academic achievements and history (situating them in the role of 'expert') 
(p. 210-212), and speakers are allowed - indeed expected - to take long turns, having 
access to the floor which far exceeds that of those in the audience (p. 149; 201-202; 212). 
In addition, I would like to argue that the space is performed as one in which scientific 
authority is taken for granted and that, given this, speakers in their role of 'expert resource' 
are automatically framed as authoritative. I have already noted that a scientifically deficient 
public is discursively excluded from the Dana space, allowing those within to assume 
expertise and authority (p. 220-221): here, then, I would like to track in more detail how 
authority is negotiated. 
Locating authority: constructing science 
I would firstly like to examine briefly the ways in which science is constructed: the 
assumptions present, in other words, about what science is and how it operates. These 
assumptions are almost entirely implicit. While the topics discussed may be scientific ones, 
and the overall framing of the event intellectual (see p. 147), there is little talk on the 'meta- 
questions' of whether science has or should have authority on these topics. For the most 
part scientific authority on the questions under discussion is assumed, rather than argued. 
The ways in which science is constructed in discourse backs this up: it is in no way 
problematised, but is seen as providing truth, helping society, being important, and as 
continually progressing. There is a narrative of process science has a specific process, a 
'right' way of being done, and this involves concepts such as'evidence' and 'testing 
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hypotheses'. Finally, science is seen as separate to society, politics, and anything that is 
seen as 'social'. We see several of these ideas within the extract below: 
1: ASm:... as a doctor () I want drugs that work and I want it to benefit the individual so I'd 
2: like as a doctor to take the politics out of it, because if you show to me (. ) as a scientist (. ) 
3: that a drug works, it's as- it's effective it reduces symptoms delays the rate of progression 
4: of a disease, then for me, that's good enough. And we will get better. Things will improve 
5: and we'll get better descriptors (. ) of the differences however small between individuals. 
(Event 1, Transcript: Extract 7.9) 
ASm, we might first note, is talking very deliberately from a position of authority: he speaks 
"as a doctor" (lines 1 and 2) and "as a scientist" (line 2). In positioning himself in this way 
he is already assuming and calling upon the authority of those roles; in a different role, we 
are to assume, his words would not be so weighty. He is framing the topic under discussion 
as, above all, a scientific question, one in which scientific expertise is required. In addition 
he is making it clear that science and politics are - or rather, should be - separate; he 
wishes to "take the politics out of it" (line 2). Good science, we are to understand, is a 
simple business of whether something "works" or not (lines 3-4), and "politics" only 
interferes with this. More strongly, this interference is a negative because science helps 
people. It "reduces symptoms delays the rate of progression of a disease" (lines 3-4), and 
ASm's desire is to "benefit the individual" (line 1). ASm's language thus reduces the 
arguments around the topic down to a simple decision of helping (through science) or not 
helping (because of politics). Finally, he is also confident of progress. The science "will 
improve" (line 4) and knowledge will increase. 
These discourses of science are not entirely new to us: they bear marked similarities to 
those identified in analysis of the group interview data (chapter 4). There too we saw that 
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ideas of science as truth were used (p. 114); we also saw that process was discussed as 
important and used as a way of bounding science (p. 115-116). In fact, boundary work was 
a key feature of talk about science in that data set. It is perhaps surprising, then, that apart 
from throwaway comments and assumptions about the separateness of science from 
society, there is little in Dana Centre discourse that could be understood as acting to police 
the boundaries of science. There is no talk about what is and isn't legitimate scientific 
expertise, for example, or of why some knowledge forms are considered not allowable. I 
would suggest that the reason for this is that there is, within the event, actually no need to 
perform boundary work, that - despite being an ostensibly public forum, where other kinds 
of expertise are welcomed in - the entire discursive situation is saturated by and framed in 
a scientific worldview. We have already seen that a scientifically deficient 'public' is excluded 
from the event, allowing those within to frame themselves as scientifically knowledgeable 
(p. 219-221). In addition, science is - as we have just seen - constructed as an 
unproblematic good, and this construction does not ever appear to be challenged (even 
when science's effects 'in society' are being discussed). If there are no encroaching 
knowledge domains, or competing authorities, then boundary work, we can assume, is not 
necessary. 
Locating authority: science and other authorities throughout the Dana space 
This concept can be explored further by looking beyond the invited speakers as scientific or 
technical authorities, to other participants, and to the ways in which other authorities are 
called upon. I have already noted, for example, that invited speakers may at times choose 
to situate themselves differently to 'expert', taking on some other role (p. 212). Such 
switching appears to be transitory rather than sustained and appears to be used, 
interestingly, as a different kind of call to authority. Take for example, this quote from a 
speaker in Event 3: 
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Cf: I- I- absolutely I mean (. ) you're talking to a pharmacologist who agonises before 
taking an aspirin you know um we don't even know how aspirin works now I mean I 
would um certainly (. ) um you know I would have reservations about taking any 
chemical when we don't actually know how it works but if I was ill and I- I'm quite 
happy to take antibiotics and (. ) um any treatment wh- which-which would make me 
better. 
(Event 3, Transcript) 
Here Cf talks about her personal experiences and the way in which she lives and rationalises 
her life: she speaks as "a pharmacologist" but also as an individual who makes personal 
choices about whether or not to take particular drugs. Such rhetorical switches (from expert 
to individual) serve a variety of purposes. They humanise the speaker, making us more 
sympathetic to them; but in addition they add authority - the authority of lived experience - 
to what is being said. It is as if Cf is letting us know that she, too, has difficulty knowing the 
best way to act; she is affirming that she is a "normal person' just like her listeners. If she is 
like us, her experiences and actions can be a guide to ours: the final impact of her 
seemingly surprising lapse from the role of expert is to convince us further that she can be 
believed. This authority of lived experience is similar to what Ian Hutchby (2001) has called 
'witnessing' on talk radio: lay speakers back up their arguments with their own experience 
of and involvement in the topics under discussion. Such role-switching on the part of Dana 
Centre speakers seems to act, then, to heighten their authority to speak. Even when they 
speak in this 'personal' mode, it is rare to find them denigrating their expertise or deferring 
to opposing audience views. 
If the talk of speakers constructs itself as almost unequivocally authoritative, despite 
occasional calls to 'lay' authorities, what of the talk of other participants? While it is true 
that audience talk frequently positions itself as hesitant and deferent (see p. 217), the 
situation is more complex than a uniform acknowledgement and acceptance of speaker 
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authority. Out and out rejection of speaker authority rarely occurs, but participants may call 
upon authorities themselves to challenge or subvert what has been said. We might expect 
these authorities to be primarily 'lay' ones such as'witnessing'; whilst these are present, 
however (for example in the 'tabloid talkshow' genre), we also frequently find audience 
members arguing from scientific and technical expertise and knowledge. Indeed, the two 
types may be merged within discourse: take, for example, this quote from an audience 
member from Event 3. 
Afi: I just wanted to share an observation regarding side-effects cos I (. ) spend most of 
my time um (. ) in the mental health er arena at the moment and um I see every day 
patients who for example are taking (elamzapine). Now (. ) we know that they tend to put 
on weight whether that's because that stimulates (. ) the appetite or whether be- it's some 
other reason um (. ) often they- I've seen them come in (. ) diagnosed as psychotic or 
whatever they get given elamzapine and (. ) they very quickly put on a lot of weight. 
(Event 3, Transcript) 
Aft is talking from her own experience here: she is careful to note that what she is about to 
say is an "observation" from her own knowledge of the "mental health arena". Her 
comments are based on personal experience, then, but they also draw upon scientific 
authority. She can give drug names ("elamzapine") and speak knowledgably about side 
effects and their causes, suggesting technical expertise. Her "observation" becomes doubly 
authoritative; a combination of "witnessing' and scientific knowledge. Others will position 
themselves firmly within science, arguing from scientific knowledge or using scientific 
arguments. We have already seen an audience member dispute the correct interpretation of 
Einsteinian physics (in extract 7.3); similarly, this participant argues from her knowledge of 
"statistics" that one form of therapy is ineffective: 
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Af10:... I've heard some statistics that CBT works very well in the short term and it's 
good for symptom relief but after a period of time the outcome success rate is not quite 
as good as one would have hoped 
(Event 3, Transcript) 
Such speakers position themselves firmly in the professional world of science: we might 
more readily imagine such comments occurring at a scientific conference than a public 
event. The use of such technical authorities by'public' participants indicates that scientific 
authority is not, in fact, entirely localised in the speakers, but that it could be visualised as 
spread throughout the space. It also lends weight to my assertion that the ultimate framing 
- the ultimate authority in the space - is considered to be science, by audience members as 
well as speakers. While other kinds of authority are drawn upon, and scientific and other 
authorities at times mingled, scientific and technical arguments appear to be used as a kind 
of 'trump card' to make and win points. Science is understood as the ultimate provider of 
truth, and this understanding appears to shape all of the interactions, arguments, and 
counter-arguments, that take place in the Dana space. It is rarely argued, for example, that 
the science is unimportant and that other kinds of knowledge should take priority; rather, 
scientific talk is challenged through other scientific talk. 
Patterns of domination and resistance 
While the format of the event and a general deference towards speakers signals a focus of 
authority in them, then, the situation is more complex than that. We might rather picture a 
'bumpy' localisation of authority, concentrated at the centre with the invited speakers, but 
also spread throughout the space. Audience members appear to be adept at challenging 
speaker authority through their own use of scientific discourses as well as by drawing on 
other types of authority. This complex dispersal and negotiation of authority in the space 
leads us on to my final point, that - while we have seen that there are particular structures 
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and localisations of power and authority in Dana Centre events - there is also resistance to 
such structures and disobedience of the rules they impose. In other words, we do not see 
the power of the facilitator/Dana Centre-role unproblematically imposed, or the localisation 
of authority (which itself is a form of power) with invited experts unchallenged. These 
structures of domination are at times resisted and challenged by audience members and by 
invited speakers. 
We have already seen examples of this resistance. Extract 7.3, which I have discussed in 
detail, shows rule-breaking behaviour from an audience member and a speaker which the 
facilitator appears powerless to halt. Similarly, we have seen that audience members may 
resist or subvert the authority of the speakers by drawing on their own authorities or by 
using scientific knowledge and expertise. Throughout the data there are similar kinds of 
resistant behaviours, from speakers rejecting facilitator ownership of the event and claiming 
ownership themselves to aggressive interruptions that seek to gain access to the floor or 
audience rejection of facilitator framing of their role. As an example of this type of 
behaviour we might take one short extract from Event 1: 
F: (pointing to the righI We have a question with the gentleman in the white shirt. 
(3) 
Am17: This is er more an observation... 
(Event 1, Transcript) 
Here the facilitator assumes that Am17 is wanting to ask a question: she assumes, as I 
have already discussed, a model of the audience which is deficient and which defers to the 
authority of the invited speakers. Am17, however, does not submit to this model but rather 
rejects it, along with the framework for his participation, stating that his turn is going to be 
"more an observation". The facilitator's control - and the authority of the speakers - is 
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resisted and a new framework for participation created. Similarly, in my discussion of genre 
I suggested that - although there remain constraints on and inequality in the imposition of 
particular genres - the flexibility of the space may allow scope for all participants to actively 
select and construct interactional genre. Events may be framed and policed as sites where 
there is strict control and hierarchies of power, but these framings are constantly under 
negotiation and policing may be rejected or invalidated through interactional dexterity. 
In sum, then, within this chapter I have used an examination of the norms of interaction 
and the roles and constructions of participants to lead to a discussion of power and 
authority in the Dana space. Norms and rules of the event appear to be dominated by the 
general rule that the facilitator controls the floor: most others - including the complex 
procedures that audience members must go through to gain the floor - fall under this 
category, although we also observed the norm that the talk of speakers takes priority over 
that of audience members. I examined the ways in which the facilitator, speakers, and 
audience were constructed throughout the event, arguing that while the facilitator is 
primarily framed as a 'host' and the speakers as an 'expert resource', constructions of the 
audience are shifting and more complex. While they are overtly framed in positive ways, 
other features of Dana events construct them as deficient 'questioners' who must rely on 
expert knowledge. They are, however, viewed as separate to a scientifically deficit 'general 
public'. 
These points led on to my exploration of power and authority, and I argued that my 
analysis has indicated that power is localised in the facilitator role (expressed chiefly 
through their tight control of the floor) and authoritative talk is localised in the speakers 
(expressed through their long periods on the floor and positioning as 'expert'). My analysis 
has, however, shown challenges to these general rules throughout; for example in my 
discussion of rule and norm-breaking behaviour, and in my argument that authority is 
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actually spread throughout the event space. These features led me to argue that the 
patterns of domination which I have identified are not unproblematically imposed, but 
rather resisted, challenged, and continually renegotiated. In the next chapter - the last on 
my analysis of the Dana Centre -I continue drawing together these issues in order to sum 
up and conclude my findings in this area. 
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Chapter 8 
The Rules of Engagement IV: Two frameworks 
for dialogue events 
In this brief chapter I wish to conclude my analysis of the Dana Centre by drawing together 
and summing up key themes, ending by suggesting two frameworks which we might use to 
understand the space. 
Firstly, then, we looked at the framing and setting of the dialogue event'speech situation', 
finding that these contained contradictory messages. We identified a power differential 
(loaded towards the individuals placed at the 'front') in the layout and design of the event 
space; but also observed messages of formality and informality, of the site as open and as 
closed, and of regulation and interactivity. The event gives mixed messages, then, including 
three different framings of the process (lecture', adversarial 'competition' and interactive 
debate). 
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Similarly, I argued that the science dialogue event'appears to be an uncertain and unfixed 
genre whose norms and rules have not yet been fully established We saw that different 
interactional genres may be drawn on, and that other features of the discourse also indicate 
flexibility: we have seen, for example, that the purposes and nature of the event may be 
framed in different ways at different times. While I suggested that this flexibility might allow 
participants to reinterpret and recreate the nature of the interactions taking place, I also 
argued that there are in practice constraints on some participants in doing this, and that 
there is evidence to suggest that uncertainty as to the norms and rules can be problematic 
for those interacting. Things "go wrong' in the event when individuals do not know how they 
should behave and when there is a 'generic mismatch' between a conversational ideal and 
the practicalities of the physical and social space. 
It is worth at this point returning briefly to the notion of the speech community. As I noted 
on p. 143, at the start of my analysis, the speech community is defined by Hymes as "a 
community sharing knowledge of rules for the conduct and interpretation of speech" 
(1974: 51). Given what we have seen of the Dana Centre space - its flexibility, 
miscommunications, and complex and often-broken rules - we might suggest that, contra 
my original assumption, its participants actually do not compose a speech community at all. 
Frequently, it appears, knowledge of how to speak is notshared but is fragmented 
throughout the space, accessible to only a few participants in more privileged positions or to 
those who are particularly adept at interpreting the current norms. 
In chapter 71 moved on to examine norms and participants within Dana events, arguing 
from my analysis of these that power is chiefly located with the facilitator, and authority 
with the invited speakers. These two points suggest to us - as the layout of the space did 
earlier - that the power structures of the event are more traditional than the language of 
'dialogue' and 'debate' would suggest. We find power slanted towards the institution (in the 
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form of the facilitator and Dana staff) and to the expert (in the form of authority), and away 
from 'public' visitors. Expert knowledge is understood as more valuable than lay; in fact, this 
understanding is naturalised to the extent that audience members concur in it and 
cooperate in its dominance by themselves drawing upon technical authority. However, these 
actions point us to a further key aspect of the space: that despite these traditional power 
structures, there remains scope for resistance and contestation by participants. Control is 
continually being asserted, challenged and negotiated, and audience members are by no 
means passive recipients of the framings imposed upon them. In fact, the ingenuity with 
which participants manage to evade and break rules, cope with shifting norms, and succeed 
in a perpetual struggle for the floor suggests a high degree of sophistication and discursive 
dexterity. 
Two frameworks for Dana Centre events 
I want to conclude this section of my analysis by suggesting two ways of reading the space: 
both are drawn from the data but each highlights rather different aspects of my discussion. 
The first draws on my discussion of the negotiations of power and authority in the Dana 
space, particularly in terms of patterns of domination and resistance. These patterns are, I 
would argue, so distinct that Dana Centre events can in fact be read as a continual 
discursive struggle, where power and authority are constantly being negotiated and where 
control is regularly asserted, challenged and reasserted. 
Dana as struggle for the floor 
Being able to speak, such that our voice can be heard, is a mark of power (van Dijk 1993); 
thus the focus of this struggle is the floor: for access to it and control of it. Hence we can 
understand such rule-breaking 'tricks' as audience members holding on to a microphone 
beyond one turn, or participants taking long turns, as ways of maintaining their access to 
the floor. The facilitator's role is to'fight back' these attempts to dominate the floor and to 
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assert their own control of it. In this contest both fair means and foul are utilised; 
participants may make use of the rules of the space or reject them and turn to more 
aggressive tactics, taking the floor by main force by interrupting or refusing to stop 
speaking. Who eventually emerges victorious from these encounters will vary. At times the 
facilitator is able to effectively control the floor and quell unrest; at others, this control is 
categorically rejected. We see these kinds of negotiations and reassertions of power in the 
following extract, which is taken from a longer section of discourse in Event 3. As the 
extract begins, PTm has just finished a long turn in response to a question from Aft 
(himself interrupting and seizing the floor from Cf, to whom Afl's question was originally 
addressed): 
1: Aft: (First words indistinguishable because spoken without a microphone) ... the symptoms 
2: rather than provide a- [a solution (is my understanding)] 
3: PTm: [Yes er::::::::: (I have a- a::::::: )] suggested a classification of 
4: personality disorder... (severa/ /irres omitted)... that's where most of the new treatments have 
5: been (trialled). 
6: Afi: [I think er- 
7: F: [But Professor- can I just- (only because we're going to) have to have a lot of people 
8: [talk and- 
9: Aft: [(I was thinking more) border- borderline (is common-) 
10: F: Okay thank you. Professor Luhman would you like to add some[thing? 
11: PKm: [Yeh. I think there- 
12: there are lots of myths about this... 
(Event 3, Transcript: Extract 8.1) 
We can read this extract very easily as a contest for the floor: all four of the participants 
seem to have an interest in gaining it, and the frequent overlaps indicate that there is 
something of a tussle between them for it. Aft is the first to use aggressive tactics. She 
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speaks, in line 1, in response to a previous turn from PTm, without waiting for permission 
from the facilitator. That the 'officials' of the space are unprepared for her turn is indicated 
by her lack of a microphone at the start of it: they clearly have removed this from her and 
are not expecting her to speak. She does so, however, and is rewarded by being given a 
microphone. Her time on the floor is limited, as PTm quickly interrupts her and succeeds in 
gaining the floor. Indeed, he could be considered the 'winner' of this entire encounter, as he 
manages to take the longest turn (most of which I have left out of this transcript, but which 
lasts for approximately seven lines). He completes his turn without any interruptions. Again, 
we might speculate that his success in taking and holding the floor is due in part to his 
automatic authority as a speaker: contrast the way in which Aft is frequently interrupted to 
PTm's successful interruptions of others and seemingly straightforward access to the floor. 
As he finishes, however, Afl immediately takes the floor again (in response to him, we 
assume from her eventual turn in line 9), this time at the same time as the facilitator. Aft 
manages only three words ("I think er-", in line 6) before the facilitator wins the floor. The 
facilitator's words act to reassert her control, which has been challenged by Aft and PTm's 
ad-libbed turn-taking: she curtails further turns from PTm (the "Professor" in line 7), 
reasoning that they need to "have a lot of people talk" (lines 7-8). This reassertion of her 
control is almost immediately rejected, however, as Aft successfully interrupts her (in line 
9) to continue her own interrupted turn (cut short by the facilitator in line 6). She is not 
interrupted, but her turn appears to break off incomplete: possibly some form of non-verbal 
communication (such as a signal from the facilitator) is used to cause this curtailment (the 
video is not clear). In any case, the facilitator's next turn ("Okay thank you", line 10) 
effectively functions to shut down and complete the preceding talk (compare with my 
discussion of 'thank you' as a mark of ending in the news interview genre, chapter 6). With 
order having been restored by this ending, she offers the floor to another invited speaker: a 
mark of 'normal' interaction. We might note, however, as a concluding point, that even 
PKm's turn does not begin in an entirely legitimate fashion. He takes the floor, in line 11, 
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before the facilitator has completely finished her turn, interrupting her final words. We 
might suggest that this is another mark of the ongoing battle for access to the floor, and 
that participants, once offered it, are wise to take it as soon as possible in order to ward off 
further attacks or challenges that might disrupt their turn. 
Access to the floor, then, is key, and is a site of conflict within the Dana space. 'Dirty' tactics 
are used to gain it - particularly, we might note, by audience members, given that the odds 
are stacked against them by the rules and norms of the space. Aft is forced to use 
aggressive techniques in order to have her say; PTm has no need to, in that he does not 
need to force access to a microphone and can interrupt others with impunity (Afl, on the 
other hand, is sanctioned for her interruptions, and her turns cut short). Despite this loading 
of the odds, Afl, we should note, does succeed in taking her turns (most effectively in lines 
1-2 and 9). She is able to reject the control of the facilitator and to assert her perspective. 
Power in the space may be unevenly located, but it is fought over and can be won by 
audience members. 
This view of the event as a long struggle between participants for the right to speak might 
be considered somewhat depressing. In fact, there are points at which more cooperative 
behaviour does occur: consider the occasional spontaneous applause of the talkshow genre, 
for example, or the 'fairness' rule imposed by facilitators to restrain domination of the floor 
by a few individuals. Some types of interruptions can also be understood as affirmation 
(Tannen 2001); possibly not all of the behaviour in the Dana space that appears aggressive 
is actually understood by participants as being so. However, a comparison with Llewellyn's 
(2005) study of public meetings brings up some interesting contrasts with regard to 
cooperation and aggression in the space. The processes that he studied are similar in many 
structural ways to Dana Centre events: they are public spaces, in which an audience faces a 
small panel, and where voice amplification is necessary. Panellists speak for a short period 
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of time and then may be questioned by audience members, who must raise their hands and 
wait for access to a roving microphone. The meetings were run by local councils, and often 
involved discussion of contentious local issues; unsurprisingly, then, Llewellyn does identify 
conflict and the use of aggressive tactics by audience members in order to express 
disagreement or gain the floor through heckling. However, he also argues that these 
meetings are actually cooperative spaces: while there is conflict between panellists and 
audience members, audiences act in collaboration to express their disapproval or to co- 
produce argumentative points. In contrast, I find no such sustained patterns of 
collaboration around gaining the floor within Dana Centre data. In fact, we find similar 
patterns of aggression between audience members as with audience members and speakers 
or facilitators, including interruptions and uninvited taking of the floor. A brief extract from 
Event 4 demonstrates this: here one audience member appears to heckle another, 
interjecting an (illegitimate, un-microphoned) comment in response to Am3's argument. 
Am3:... and prove it that er uncle al was really wrong. 
Am: Not in that. (without rnic) 
Am3: In that (. ) in that (. ) in that.... 
(Event 4, Transcript) 
In the Dana Centre, then, there appears to be no coordinated work done by the audience to 
challenge speakers or facilitators. Opposition and conflict, we might say, is spread 
throughout the space rather than being focussed in a speaker-audience divide (as occurs in 
Llewellyn's study). The reason for this, we could speculate, could again be the curious 
nature of the Dana space and the spread of 'science' (in the form of calls to scientific 
authority and expertise) throughout all participants. Llewellyn's public meetings had a very 
clear divide built into them: a public audience and a panel of council officials, who had 
authority within local government systems and who were accountable to their public 
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audience. The audience shared similar concerns and had an interest in acting in 
conjunction, as the most effective way to make their points and to hold panellists 
accountable. In the Dana Centre, we might argue, there is no such shared interest within 
the audience. We do not, in fact, have a 'public' audience holding an 'expert' panel to 
account, but a space in which public/science distinctions are not clear and therefore where 
coordinated action becomes difficult. Any alliances formed - for example, within the 
supportive and therapeutic 'talkshow' genre - will of necessity be shifting and temporary as 
roles change and audience members call on different kinds of authority. Hence conflict may 
be spread throughout the audience as well as being crystallised in the more static power 
relations of the site (such as between audience and facilitator). 
The reading of the space as a struggle for the floor, then, does not imply a simple battle 
between those with power, on the one hand, and those without it on the other - although 
this certainly occurs. Rather we find complex relations between all participant roles. This 
reading does, I would argue, help us make sense of this complexity by highlighting the 
conflict within the space and its final object of access to the floor. It might also help us to 
tentatively suggest a reason for this conflict. Participants seek to gain the floor and to have 
their voice heard in the space: this process, taken throughout the event, could be 
understood more broadly as a desire to reconfigure the entire format to one where all can 
be heard more equitably. What is resisted in this struggle, in other words, is not just the 
power of the facilitator or experts but the very form of the event. 
Dana as performance designed to entertain 
Finally, and perhaps more positively, I want to note that 'performance' could also be a 
valuable frame for understanding what goes on within Dana Centre events (cf. Hilgartner 
2000; Lefstein 2006; Wilsdon and Willis 2004). Several features of my analysis point us 
towards this: the 'platform' at the centre of the space; the stylish, new media-heavy design; 
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the presence of genres and language which link discourse to 'overheard' and performed talk 
(cf. Heritage 1985); the use of humour to create engaging talk; the emphasis throughout 
events on audiences hearing and seeing what is taking place; the 'having fun' framework 
that is applied to the process. Perhaps most significantly, there is the evident pleasure and 
enjoyment that many participants - both lay and expert - express in interviews about the 
events: 
Speaker: Um (. ) quite a bit nervous at first quite thought it was a lot of fun once I got 
going ... I thought it was really nice to sort of go to speak to people in just a little cosy 
group... 
(Event 4, Speaker interview) 
I: How bout the way that it's (. ) kind of being run, was it what you were expecting? 
F2: Yeah, it is. It- it's really good, I'm enjoying it. 
I: Were you going to say no to that? 
Fl: I was gonna say I had no preconception I thought that a lecture is a lecture, but this 
is actually better, it's much more interactive. 
(Event 2, Interview 1) 
For the vast majority, a Dana Centre event seems to be a positive and entertaining 
experience (we might also infer as much from the high numbers of repeat visitors; Brehaut 
and Simonsson 2006). 
Given these factors, we might understand the interactions that take place as performances 
designed to entertain. Reading the space in this way deflects attention from some of the 
problematic features of interaction that I have noted: the space becomes a forum where 
science is performed, observed and enjoyed by the various actors, rather than an 
aggressive struggle for the opportunity to speak. Thus drawing on various other genres of 
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performance - the talkshow or news interview - might demonstrate participants' ability and 
skill in producing a spectacle to be watched (cf. Davies et al 2006). Similarly, long stretches 
of two-way discourse, with participants debating particular points, seem designed to be 
observed by others and to allow the expression of several perspectives by just two 
individuals. Dialogue as performance also makes sense of the constraints of the physical 
space and environment: after all, as Llewellyn (2005) notes, open debate in large groups of 
people creates an immense organisational challenge. 33 Finally, this framework makes sense 
of the majority of audience members who are seemingly content not to speak. Their role as 
observers of, and appreciative audience to, the other performances that take place is 
collaborative, giving meaning and significance to those performances. 
To note this alternative framework is not to ignore the -I believe - significant challenges 
that my analysis of power in the event space has brought up. Such questions of power and 
authority are vital in terms of the wider role of "science dialogue' in society and for the 
information they give us about the true commitments of broader movements in science- 
society relations. However, it is important to acknowledge that such readings may well 
appear alien to many who participate in dialogue events. Dialogue as a performance for 
others may well be ultimately problematic, but it remains that this view of the space 
appears to be effective for many. Affirming the value of 'entertainment' also acknowledges 
that these are difficult processes. While I have problematised much of what takes place in 
the event process, it is important to note that analyses of other processes have done the 
same: public dialogue on science seems - so far - to universally fail to live up to its ideals. 
As Davies et al note, in concluding their analysis of a large-scale deliberative process on 
healthcare, transforming "vision into practice... is more difficult than many are prepared to 
acknowledge" (2006: 232). Of their process, they note that "Deliberation emerges as fragile, 
as proceeding in fits and starts, as requiring a large amount of thoughtful nurturing and as 
33 Similarly, Lefstein (2006: 10-11) considers ideas of classroom dialogue, concluding that such dialogue almost 
inevitably becomes discussion between a small group of pupils before an audience of the rest of the class. 
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permeated through and through with dilemmas of inclusion, control and engagement" 
(p. 137). Given the problems that beset the practice of dialogue, then, from the constraints 
of space and time and money to the assumptions that participants arrive with, it is no mean 
feat for the Dana Centre to have achieved an enjoyable experience for those who 
participate: 
F2: I like the fact- the fact that it's an informal it's- (. ) it's informal isn't it it's not you're not 
all sat in a lecture theatre- 
F3: It's not intimidating. 
F2: Yeah. 
Fl: And very interactive. 
F2: And there's a bar (laughter) 
(Event 3, Interview 1) 
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Chapter 9 
Private talk in public places: A theory and 
vision for informal dialogue 
So far within this study I have done several things that this chapter will build upon: I have 
briefly discussed the origins and literature of the (formal and informal) science 'dialogue' 
movement (chapters 1 and 2); argued, from an empirical study of scientists' language in 
group discussions, that a range of discourses of publics are employed and that scientists are 
not as 'sociologically naive' as some literature might suggest (chapter 4); and, finally, 
analysed a site for informal dialogue processes, arguing that these are flexible environments 
whose contested power structures are, however, weighted towards the institution and 
'expert' positions (chapters 5-8). 
Much of this work has - implicitly or explicitly - acted to problematise informal dialogue. 
From both a theoretical and empirical perspective, we are left with some key questions 
about it: my review of relevant literature indicated the rather uncertain status of informal - 
as opposed to policy-connected - dialogue processes; while my empirical study of Dana 
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Centre events revealed what might be seen as significant failings in the way the events 
operate. Important questions therefore revolve around the ways in which such processes 
can be justified and understood, particularly from critical perspectives, and - on a practical 
level - how they could be carried out to avoid the problems of power we have seen. I wish 
at this point to start addressing these questions. Over the next few pages, I will examine a 
critical case against the usefulness of "non-policy' dialogue. By considering the reasoning 
behind the academic move towards dialogue, I will acknowledge the strength of arguments 
which criticise non-policy dialogue as a bid to increase public trust in science without 
increasing accountability. However, I will then seek to 're-imagine' informal dialogue 
through focussing on other outcomes than policy-based ones, arguing that such processes 
can be viewed as valuable from a critical perspective, and could even be seen as a more 
effective mechanism for changing science from the bottom up. 
Having sought to theorise dialogue processes in this way, I will consider the implications of 
my empirical data for them. I will note what my findings suggest about the current 
problems with informal dialogue, and what encouragement they give. I will conclude with a 
practically-orientated vision for dialogue: a suggestion of how it could take place in order to 
harmonise with the theoretical underpinnings I have given it. In particular I return to the 
notion of conversation, as the ultimate in equitable talk, and based on this create two 
practical models for informal dialogue processes. 
The critique of informal dialogue: seeking public trust without public 
accountability 
The canonical story of UK PUS (Lock 2007) can be very briefly described as the use of the 
deficit model by early practitioners (Durant et al 1989; Royal Society 1985), its critique by 
authors such as Wynne and Irwin (Irwin & Wynne 1996), and critical accounts of the 
complex relationships of publics with science (de Cheveigne & Veron 1996; Grove-White et 
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al 2000; Irwin & Wynne 1996; Layton et al 1993; Wynne 1992b; Yearley 1999). Such critical 
studies indicated that non-scientists are competent and sophisticated in their dealings with 
science: Marris et al (2001), for example, used data from focus groups to challenge ten 
'stakeholder myths' of publics - which relate to deficit models - and to show that laypeople 
drew on different forms of knowledge to negotiate issues around genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs). They use these findings to argue for the need for societal deliberation 
around these issues, stating that a "debate about the purposes and social visions driving 
and shaping research and innovation needs to be developed and made part of the 
accountable decision-making process" (2001: 112). Such debate becomes part of an 
"extended peer review" process (p. 113) which both examines the framing and internal 
values of particular areas of science, and adds to it other relevant forms of knowledge. 
Other authors have also argued that laypeople have the competences necessary to be 
involved with scientific decision making (Durant 1999; Kerr et al 1998; Locke 1999) and that 
the involvement of non-scientists will lead to superior judgements and knowledge (Fischer 
2005; MacMillan 2004; Stirling 2006). In addition, there have been calls for greater public 
involvement in science policy on purely normative grounds. It is simply right, it is argued, 
that the public should be involved in the control of science in the UK (Involve 2005; Stirling 
2005): in a democracy citizens should be empowered to criticise, challenge and affect 
policy. 
Such arguments provided at least part of the impetus for a switch from deficit model PUS 
towards a more dialogue-focussed approach, with this switch exemplified in the House of 
Lords Report on Science and Society (2000) and its talk of a 'new mood for dialogue' 
(Wynne 2005). These arguments also, it is important to note, depend on any 'dialogue' in 
science actually having effects within science. In practice this means that citizens' 
participation in science needs to be linked, whether on a large or small scale, to science 
policy or technological development in some way. Of course, such participation could and 
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should take place in many different ways, depending on the situation and desired output 
(see my discussion of formats and classification systems in chapter 2). But these methods 
all attempt to meet similar ends; that, as a recent report concluded, science governance 
activities "should be informed by, and should themselves incorporate, more effective forms 
of symmetrical two-way deliberation, empowering inputs from a wide diversity of social 
actors" (Stirling 2006: 6). Consent, contribution and support of governance cannot happen 
without some feedback mechanism from the engagement into the bodies that control 
science. 
At this point it is useful to bring in Lehr et al's (in press) distinction between policy informing 
and non-policy informing dialogue processes, and to note again that there has so far been 
little analysis of those dialogue processes outside of science governance: the reason for 
this, it seems reasonable to suggest, is that informal engagement has no space within the 
arguments discussed above. If a key impetus for the development of 'dialogue' was to see 
science more democratically controlled, then dialogue processes with no connections to 
policy are open, at the very least, to the charge of taking on board the language and, to 
some extent, the methods of 'dialogue', while ignoring the reasoning behind them. At worst, 
they could be accused of using dialogue as a cynical ploy to increase the appearance of 
scientific openness while continuing to protect scientific practice (Beder 1999). In the same 
way that the GM Nation? debate was criticised as ineffective in affecting government 
practice (Mayer 2003; Wilsdon and Willis 2004), non-policy dialogue could be criticised for 
not allowing any opportunities for public views and debate to impact on science. 
We might exemplify this question (what is the point of informal dialogue? ) with a comment 
from a speaker at a Dana event: 
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So I think the event's very good it's great for dialogue I think it's great for feedback () 
but what I'm not certain is (. ) what they're going to do with it. You know wh-what 
happens now you know okay you've got all this opinion but () they just move on to 
aliens34 
(Event 1, Speaker interview) 
The speaker is frustrated by the lack of formal outcomes. Implicit in his comment is the 
assumption that - after good "dialogue" - there needs to be a formal outcome or change. 
The implication, then - from the literature, if not this speaker - is that informal dialogue 
processes are actually traditional PUS activities which have been wrapped up in user-friendly 
interactive formats. The unspoken purposes of 'engaging the public' are thus to transmit 
scientific information to publics, restore trust in science, and create an appearance of 
openness and engagement while continuing to act to protect science from democratic 
accountability. There is certainly some evidence to support this perspective: Alan Irwin 
(2006) has written on the tensions within 'public talk' on engagement, between 'old' 
(influenced by deficit model PUS) and 'new' forms of scientific governance. Such tensions 
may well be expressed in the conflation of new language and methods with old practices in 
informal organisations and processes as well as formal. Indeed, we have already observed 
the presence of the language of both 'education' and 'engagement' in statements by the RI 
(which "acts as a unique forum for informing people about how science affects their daily 
lives, and prides itself on its reputation for engaging the public in scientific debate", RI 
2005, italics mine; see p. 41). Wynne (2006) has argued that much 'public engagement' is 
failing because it ultimately seeks to encourage public trust in science rather than opening 
science up: such a criticism, we might speculate, could similarly be applied to non-policy 
processes. We might also suggest that any such superficiality in the shift from deficit to 
dialogue is perhaps not surprising given the high degree of continuity in the organisations, 
34 'Aliens', it should be noted, refers to the topic of the next event. 
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institutions, and, in many cases, individuals involved. Those who sponsor 'dialogue' - in all 
of its forms - are frequently those who previously supported 'public understanding of 
science'. Perhaps we are unrealistic in expecting deeply engrained notions about the right 
relations between science and society to have altered because a new vocabulary is in use. 
It seems, then, that informal dialogue cannot be viewed as valuable through a critical 
framework. This framing requires dialogue processes to have outcomes that impact on 
science, and rejects processes with no such impacts as traditional PUS activities or as 
seeking to increase public trust without allowing public accountability. Even a "perfect' 
informal event, where there is complete equity, inclusion of diverse voices, and no traces of 
the deficit model (and such perfection, as my analysis of the Dana Centre indicates, appears 
to be hard to find), would thus fail as a useful enterprise because lacking in any productive 
outcomes. 'Dialogue' processes, in other words, must involve a genuine, two-way dialogue 
where all actors can be impacted. Anything else becomes a monologue and therefore takes 
us back to traditional PUS and models of a deficit public which must be "filled up' with 
scientific information. 
I do not wish to understate the importance of these arguments. The background to the turn 
towards participation and dialogue on science strongly implies that many organisers of 
informal dialogue activities have misunderstood - or missed, or rejected - the reasoning 
behind such processes, and makes this "dialogue' deeply problematic. The difficulty is not 
aided by the widespread lack of acknowledgement, in practitioner and academic literatures, 
of the differences between policy and non-policy informing processes, and a lack of 
consideration of the meanings that non-policy informing processes therefore must have 
(with the exception of Lehr et al in press). Rather than simply abandoning informal dialogue 
as a regressive but perhaps inevitable feature of science-society relations, however, I want 
to argue that there are ways of reconceptualising such processes. Importantly, I seek to do 
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this from a critical point of view and therefore without losing the normative stance that the 
democratisation of science is a good, or a theoretical interest in unpicking the common- 
sense assumptions of such processes. In particular I will argue for a shift in perspective 
from looking at dialogue on the level on institutions to viewing it on the level of individuals. 
Reconceptualising informal dialogue: small-scale, symmetrical social learning 
Such a shift from the large scale to the level of small groups and individuals will remove the 
problem of a lack of policy outcomes discussed above by focussing attention rather on 
outcomes on a much smaller scale. In particular, impacts on individuals will become 
important. Laird (1993) has previously argued that learning is a useful outcome of 
participatory processes in his discussion of direct participation in democratic processes (see 
also Hansen 2006; Involve 2005). He describes how "educational and psychological effects" 
(Laird 1993: 345) on participants are viewed as a useful outcome alongside actual effects on 
policy: as he writes, "democracy enables people to become fully developed citizens" (ibid). 
Such learning is not merely of new 'facts', but rather is an augmented understanding of the 
complexity of an issue, the wide range of views, and the best way to negotiate and analyse 
these. The idea of 'social learning' is perhaps useful to us here (Limoges 1993; Rip 1986). 
Developed in the context of scientific controversies in the public domain, the concept of 
social learning describes a process of societal learning through the articulation of different 
viewpoints and the interactions of these viewpoints. Limoges (1993) suggests that to 
maximise social learning, controversies should be managed in order to ensure the 
articulation of as many different viewpoints or'worlds of relevance' as possible. It is through 
this articulation, followed by the negotiation and bridging of these worlds, that learning can 
occur, perhaps changing the very nature of the controversy in the process. Importantly, this 
learning "is not a question of transferring existing knowledge, understanding or skills to 
people who do not yet master them. The learning is open ended... The controversy is about 
what the content of the learning should be" (Rip 1986: 358). There is therefore no fixed 
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agenda, no one set of facts to be transmitted from one group to another. Debate will focus 
around which issues are important as much as the content of those issues. 
In the context of controversies there is a clear endpoint to be aimed for: a socially robust 
outcome, which Limoges and Rip argue can be best reached through this process of social 
learning. The scale again tends to be on the level of institutions and the learning on the 
level of whole societies. But the concept can also be applied on a smaller scale to individuals 
within dialogue processes. As articulation occurs within these contexts, diverse - indeed, 
perhaps incommensurable - worlds are described and understood and negotiated. 
Individuals' learning would not only or even primarily expected to be about new 'facts' or 
information; rather it would be a complex process of social, cultural and moral 
understanding and may result in changes of attitude as well as of knowledge and 
knowledge of knowledge. Indeed, non-policy dialogue may in some ways be a better forum 
for this learning process than controversies or policy debates where outcomes are 
demanded. Without the pressure of having to create an often impossible consensus or sum 
up diverse viewpoints into one statement or recommendation, participants can be free to 
explore all positions and to avoid polarising the debate into two or three opposing camps. 
We might further argue that to genuinely facilitate the articulation of incommensurable 
worlds and enable social learning, we must go beyond the practices of 'deliberative 
democracy' (see Benhabib 1994; Cooke 2000; Davies et al 2006) as applied to both formal 
and informal dialogue. Elam and Bertilsson (2002) argue that by "valuing rationality, 
reserve, selflessness and powers of argumentation, deliberative democracy is a democratic 
politics played out on scientists' home turf" (p. 18): the Habermasian concept of free, 
equitable and rational debate is therefore not enough, as it remains a frame for dialogue 
which ultimately prioritises and imposes scientific worldviews. We cannot merely, then, 
imagine social learning as a 'rational' process. It must also include aspects of what Elam and 
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Bertilsson have characterised as'radical democracy' and 'alternative public understandings 
of science' (2002: 21-25), and which Young (2001) describes as 'activism'. Such activists, as 
Young describes them, act outside formal processes of deliberation in order to highlight the 
problems embedded within them and to draw attention to other ways of knowing and 
doing. She writes: 
Because he suspects some agreements of masking unjust power relations, the activist 
believes it is important to continue to challenge these discourses and the deliberative 
processes that relay on them, and often he must do so by nondiscursive means - 
pictures, song, poetic imagery, and expressions of mockery and longing performed in 
rowdy and even playful ways aimed not at commanding assent but disturbing 
complacency. One of the activist's goal [sic] is to make us wonder about what we are 
doing, to rupture a stream of thought, rather than weave an argument. 
(Young 2001: 687) 
To truly be an equitable site, then, and to allow the articulation of all 'worlds of relevance' 
(Limoges 1993), the dialogue space must be open to such 'messy' and nondiscursive 
contributions. Social learning must be a learning not restricted to one - or even a few - 
ways of knowing, and articulation should not be restricted to one mode of communication. 
Rather, it would involve diversity. Some actors may choose to argue their perspective, 
others to shock the emotions through art or personal testimony. Some might bring material 
experiences into the dialogue space as a way of explaining, while others choose simply to 
listen - as silence, too, must be an option. In Law's terms (2004), different realities will be 
given voice through different means and mechanisms (maps, bodies, ceremonies, for 
example; see Law 2004: 146). 
Such social learning as would take place through these processes of articulation could be 
viewed as empowering participants for further debate (Kerr et al 2007). However, 
-253- 
positioning 'learning' as the key outcome for lay participants in non-policy dialogue may still 
appear a deeply deficit model perspective: whether the learning is of 'facts' or of social 
understandings such as Limoges and Rip discuss, if it is lay participants alone who need to 
learn then they are implied to be deficient in one way or another. It is therefore vital that 
any such learning, to be truly part of a dialogue process, should be symmetrical Social 
learning and enhanced understandings must occur within a//those involved, whether they 
are present in their roles as scientists or as citizens. The dialogue forum should not imply 
the superiority of one form of knowledge over others, or that the expertise of one group is 
more valuable than that of others: conditions of strict equality must be imposed. The 
dialogue would then be occurring on a micro-scale. Rather than public(s) interacting with 
science(s) en masse to influence policy and knowledge production, individuals would 
interact with other individuals to come to shared understandings in the process of 
articulation and social learning described above. Impacts and outcomes will be on the level 
of individuals and could be anything from changed knowledges and understandings to the 
formation of new alliances and groups or changed behaviour. As Laird notes for direct 
participation theory, participation "changes the outlooks and attitudes of participants. It 
makes people more aware of the linkages between public and private interests, helps them 
develop a sense of justice, and is a critical part of the process of developing a sense of 
community" (Laird 1993: 345). In other words, social learning in a dialogue forum could 
equip a// involved to be more effective citizens. 35 
In practice, however, this study is more interested in impacts of dialogue on science than on 
publics: I have particular interests, for example, in democratising science and correcting 
power inequities. Given this, the argument that simply creating open debate will leave intact 
deeply ingrained power relations is important. Action must be taken, it has been argued 
35 We might also suggest that this 'citizening' might be an enjoyable experience for all involved - something which 
might heighten the likelihood of individuals (both scientists and lay) wanting to participate. Data from the Dana 
Centre (see p. 242) and from other studies (Gavelin et al 2007; Kearnes et al 2006; Stilgoe 2007b) indicates that 
participants generally enjoy current 'dialogue' processes. 
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(see Ellsworth 1989; Lehr et at in press), to limit more powerful voices and to enable more 
oppressed ones. Even given such actions, however - which might include the inclusion of 
nondiscursive contributions described above, or a degree of control placed on the dialogue 
forum to ensure a voice for those with traditionally little authority - the question of possible 
impacts on those present in the role of "scientist', and thence on science itself, remains a 
particularly pertinent one. Laird seems to view direct participation processes as mechanisms 
for 'citizen ing' those involved: might this 'citizening'of scientists have an impact on science 
itself? If this were the case, we could view non-policy dialogue as a possible tool for 
changing the culture of science to become more democratically accountable. If enough 
individuals within science learn about the diversity of opinions about science, the manifold 
framings of scientific questions, and the pragmatic capabilities of publics, then - we might 
speculate - science as a body could slowly be changed. Social learning on the level of 
individuals in science, in other words, might so affect those individuals that the character of 
the enterprise they are collectively engaged in might alter from the bottom up. An 
increasing sophistication - in terms of sociological awareness and sensitivity - might 
become a grassroots movement in science. Given the problems that so far appear to be rife 
in attempting to govern science more democratically from the top down, through public 
engagement in policy processes (see Goven 2006; Horlick-Jones et al 2006; Irwin 2001; 
Rowe et al 2004; 2005; Schibeci et al 2006; Wynne 2002; 2005; 2006a), the experiment of 
this'bottom up' approach must be a hopeful, if uncertain, development. 
In sum, then, I have argued that non-policy dialogue should be viewed as having outcomes 
at the level of individuals rather than that of institutions, and that a useful outcome would 
be symmetrical social learning. Our non-policy dialogue processes have thus become spaces 
of mediation, enabling individuals from diverse cultures to come together, articulate 
positions and views, and interact in a context of genuine equality. Such spaces would not 
demand or even expect any kind of consensus to develop, but they would allow the 
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formation of associations between different worlds (Limoges 1993) and the creation of new 
networks and alliances (compare with Irwin and Michael's 'assemblages', 2003). Among 
those learning, claiming, understanding and being 'citizened' in such processes will be those 
from expert and scientific cultures: we might hope, then, that as informal dialogue increases 
we might see a gradual citizening of science from the bottom up. As a final point, we might 
also point to the work of Callon (1999; 2003) on hybrid forums and the co-production of 
knowledge. Depending on the subject matter under discussion36, dialogue spaces could also 
become sites where knowledges are not just articulated and shared but also co-produced. 
Again on a small scale, we might see impacts on science, as'confined researchers' (the 
traditional scientific community) and 'researchers in the wild' (concerned lay people) 
collaborate and make new knowledges. Informal dialogue, in other words, could enable not 
just a more democratic and sensitive science, but also one that produces more robust 
knowledge. 37 
From theory to praxis 
Points for application from the theoretical model and empirical findings 
Having argued, then, that this is what informal dialogue could look like -a symmetrical 
space for social learning - what might this mean for the actual practice of dialogue 
activities? A comparison with the practices of the Dana Centre (as representative of the 
informal dialogue movement) immediately indicates the need for a re-think of the'dialogue 
event' on a very practical level. Key concepts of the theoretical model I have described are a 
focus on and interest in the individual (as site of a 'world' of meanings, framings, and 
ethics, and as the primary site for outcomes of the process), the necessity of scope for all 
involved to 'articulate' their worlds by whatever means they see fit, a lack of interest in 
36 As Callon points out (1999: 93), it is hard to see how particle physics - in terms of its substantive content rather 
than its framing or governance - could submit to his'co-production of knowledge' model. 
37 Something which may act as further motivation for involvement of both scientists and laypeople. Recruitment for 
these processes would then be aided both by the attraction of the experience and in being able to fruitfully impact 
science. 
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forcing consensus, and an emphasis on the symmetrical nature of the interactions and 
learning that takes place. If these factors are present in the dialogue space, there is the 
hope and expectation of social learning - or'citizening' - in all involved, of the formation of 
(shifting) alliances and networks, and - perhaps at a later stage, as a result of the dialogue 
interactions - of the production of new, co-produced scientific knowledge and the gradual 
citizening of science. These concepts are prescriptive, but not absolutely: there doubtless 
will be a variety of formats, methods and modes of 'dialogue' which will allow and enable 
them. In addition, they suggest the need for flexibility in the space. Formats cannot be set 
in stone; there must be scope for a continual (and equitable) negotiation of how the space 
works as well as of how articulation occurs. If there is to be the possibility of the formation 
of new alliances, in particular, there must be the opportunity for movement (both physical 
and metaphorical): for the breaking off of one train of debate and a shifting around the 
space; the juxtaposition of new ideas and the gathering of new 'assemblages'; the 
negotiation of the very topic under discussion. A flexible space will also, it is to be hoped, 
help guard against the imposition of unequal power structures, allowing all involved to 
shape the nature and course of the dialogue process rather than one form being imposed 
by one particular group. 
There are some very obvious differences between this sketched-out vision and what my 
analysis of Dana Centre events indicates about current dialogue processes. While there is, 
to some degree, flexibility and uncertainty within these existing spaces, this is by no means 
as radical as my sketch suggests it should be, and seems, frequently, to act as a problem 
rather than a resource for participants. In addition I have described power differentials in 
this flexibility: it is easier for some participants to reinterpret and control the space than for 
others. In particular the institution has overall and almost absolute control over the process. 
We have seen how the facilitator is able to define the course of the event, for example, or 
control the types of contributions invited. While the presence of flexibility is perhaps 
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encouraging, then, overall it is by no means as developed as my theoretical argument 
suggests it should be. In addition my analysis indicates a key lack of symmetry in dialogue 
spaces. Power is unequally distributed, and though there is scope to challenge this, it 
remains the case that it is generally weighted towards traditionally powerful actors (the 
'institution' and the 'expert'). While symmetrical learning may take place, many features of 
the space act against it: the layout, which forces a focus on the'speakers' at the centre; the 
rules of access to the floor, which prioritise expert talk and grants them long periods 
'lecturing' their 'audience'; and much of the discourse of the event, which frames what takes 
place in terms of 'audience learning' and a one-way flow of information. In addition, I have 
argued that the Dana space is one in which science is unproblematically assumed to be the 
authoritative knowledge source by both 'audience' and 'speakers'; it acts as a trump card 
which decisively closes any discussion of `facts'. There is currently little scope for the free 
expression of, and attention to, other worlds of relevance or ways of knowing. In addition, 
as well as working to limit what is 'relevant information' in the space - hindering the 
articulation of non-scientific woridviews or modes of expression - we have also seen that 
the discourse of the event often acts to frame the process as competitive debate or 
persuasion. The voting process, in particular, lends a sense that the outcome of the event is 
to be consensus or at least an actionable balance of views. 
Currently, then, non-policy dialogue is problematic in terms of my critical theoretical vision. 
It appears possible that many of the issues above are derived from the application of policy- 
focussed participation methods and formats to an informal and non-policy related space 
(hence, for example, the voting process; concepts of fairness in access to the floor; 
audience participation as an outcome to be aimed for; the emphasis on information 
provision then discussion). Indeed, given that the vast majority of work in designing and 
theorising dialogue or engagement processes has been done on policy-related dialogue (see 
my discussion in chapter 2), this is not surprising. Alan Irwin (2006), as I have noted, talks 
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of the presence of both 'old' and 'new' styles of governance within talk on public 
engagement and dialogue; similarly, Burchell (forthcoming) argues that much current 
practice mingles 'academic' and "practitioner' styles of dialogue (cf. Smallman and Nieman 
2006) to produce what are at times troublesome hybrids. Given this trend of hybridity, we 
might suggest that many of the problematic aspects of contemporary informal dialogue 
activities result from their somewhat unreflective use of the formats, and to some extent 
the theory and the language, of policy-related dialogue. 
While current informal dialogue is problematic, it is certainly not to be criticised for re-using 
the language and methods of formal dialogue when these are the only kind available to it. 
Indeed, there are some key features of the practice of Dana Centre events which seem to 
me to be interesting enough to seek to develop further: some positive considerations, in 
other words, to stand in contrast to the failings that I have detailed above. To note them 
briefly, at this stage: one such is the concept of genre and of conversation. Admittedly 
'conversation' as a genre of Dana Centre talk tends to fail, in current practice (see chapter 
6), but the fact that some talk, at least, seeks to mimic conversation and to create pseudo- 
intimate styles of talk remains interesting. Conversation, we might argue, is the ultimate 
type of equitable talk: it is relaxed, informal, cooperative and open to manipulation by its 
participants (Cameron 2001). Conversation (as opposed to - say - lecturing, interviewing, 
or teaching) as a model for the 'healthy' talk of a dialogue space is therefore a concept I 
would like to develop further. Similarly, we have seen that flexibility and uncertainty are 
already present in informal dialogue: this gives us scope to imagine that they can be 
developed further. I have suggested (chapter 6) that this flexibility derives in part from the 
newness of the social space of 'dialogue'. Again, this newness and lack of settled norms 
could mean that such spaces remain open to reinterpretation and invention in the direction 
I have described. We have also seen that audiences - despite the structures of power 
imposed on the space - are active in resisting control, drawing on their own authorities, and 
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defining the genre and nature of events. Such agency leads us to believe that my vision of 
dialogue as free and equitable social learning, where all participants are active and shape 
the course of the event, is possible. We might argue, as well, that many of the problems 
that I have identified with Dana Centre dialogue events indicate within themselves possible 
solutions: that, in other words, we can use what currently doesn't work to suggest things 
that might. Thus, for example, my critiques of features such as the layout or overt framing 
of events as not conducive to equal relationships could suggest alternative framings or use 
of space. 
Before I move on to consider these things further, however, I would like to examine briefly 
the implications that the first section of my analysis - on the talk of scientists and engineers 
in group discussions - might have for my model of the practice of dialogue. A key finding 
from this data was the concept of complexity: while my interviewees did use discourses of 
deficiency to describe'the public' and simplistic models of science, they also, at times, drew 
upon more complex models of publics as differentiated and active. I loosely drew the 
discourses present together into two key themes: there were discourses of identification 
(where science is unbounded and scientists may identify with publics) and separation 
(where there are sharp distinctions between science and the (deficit) public). These 
discourses are competing - in that they may act to contradict one another - and their use 
appeared heavily dependent upon context, with both types present in the talk of groups and 
individuals at different points in the discussions. Discourses of identification, for example, 
seemed to be especially prevalent within talk based on personal experience and in a type of 
talk I called 'reflective discussion'. 
There are several implications, I think, from these findings for dialogue processes. The first 
is perhaps rather obvious: that scientists and engineers do not only have access to the 
linguistic resources of deficit but are capable of using more developed sociological models of 
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publics and of science. Dialogue processes should anticipate - and seek to encourage - the 
use of such models, rather than positioning experts only in terms of a narrowly scientistic 
viewpoint. We should expect, in other words, technical experts to be just as capable as 
other participants to negotiate the sociological complexity of a dialogue process and the 
necessarily differentiated nature of the worlds articulated within the event, as well as of the 
world at large. Similarly, we have cause to know that experts are capable of drawing upon 
discourses of identification: that they can position themselves within 'the public' and in roles 
other than 'scientist' (cf. Tutton et al 2005). This positioning work is part of their own 'world 
of relevance'; part of what can be articulated and explained and - perhaps - part of some 
of the shifting allegiances and connections that might be formed. Role-switching, then, is 
possible for experts and should be encouraged within the dialogue space: as well as aiding 
the formations of networks it will also encourage an equality of voices (as "experts' switch 
between less traditionally authoritative roles such as'mother' or'consumer'). Finally, 
findings from the group discussions give us some clues as to how this more complex 
discourse can be brought about. 'Reflective discussion' - in other words, dialogues rather 
than merely exchanges of monologues - and personal experience both appear to draw forth 
more complex narratives (see p. 130-137). The sustained discussion (including discussion 
not always carried out by discursive means) and close interactions with other participants of 
our imagined dialogue space might also, we can speculate, result in the use of complex 
discourses. 
Two practical models for informal dialogue 
To draw together my discussion, then, our practical model for dialogue must take into 
account or include the following features: 
0 An emphasis on the individual as site of a 'world' of meanings, framings, and ethics; 
0 Scope for all involved to 'articulate their worlds by whatever means they see fit; 
0A lack of interest in forcing or arranging consensus; 
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0 An emphasis on the entirely symmetrica/and equitable nature of the interactions and 
learning that take place; 
0 Scope for the formation of shifting alliances and networks (which may, but not 
necessarily, lead to the production of new, co-produced scientific knowledge). 
In order for these things to take place, it seems that we require a flexible space. We may 
wish to draw upon the idea of conversation to enable them; similarly, we want to encourage 
reflective discussion and role-switching among participants in order to draw out complex 
narratives and maximise social learning. 
As noted earlier, there will doubtless be many different ways and formats to achieve this 
kind of space. Here I wish to develop, on a very practical level, just two. Both, I believe, go 
some way to meeting the criteria described above. Both also rely to a large extent on the 
concept of the value of conversational talk: before I go on to flesh my models out in more 
detail, I wish to spend some time exploring this value for my vision of informal dialogue. 
What is conversation? Definitions vary, and its meaning for each one of us will probably be 
subtly different. Most seem to agree, however, that it involves talk between two or more 
people and that it is informal - rather than institutional - talk (Cameron 2001). It is, 
perhaps, a default form of speech for many of us: that which we use most naturally and 
which other talk is measured or compared against. That it is a broad category makes sense 
to our normal experience. We may have a 'serious conversation' with someone or a brief 
chat about the weather; we can hold conversations with those we know well or those we've 
only just met. Conversation allows us to talk about many different things in many different 
ways: it gives scope for humour, aggression, 'small talk', or intimacy. It is not, however, a 
simplistic mode of communication. The work of the pioneering conversation analysts (see 
Heritage 2001) indicates that conversation is highly organised. The study of features such 
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as turn-taking, the protection of face, and repairs of miscommunication (Cameron 2001; 
Goffman 2001; Sacks 2001; Schegloff and Sacks 1999; Schiffrin 1999) has shown that 
conversation is a complex, collaborative enterprise. Importantly for our purposes, it is also 
an equitable form of talk (Cameron 2001). While power can be exercised in any interaction, 
some genres have power structures more deeply encoded in them than others: consider the 
interview, for example, where the questioner generally takes the position of power, or 
classroom talk (Cameron 2001; Hutchby 1996; Mehan 1985; O'Keeffe 2006). Conversation, 
in its very generality, leaves participants more open to invent their roles and to interact in a 
context of equal status. Its informality also aids in this. Compared with institutional talk, 
conversation is flexible and there is a continual interest in mutually maintaining face and 
'friendly' relations which may not be as present in other, more formal, genres (Brown and 
Levinson 1999). 
Conversation, then, appears to be a genre of talk which is ideal for the formation of 
equitable and flexible relationships. It allows role-switching and has scope for different keys, 
from the humorous to the passionate, while maintaining a 'friendly' relationship. Its 
flexibility extends to topic, enabling switching between different foci of talk. (We can readily 
imagine, for example, conversations that flit between the ethics of stem cell research, the 
pragmatic experience of parenthood, and the merits of TV's 'supernanny'. Role-switching, as 
well as topic-switching, is implicit in such talk. ) However, it has some limitations as a mode 
of talk for dialogue as it is currently organised - some of which we have seen already, from 
our analysis of Dana Centre events. One is that it does not occur automatically. All talk is 
shaped by the context in which it occurs, and we have seen that talk which seeks to mimic 
conversation at the Dana Centre (in mimicking intimacy, for example) frequently fails. It 
seems likely that the relatively formal event structure and space act to constrain informal 
conversational talk: thus participants' names are forgotten and attempts at intimacy foiled, 
there are awkward and unnatural pauses as the microphone is passed around, and 
- 263 - 
participants frequently reject it as a way of talking and choose to use other genres of 
interaction. Conversation, then, needs to be fostered. Conversational talk is constructed not 
just through the linguistic decisions of participants but also through its physical and 
discursive surroundings. Conversation will occur more naturally in some environments than 
in others. (It is unlikely, for example, that 'conversation' will naturally spring up in the 
question and answer session after a formal lecture: both the discursive and the physical 
context work against this. Roles are entrenched and a level of formality already set. ) We 
might also note that conversation is more natural in cases where participants are already 
known to one another. This is by no means absolute - consider the work done to create a 
conversational style and pseudo-intimacy on radio talkshows (O'Keeffe 2006) - but it is 
worth our acknowledging that where participants are not previously known to one another 
more work must be done to bring about the informality of conversational genres. 
A further factor that must be taken into account is numbers of participants. Our own 
experience informs us that conversation is difficult in large groups of people; the 
paradigmatic case, in terms of conversation analysis (CA) research, is talk between two 
people. (For various reasons CA research has often made use of telephone conversation, 
which of necessity only involves two speakers. ) Lefstein (2006) notes, in a discussion of 
dialogue in classrooms, that whole-class dialogue is simply not possible, and that at best 
what can be achieved is the participation of five to six individuals with an 'audience' of the 
rest of the class; similarly, we might argue that a conversation reaches its limits with five or 
six participants. Either, then, we argue - as Lefstein does - for a division between 
conversationalists and auditors of the conversation, or we create a format which allows for 
conversations between small groups of people. In either case we must not force 
conversational genres upon larger groups (as my analysis indicates Dana Centre talk 
currently does). At this point we can link conversation into the requirement, in my dialogue 
model, for a focus on individuals: conversational talk is never between groups of people, or 
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institutions, but rather - by the small numbers involved - forces a focus on individual 
participants. 
Having acknowledged these benefits and constraints of conversation as a mode of talk for 
dialogue, then, we can move on to explore my two models for dialogue. Both rely to a large 
extent on the informality of conversational talk, and each uses a key metaphor or exemplar 
which frames the dialogue process and which is used to seek to normalise 'conversation'38. 
The first is the meal. 
A model for informal dialogue: the meal 
Eating - and perhaps in particular eating together- is an act layered with meaning. The 
gradually growing study of the sociology of food and eating is elucidating some of these 
meanings and practices (see Mennell et al 1992; also Bell and Hollows 2007; Kemmer 
2000); many of them, indeed, are familiar to us from our own lived experiences. Mennell 
and co-authors, describing the work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas, note that: 
Food categories encode social events, as Douglas puts it - they express hierarchy, 
inclusion and exclusion, boundaries and transactions across boundaries. Thus, in the 
Douglas household, drinks were shared with strangers, acquaintances and workmen, but 
meals were shared only with family, close friends and honoured guests; so the meal 
structure serves to maintain external boundaries, and significant social thresholds are 
crossed when a guest is invited to share a meal. 
(Mennell et al 1992: 10) 
While the social encoding of eating practices is deeply culturally embedded, the pattern 
described for the Douglas household above remains familiar to many of us today within the 
38 I should note here that, again, these metaphors are not exclusive. Others may function equally well for building 
a practical model for the dialogue process. 
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UK context (and indeed in many others). Eating - as a concept, if more variably as a 
practice - frequently remains wedded to coinmensality. to group membership, community, 
and mutual commitment (see Mennell et al 1992: 115-9). The informal meal (as opposed to 
the formal dinner; we might suggest state banquets or the traditional university 'high table' 
as examples) is thus about informal relationships, and creates a space where conversation 
is the natural form of speech. It promotes a sense of commonality, of shared goals, and of 
equality, and its informal nature allows role-switching. 
We have already seen that food and drink are important parts of the Dana Centre 
'experience' (chapter 5) and that the presence of a cafe-bar acts to construct -I have 
argued -a particular kind of social space. My argument here is that currently, food and 
drink in the event space are working in the wrong direction: they create a "bar' or 'bistro' 
rather than a meal. The model, in order to promote this sense of community and the 
presence of conversation, should perhaps be the family meal or the dinner party rather than 
the urban bar. In particular numbers should be limited; as we have seen, 'conversation' will 
not occur in large groups. Our 'meal' will not be partaken of by more than - say - six 
people. In addition, it should not take place in a formal environment. I have argued that the 
Dana space gives mixed messages in terms of its nature and 'genre' (chapter 5) and that, in 
particular, its layout and gatekeeping signal that it is a formal and regulated environment. A 
space which signals the informality of a meal with friends or family would be the ideal for 
our model: a home, restaurant, or other neutral and 'friendly' space. 
Having set up the model of an informal meal, then, for small-scale symmetrical dialogue, 
what exactly might this mean for practice? It is worth noting here that readings of space will 
be highly culturally contingent. My understanding of a particular kind of restaurant as a 
relaxed and informal environment for conversation with friends, for example, may not be 
shared by others. In practice, then, this means that each dialogue will be locally variable, 
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adjusted and arranged to fit each group of participants and to create the best environment 
for an informal meal. Given this flexibility, though, and with the acknowledgement that this 
is just one interpretation amongst many, I would like to visualise a way of arranging and 
performing this meal-based dialogue process. Rather than sketch out a formal plan, I will 
walk through the imagined experience: my story is speculation, based on my theorisation of 
what could happen in the space I imagine. The story raises some questions; I will deal more 
fully with these, and with other issues around the planning, running and nature of this 
'dialogue meal' model after the story has given a taste - so to speak - of the process. 
In this imagining, the meal takes place in a home. Perhaps one of the participants hosts it, 
perhaps an organiser/social scientist/Facilitator (who is, of course, also a participant). The 
host cooks the meal; others, perhaps, bring drinks or more food. Six participants in total 
have confirmed their attendance, and they arrive gradually, individually or perhaps in pairs 
where they know one another already. They live in the same town or city but have been 
invited because of their range of experiences and expertise: some (but no more than three) 
are technical experts of different kinds, others might be active in lay groups or have 
relevant personal experience. Of one kind or another, then, they all have a 'world of 
relevance'to a particular topic which can be articulated. This topic, as well as the 
geographical location, is what unites them. Along with their invitation they have received 
briefing notes about the process and its aims: they know, then, that their role is going to be 
to listen as much as to speak Some are nervous, some cynical, others hopeful. 
As they arrive, gradually, they sip drinks and make desultory conversation with one another. 
Perhaps there is some awkwardness: they do not know each other, and make small talk No 
name badges are worn, or positions set out, and individuals introduce themselves in various 
ways. As they chat, however, they find topics of common interest or experience. Perhaps 
they live in the same area, or have children at the same school, or grew up in the same part 
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of the world. They interact as they would at any other informal social gathering; there is 
humour, roleswitching, and the gradual deepening of intimacy as they talk about more 
personal subjects. Eventually the meal is ready, and they sit down to eat. They are around a 
small table, all within hearing distance of one another, a/though at some points smaller 
conversations may break off from the main one. It is at this point, as they start to eat, and 
after all introductions have been performed, that more focussed conversation around their 
common topic of interest begins Perhaps this is instigated by the host; perhaps another 
participant, keen to share their experience, begins. Each tells of their interest in the topic 
and of their thinking on it. They do not necessarily, however, remain in fixed roles as they 
do this: they may signal their understanding of another's perspective by expressing 
solidarity with them, for example. As they talk through their experiences and reflect upon 
their beliefs a discussion begins. Their talk is in depth, reflexive, and context dependent: 
they use a range of discourses and types of language and their positions may shift 
throughout the meal. Some will seek to make their case through logic or science, others 
simply share their stories or feelings. At times the talk is emotional and impassioned; the 
context of the meal, however, keeps the discussion friendly and participants are careful to 
remain within the bounds of politeness At times someone breaks into humour and the 
mood is lightened, and there are pauses and breaks in the discussion. There are moments 
of silence and moments of unrelated talk: the food is complimented, sport discussed. The 
conversation is unregulated and may drift to other topics of common interest. Perhaps 
questions of governance are discussed, or perhaps the differences between participants 
make these questions too vexed, and they are put to one side. 
As the meal ends and people start to glance at their watches, some participants exchange 
phone numbers or email addresses with promises to keep in touch. As the talk has gone on 
it has become clear what similarities and what differences they have, and some of the 
temporary alliances that formed may, it seems, have a life beyond this conversation. 
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As I write it is clear that this is not a perfect or fool-proof recipe for dialogue: such a thing 
cannot exist. This vision is problematic in various ways: it is culturally bound and dependent 
on various shared social norms and experiences (and hence may work to exclude those not 
so familiar with such norms), it is open to the power plays that take place in everyday social 
interactions and which may remain unquestioned, and there is relatively little scope or 
space for non-discursive modes of expression or those without 'articulatable' positions on 
the topic under discussion. I should once again emphasise the high cultural contingency of 
this particular type of meal: with its 'dinner party' connotations it will simply not be 
appropriate in some contexts. The question also arises of whether it is hopelessly idealistic: 
would participants be prepared to listen as well as talk, to put authoritative roles aside at 
times and to admit the validity of others' opinions? While briefing notes on the process may 
have been provided, expectations of the process and of individual's roles may in practice 
vary widely. Only experiments with this format will answer these questions, and doubtless 
each 'dialogue' will be different: a conversation, by its very nature, will be heavily 
dependent on the conversationalists. There are, however, some reasons to be hopeful. We 
have seen within my data that groups of scientists are capable of the type of `reflective 
discussion' that this format aims for (chapter 4), and previous studies have shown or 
suggested flexibility and role-switching in scientist-public dialogues (Deckers 2005; Tutton 
et al 2005). Ultimately this format aims to make use of the social dexterity we all of us 
employ in our day to day interactions, enabling equitable relationships by mirroring a 
situation which highlights commonality. It allows participants to consider each other in 
terms of multiple identities and to situate themselves in different roles, and to talk in the 
context of relationships rather than merely as proponents of particular arguments: the 
setting- a home or restaurant - is key in enabling this. 
There is a further limitation to the meal format: it seems likely that, to operate successfully, 
both the nature of the topic under discussion and the positions and interests participants 
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represent must be relatively focussed and 'articulatable'. Thus the meal could be considered 
as hosting a meeting of various stakeholders in a particular issue, and participants expected 
to have particular pre-existing positions. Participants - while role-switching within their 
conversation - would also be understood as representatives of a particular social group(s) 
or identity(s). This is not to say that such positions may not shift or alter through the 
process, or that the nature of the 'issue' under discussion is itself not negotiable, or that 
participants can be viewed as straightforwardly 'representative' of certain social groups. 
Indeed, the literature encourages us to expect flexibility and complexity around such points 
(Cambrosio and Limoges 1991; Limoges 1993; Rip 1986). For the conversation to be most 
productive, however, it should draw in a range of different and at least partially developed 
perspectives: the process as I have described it does not seem particularly fitted for the 
exploration of an issue by those who are entirely new to it. This provides a contrast to 
recent discussions on formal dialogue, where the heavy involvement of interest groups may 
be viewed as counterproductive (Burchell forthcoming; Horlick-Jones et al 2004) and where 
there is often a search for a 'pure' or blank slate public (Lezaun and Soneryd 2007). Here 
the aim is not to identify what discourses a representative 'general public' might mobilise in 
response to an issue or to encourage them to reach a workable consensus, but to enable 
the articulation and negotiation of many different types of discourse from many different 
positions for the sake of that articulation alone. 
Rip (1986) and Limoges (1993) discuss this concept of articulation of different 'worlds of 
relevance' in the context of public scientific controversies, and it is relatively easy to see 
how different perspectives on a particular controversial question could be brought together 
through such dialogue meals. Other less obviously controversial issues may have less clearly 
defined, but still identifiable, positions and perspectives on them. A dialogue meal on a 
particular medical topic might, for example, bring together a patient, an activist, a GP, a 
scientific researcher, a policy-maker, and a carer. Participants will thus have stakes in the 
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same issue but bring different forms of expertise and experience to be articulated, shared 
and developed through the course of the conversation. This position does, however, bring 
us rather uncomfortably back to the question of power in dialogue, specifically in terms of 
who decides what are relevant positions and expertise: as Rip (1986) discusses, the very 
question of what is'relevant knowledge' is up for debate within controversies. Within this 
meal format, as I have described it, it appears that the organiser or host has the power of 
deciding who to include (and therefore who to exclude). They issue the invitations and - 
presumably - scope out which social groups and identities may have a stake in the topic 
under discussion. The format is therefore limited in that it is to some extent still closed to 
some. There seems no way to adjust this without doing violence to the model of the small, 
informal meal which enables conversational talk: it remains, however, a factor which 
organisers should be aware of. Selection is likely to be based partly on visibility(i. e. already 
active groups/individuals) but the possibility of prior advertisement and requests for 
indications of interest remains open. 
The "meal' model, then, though not without its problems, seems to broadly meet the 
requirements for dialogue detailed above (p. 261-262) and to provide the potential for a 
realistic space for conversation. However, in practical terms it has some further key 
disadvantages: it is tiny in scale; socially, intellectually and emotionally intensive for 
participants; and requires a high degree of organisation and commitment (in particular from 
the host, who will generally also be the main organiser). It is likely to be difficult and 
perhaps controversial for informal practitioners to organise - particularly when compared to 
current formats. My second model responds in part to some of these issues, and describes a 
space which, while still primarily conversational in discursive expectation, allows for more 
participants and for a greater degree of flexibility. The key metaphor this model is based 
upon is the marketplace. 
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A model for informal dialogue: the marketplace 
The marketplace - or agora- is already familiar to us as a metaphor in science studies. 
Nowotny, Scott and Gibbons (2001) use the term to describe the space where, they argue, 
'Mode-2' society and knowledge production now occur: it is a "new public space where 
science and society, the market and politics, co-mingle" (2001: 203). Their agora is flexible, 
messy, and in transition; it is a space where old boundaries are transgressed and 
knowledge is made in new ways. The term comes from the marketplace and public forum of 
Greek city-states, and refers to an essential part of a city, a prototypical public sphere, 
where markets, culture, and knowledge-making met and mingled. Nowotny et al's agora is 
virtual, rather than physical: it encompasses (and intermingles) science, society and 
economies. Here, however, I would like to take this idea of the marketplace - as a messy, 
noisy and flexible space where connections can be made and knowledge co-constructed - 
and apply it to the physical process of doing dialogue. 
A marketplace, at first glance, may not seem the ideal environment for conversation. 
Interactions are dispersed and (perhaps) transitory, there is constant competition for 
individuals' attention, and there is frequently a definite purpose to talk (buying or selling). I 
would argue that such spaces do, however, allow for conversation, but in a rather different 
form to that we have just seen exemplified in the 'meal' model. In fact the marketplace is a 
balance of both commerce and community: we might extend the metaphor to include local 
village fetes or food or drink festivals, where the community element is highlighted. In this 
case the space will not host one or two sustained conversations, but many, occurring 
simultaneously. Participants will have a high degree of mobility and, although there is scope 
for sustained interaction between individuals who choose to remain talking to one another, 
it seems likely that many conversations will be brief, allowing an exchange of views or 
positions (rather like the exchange of commodities in the market), and perhaps some 
negotiation of these. Such talk may attract others to it, or drive participants apart and on to 
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other interactions. The great advantage of the marketplace model for our purposes is its 
flexibility and scope for individual agency. The space allows for diverse methods of putting 
across worlds of relevance - discursive and non-discursive - and for individuals to choose 
how, when and with whom they interact. In many ways it is less socially constrained than 
the meal, where the social norms of eating together will be relatively strong and behaviour 
accordingly determined. (This is, conversely, one of the advantages of the meal format: 
these constraining social norms are used to encourage conversational talk. ) Rather the 
marketplace is a deliberately messy format which allows for unexpected interactions and 
collaborations: actors are mobile within it and may (or may not) form (temporary) physical 
groupings or patterns. It remains, however, a 'flat' environment in terms of power and 
authority (in contrast, of course, to Dana Centre events, where we have seen that power is 
very much focussed onto the 'front' or centre of the space). Its very mobility helps to 
ensure this, as does the cacophony of voices that will be simultaneously present: any 
whole-space consensus or performance must be collaboratively achieved rather than 
imposed by one actor. 
A marketplace suggests, to us today, a place with many different stalls; relatively fixed sites 
which set out particular wares. This concept is also useful to us in our dialogue 
'marketplace', suggesting a way in which some interactions could be structured (rather than 
having an entirely blank and open space). Some participants may wish to set out a stall or 
to present particular information through the use of a particular patch of ground. This need 
not be a traditional stall providing products or leaflets, or the dry'poster presentation' 
format familiar to us from academic conferences; rather, such spaces might also be used for 
dramatic performances, the giving of personal stories, works of art, or the dissemination of 
subversive and counter-institutional information. These spaces and presentations should not 
be seen as ends in themselves - although some participants may choose to use them as 
such (we have already seen, from my analysis of the Dana Centre, that audience members 
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may construct events primarily as one-way spaces for learning). Rather we are to expect 
that these presentations of worlds of relevance will initiate conversation: that 'viewers' will 
be active and will respond, presenting their own worlds, in agreement, disagreement, and 
neutrality. We can also argue that this type of format allows for a greater range of 
participants and for a greater degree of participant control. While again the process is 
focussed around a particular topic, in this format there is scope for those with fully formed 
views - those already deeply entangled in the topic - to express these, for those familiar 
only with their own experience to negotiate and understand this in the light of that of 
others, for participants to engage in discussion that builds new meanings and knowledge, 
and for those simply interested in an unfamiliar topic to attend an entertaining event. In 
contrast to the meal, then, this type of dialogue does not limit participation to those with 
prior interests in the issue under discussion, or to stakeholders in it. There is scope - and 
indeed, an invitation - for anyone to attend. In addition participants are not confined to one 
role. As they move around the space - or remain static - and interact with different people 
they talk in a manner and role most appropriate to each relationship. 
In order to visualise this marketplace more thoroughly, I will - as I did with the meal format 
- walk through the imagined experience. Again, I must emphasise that this is just one 
imagining. There will be other ways of interpreting the 'marketplace', and the actual practice 
of the format will most likely differ from these imaginings again. As before, I will then use 
this imagining to briefly discuss possible shortcomings of this model. 
The site our dialogue market takes place in is rather more flexible than the meal: it requires 
simply a large empty space. In the summer it might be a field (giving, perhaps, a 'village 
fete'feel to the process); in colder weather it might be an empty hall, warehouse, or even a 
purpose-built event space such as the Dana Centre. The space is flat. - there are no 
platforms. A general invitation has gone out to interested individuals, groups and 
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organisations and to the local community. As we arrive, just before the official start time, 
some people are already setting up stalls or marking out spaces they would like to claim. 
Some have brought or found tables and chairs and set up around these; others simply 
stand. There are also some food stalls present, attracted by the open invitation, and 
participants are starting to buy cake, or chips, or cups of tea, and to wander around the 
space. 
Gradually more people arrive and the space becomes busier and noisier. While some 
participants remain relatively static at stalls (although they too occasionally break off what 
they're doing to look at other parts of the space), most wa/k around. In the hustle and noise 
it is not immediately obvious who is doing what. ' which individuals are presenting which 
information, who is fixed on which space. As we walk around we watch storytelling 
performances, talk about our own personal experiences, hear scientific information being 
presented, look at maps of the local area, talk to representatives of different groups. Loud 
talk, music, and laughter comes from all around us. Various campaigning groups are 
present, and give out flyers and information, but many of the spaces are used by informal 
groups or simply by individuals to put across their own 'world' relating to the topic. As we 
look about we see some participants engaged in conversation. As we saw at the meal, a 
whole variety of keys are drawn upon; humour, seriousness, informality, anger, surprise. 
Participants watch conversations or performances, or are given information in different 
formats. Occasionally the space around us shifts as groups, realising their similarities, move 
to be closer to one another in the physical space. A similar, virtual, effect occurs as 
individuals exchange contact details with the intention of forming alliances or of continuing 
discussion. Participants slip free from their stalls and spaces to follow up conversations they 
have had, and as they move around the space find themselves empathising with 
unexpected positions and switching their role in the space: they were a presenter, now they 
are a listener; they were an expert, now they are taught by others. As social relationships 
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are formed and they interact in the context of them, individuals speak as scientists, 
consumers, voters, children, believers, and many other types of role. 
Slowly time passes and the dialogue market winds down. Participants are tired but leave 
having heard many voices and opinions and - often - with the promise of new partnerships 
and relationships. Some have formed new ideas and opinions, others are more aware of the 
multitude of opinions that there are on the issue. Some have reached compromises and 
new positions with those that they thought they had nothing in common with. As with the 
meal, there is a sense that for many, the dialogue market has been the start of new 
alliances, actions, and extended conversations 
Again, while my description of the dialogue market seems to meet the criteria for informal 
dialogue I described earlier (p. 261-262), it is easy to point out possible problems with the 
format. A market space is generally unregulated: is there a possibility that interactions may 
be too open to the imposition of existing power relations, or that they might degenerate 
into angry refusals to listen to others? Is the ideal of sustained, equitable and reflective 
discussion really possible in this kind of noisy and transitory space? Is the'fete' feel of the 
space appropriate for talk abut issues which will almost inevitably be deeply emotive and 
possibly relationally dangerous, and could these 'markets' degenerate into entertainment- 
based science 'funfairs' for the engaged? Indeed, we might speculate that these types of 
events might be unhelpfully similar to existing "science festivals' (despite their inclusion of 
non-discursive modes of articulation). Again, only experimentation with this kind of format 
can fully answer these questions. We might, however, argue that this remains a more 
realistic format for current dialogue than the meal. The space required is not dissimilar to 
what is used in existing dialogue formats such as Dana Centre events (indeed, the Dana 
Centre event space, cleared of most of its furniture, could perhaps be used for this kind of 
'market'). In addition the format allows for participants to construct the event as 
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entertainment -a framing which appears important to many participants in current dialogue 
processes at the Dana Centre (see chapter 8). The dialogue market, I would suggest, allows 
for these framings to co-exist alongside a more in-depth articulation process and dialogue 
and to unite many of the meanings that dialogue can have. 
Conclusion 
The two models that I have discussed - the meal and the marketplace - are pragmatic in 
that they could be put into practice with relatively little further development. I have 
suggested both a process and some practical details such as recruitment methods and the 
type of space that should be used. These techniques remain, however, experimental, and I 
would suggest that they require further academic analysis as they are used. The models are 
based on theory and require 'testing' in practical situations: they are currently primarily 
'academic' rather than 'practitioner' formats (see Burchell forthcoming; Smallman and 
Nieman 2006). It remains to be seen, for example, whether the experience of taking part in 
such processes is reward enough for participants, or whether recruitment might be difficult 
and further incentives required. I would also suggest that the question of power in these 
spaces is also likely to remain a vexed one that requires further analysis and action. While 
these processes may be structured as far as possible to encourage equitable relationships, it 
seems likely that to some extent the hegemonies of broader culture will be maintained by 
actors. Indeed, my own data suggests this: I have shown that lay participants in Dana 
Centre events frequently deprecate their own knowledge and defer to speakers' expertise 
(p. 217), as well as bringing traditional PUS framings to events (p. 169-170). While 
organisers can work to mitigate these effects as much as possible and prioritise dominated 
voices (see discussion on p. 252-253), this is unlikely to be entirely effective in removing 
traces of unequal power structures. In this regard such informal dialogue processes must be 
viewed as in flux with and part of the surrounding culture: they will both reflect and impact 
on broader social relations. 
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I would further argue that the study of the processes I have described would be empirically 
rich of itself. Analysis of the talk of these kinds of dialogue processes could reveal both the 
discourses in use within particular communities around a topic, and the ways in which such 
discourses are used in interaction (as patterns of argumentation, for example; see Swierstra 
and Rip 2007). Experimenting with these formats, in other words, could be both empirically 
rich (in enabling a better understanding of discourses mobilised around particular issues) 
and practically useful (in testing and developing models that could be used by informal 
science dialogue practitioners). 
On that note - the possibilities of further research -I want to conclude this chapter and 
move on to the next. Within this chapter I have sought to start drawing some of the 
implications of my empirical research out, combining this with a theoretical analysis in order 
to reconsider the notion of 'informal dialogue'. I have argued that this concept is 
problematic when considered against the background of public participation in science, but 
that it can be understood positively if we shift the emphasis onto individual and symmetrical 
'social learning'. Drawing on this theoretical framework I have noted criteria for informal 
dialogue processes and, using the notion of conversation as a way of enabling these, 
developed two practical suggestions for how my theoretical framework could be put into 
practice. This chapter has thus started to synthesise the results from chapters 4 to 8, and to 
suggest next steps for research: in my next and final chapter I will consider these kinds of 
questions in more detail. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
The previous chapter merged theoretical arguments with some of the implications from my 
empirical work. In this, my final chapter, I want to continue to reflect on my findings and to 
draw the thesis to a conclusion: specifically, I will be returning to the research foci 
introduced in chapter 1; discussing how the two 'phases' of my work link together; noting 
the limitations and broader significances of this research; and, finally, considering next 
steps. 
Returning to the research questions 
My research questions, as I describe in chapter 1, were designed to give structure to my 
research without closing its interests down too narrowly. Throughout the study I have used 
them to give my fieldwork and analysis focus, while remaining open to other important 
themes and categories: my discussion of the questions throughout my data chapters has 
therefore been brief. At this point, however, I wish to return to them in a more focussed 
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way. How have they been answered, and how do these answers relate to existing 
literature? 
What discourses do scientists and engineers use in talk about the public, and how do these 
relate to the 'deficit model'? 
In chapter 41 mapped language about the public (and science) from group discussions with 
scientists. In fact, not only does my data provide answers to the research question, but it 
also gave us several other important findings: the co-construction of science with the public, 
and boundary work involved in this; the media as a 'default discourse' in scientific talk; and 
the context-dependency of all the talk I mapped. 
I described a variety of types of talk about'the public', arguing that scientific talk "is not 
tidy and smooth, but complex and full of disjunctions and contradictions" (p. 140). 
Discourses relating to the deficit model - such as the public as passive, ignorant, and fearful 
of science - were present, and I used my data to reconstruct an ideal-type (The public are 
passive and ignorant. They can be easily manipulated and fear what they don't understand. 
This leads to a negative attitude towards science. '). However, I also described a range of 
other, more complex discourses of the public (such as its differentiation, knowledge, and 
activity) and noted that some of these discourses can contain great discursive flexibility. 
Scientists, it appears, actually make use of an entire repertoire of discourses of 'the public'. 
I concluded the chapter by arguing that my findings were important for their emphasis on 
the complexity and diversity of scientists' talk in a field which has at times tended to 
homogenise scientific discourses, comparing my findings with other studies that have been 
unable to effectively map complexity (Burchell 2007a; Cook et al 2004; Frewer et al 2003; 
Young and Matthews 2007). 1 also emphasised the context-dependency of the discourses I 
identified, a feature which reinforces other studies with similar findings (Kerr et al 1997; 
Michael and Birke 1994a; 1994b). 
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A further question might be how similar the assemblage of 'deficit model' characteristics I 
found is to canonical accounts of this model (see discussion in chapter 1, p. 15-16). Certainly 
the reconstructed ideal-type discourse, and many of the sub-discourses (for example 
ignorance or fear), fit in well with the ways in which science's 'deficit' constructions of the 
public are described in the literature (for example Irwin and Wynne 1996; Wynne 2006a). 
In both my discussion and other accounts we see concepts of the public as deficient in 
knowledge, agency, trust, and understanding of process. The causality that I have noted - 
ignorance leads to mistrust - also appears in both my data and in the literature's accounts 
of the deficit model (Miller 2001; Sturgis and Allum 2004; Wynne 2006a). 
While there are strong similarities, then, there are some variations which are worth noting. 
The emphasis on the public as specifically uncritical- as a subcategory of their passivity - 
does not appear to have been identified elsewhere. As my discussion of this (and of the 
construction of science as an essentially critical enterprise) indicated, this idea appears to 
have a special meaning and resonance for scientists: it is used as a key boundary marker 
between science and other domains. Furthermore, where many accounts emphasise the 
public's mistrustof science as being the key problematic attitude stemming from their 
ignorance (see Wynne 2006a), in this data we see mistrust merely as one of a constellation 
of negative attitudes. It is closely linked to - and at times cannot easily be separated from - 
other factors such as blame or fear. 
How are publics constructed within informal science-public dialogue events, and what other 
performances and meaning-makings occur within these? 
My analysis of Dana Centre events - my case of 'informal science-public dialogue events- 
in chapters 5 to 8 can be seen as largely focussing on unpacking the second, broader, half 
of this question: the chapters are structured around exploring, through the ethnography of 
speaking, exactly how the interactions of the events work. In these chapters I argued that 
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the events were flexible and uncertain. The space gave mixed messages, event framing 
varied from moment to moment, and genre of interaction shifted. In addition I tracked 
power (in the form of control) in the space, arguing that this was weighted towards the 
institution and to scientific experts, but that there was also a constant struggle over it. 
Broadly, then, we might answer the second part of the research question by saying that 
dialogue events seem to be marked by a variety of performances and meanings: roles shift, 
internal definitions vary, and the space is marked by contestation. 
While the way in which my analysis was structured, then, was relatively general, it also 
provided answers to the more focussed interests of this research. In chapter 71 spent some 
time examining the 'audience' of Dana Centre events (p. 212-221), and touched upon 
explicit discourses of 'the public': it is this analysis which helps us answer the first part of 
the research question. I noted that there was little talk of 'the public', but that when this did 
occur it was viewed as separate to those present in the Dana Centre, and deficient. We 
saw, in fact, versions of the deficit model being used, in talk from audience members as 
well as from the authoritative 'front' of the space. 
I also discussed at some length the ways in which the 'public' of the Dana Centre, the 
audience, was framed and positioned, finding that this was complex and shifting. Overt 
language about the audience constructed it in a positive way: it was viewed as informed, 
interested, and active. More subtle positioning seemed, however, to dispute this. I argued 
that in practice the audience was framed as homogenous and deficient; in particular, that 
their role was most frequently seen as to enquire rather than to speak. Moreover it 
appeared that audience members were complicit in this, often positioning themselves as 
hesitant enquirers of authority and deprecating what they had to say. 
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It seems important - particularly given the current popularity of 'dialogue' in policy and 
communication - to reflect on the broader implications of these findings. Firstly, then, I 
would like to comment on how my description of the dialogue process compares to the 
rhetoric of the public engagement movement. Others have already broadly criticised these 
kinds of activities as not living up to their promise (Beder 1999; Lock 2007; Wynne 2005): 
my study, I would suggest, adds to these critiques by presenting a detailed picture of the 
interactions that actually occur in dialogue events. Practitioners of dialogue - including 
those at the Dana Centre - emphasise that these processes are different to PUS and that 
they have left the deficit model behind (see Miller 2001). The language is of 'debate' (see 
p. 74), two-way communication and the "open exchange and sharing of knowledge, ideas, 
values, attitudes and beliefs" (Jackson et al 2005). Such language suggests symmetry and 
equity in the 'dialogic' interactions that take place. My study indicates that this symmetry 
and equity is not yet in place and that, as Wilsdon et al have suggested (2005: 34), reports 
of the death of the deficit model have been greatly exaggerated. 
I indicated some of the ways in which my data points to this in the previous chapter (p. 257- 
258). Perhaps most significantly, we have seen that the dialogue space was dominated by 
science as the ultimate authority. While this authority is concentrated, I argued, in the 
figures of the technical experts, it is also called upon by audience members: the entire 
dialogue event is saturated in scientific knowledges and values. Yet science dialogue 
processes have always been meant to be a meeting point for different forms of knowledges; 
to involve, as one document puts it, "'informed contributions from many perspectives" 
(Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2001: 1). In the Dana Centre, at least, 
there currently seems to be little space for non-scientific perspectives or for the voices of lay 
knowledges. 
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This example of 'dialogue', then, does not seem to live up to the promises of the movement 
as a whole. We might also wish to reflect on my depiction of Dana Centre events as marked 
by conflict around access to the floor. What implications does this have for the dialogue 
process? Are equitable conversations possible without cooperative behaviour, or should we 
see the constant struggle within the space as another problematic feature of current 
dialogue? 
The answer to this remains unclear - although, we might note, my theoretical modelling in 
chapter 9 suggests that a more cooperative environment could be important for fostering 
conversation. But the issue of conflict also links to the findings of a recently published study 
of similar "dialogue' events (Kerr et al 2007). Anne Kerr and her co-authors describe several 
points which my findings closely mirror (the overall privileging of scientific knowledge, the 
separation of those present from 'the public', shifting lay and expert subject positions); a 
key contrast, however, is their emphasis on the lack of conflict within events. They found 
"friendly debate rather than entrenched confrontation" (p. 402) and appear to view this as 
problematic and as part of the reason that they ultimately "question the extent to which lay 
people can ever expose scientific error and hubris" (p. 408). Their pessimism stems from the 
'fragility' of the lay positions they observe: these so readily defer to technical expertise, 
avoiding any confrontation, that there seemed little chance of dominant scientific discourses 
being resisted or challenged. 
The Kerr study points us to the presence - or possibility - of two different forms of conflict 
within dialogue. My data indicates that there is conflict on an almost invisible (to 
participants) level within the Dana Centre, centring around access to the floor and pointing 
towards, I have suggested, a rejection of the rules of the space (see p. 241). I understand 
this conflict as being not over substantive issues but rather over who is allowed to have a 
voice - indeed, the very form of the event. Kerr et al's discussion, and my findings on the 
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primacy of science in the Dana space, focus on a rather different form of conflict: that 
which manifests itself as overt disagreement and confrontation in talk. In particular, what is 
lacking in both my own and Kerr et al's cases of public engagement are challenges to 
scientific knowledge and authority. Conflict around what is valid knowledge, for example, is 
entirely lacking. 
The Kerr et al study is significant not just in that it adds to my discussion of conflict in 
dialogue. It also marks what appears to be an increased interest, from critical authors, in 
dialogue and public engagement. In addition to recent work which understands these kinds 
of events as boundary objects (Parry and Faulkner 2007), examines the broader trends of 
the dialogue movement (Burchell forthcoming) or explicitly examines the attitudes of the 
scientific experts involved (Burchell 2007b), Alan Irwin has discussed public engagement 
(2006) in terms of competing discourses of 'old' and 'new' governance. His work explains 
many of the tensions of my data: the different framings of events, for example, which range 
from the dialogue event as PUS to it as open debate, or the differences between language 
(of audience as active) and practice (audience understood as deficit). In his terms all such 
events, torn by complex histories, will bear the traces of previous models and current ideals. 
Tension and multiple discourses are therefore to be expected: he talks of a "discursive 
struggle" (p. 315) being present within engagement processes and talk around them. 
The complexity of these processes is also deeply significant for the movement as a whole - 
a complexity which we have seen repeatedly in my analysis and which can be, as Davies et 
al (2006) point out, ignored within an at times idealistic literature of 'deliberation'. As I 
noted in chapter 3 (p. 87), the categories that are drawn upon in discussing dialogue -'the 
public', 'science', even 'dialogue' - rapidly become misleading when applied to actual 
events. My analysis of authority in the event space indicated that the Dana site is more 
complex than a public space with access to a panel of 'scientific' or technical experts: in 
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fact, 'science' is spread throughout the space, and is drawn on by the public' audience, 
while technical experts may at times call upon lay authorities. 'The public' and 'science' of 
public engagements events are therefore not monolithic or even static entities but 
variegated and shifting. Any discussion of the nature of 'dialogue' similarly becomes 
problematic. What it is, or should be, and how this relates to practice on the level of detai 
that my analysis has examined is by no means clear: the literature in this area, as chapters 
2 and 9 indicate, is prolific but inconclusive. This complexity is an important factor for future 
analysts, practitioners and evaluators: the use of homogeneous categories in seeking to 
understand or carry out dialogue will, it seems, be misleadingly reductionist. 
Discourse and dialogue: the project as coherent whole 
This thesis has sought to examine constructions of 'the public' within scientific talk and in 
dialogue processes. While this interest has been a unifying theme, the reader will have 
noticed that my fieldwork and analysis has largely been carried out as two distinct projects: 
phase I, examining group discussion data and described in chapter 4, and phase II, 
analysing the case of the Dana Centre (chapters 5-8). In chapter 91 drew on findings from 
both chapters 4 and 5-8, starting to synthesise my results by reflecting on their implications 
for informal dialogue; I wish here to consider further the ways in which my thesis holds 
together as a coherent whole. 
My "natural history' of research, in chapter 3, charts the background to the two phases of 
research. I was originally interested in examining changes in 'beliefs and attitudes' in 
scientists after participation in dialogue but, even as I carried out the fieldwork, found this a 
misleading framework and altered my focus to an examination of the discourse of particular 
sites. However, as a result it at times felt as though the two phases of research had lost any 
strong connection to one another. The question naturally arises of whether they are linked 
at all, or if they can in fact be viewed most productively independently of one another. 
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Certainly my discussions in the sections above would support this: I am able to reflect on 
the two research questions and the answers my data provide entirely separately. 
While each half of my analysis does stand alone, I would argue that they also support and 
give new meaning to each other. The sections are linked by a continued interest in 'the 
public' within discourse and practice: this theme runs throughout and enables us to examine 
it in two different sites. That this connection has not always been apparent throughout the 
study is perhaps due to my findings from these sites. We have seen, firstly, very different 
ways of constructing publics (from the largely discursive means of the discussions, to 
implied framings from interactions within Dana events); and secondly rather different 
emphases and forms within those constructions. Thus my findings from the group 
discussions with scientists and engineers showed deficit models of publics in their talk, but 
also more complex concepts of the public. The naturally occurring, unprompted data of the 
Dana Centre, on the other hand, gave us very few vocalised models of 'the public' (those 
that did occur were dominated by the deficit model); in the practice of the site, however, I 
identified multiple constructions of the-public-as-audience. These included overtly positive 
models but also a deficit model of the audience as lacking compared to the "experts'. 
Deficit models thus appear to dominate throughout. In both the cultures of science and 
'dialogue' the deficit model of the public is an important resource for describing publics and 
organising the practice of interacting with them. We can further suggest that, throughout 
the entire data set, there seems to be a great deal of discursive flexibility around this topic 
of the public. Despite the predominance of the deficit model, the public's nature is by no 
means fixed and there is considerable space for discursive dexterity around it as the context 
of talk requires. In part this seems to derive from the distinctions that are often drawn 
between 'the public' and particular publics: the ability to distinguish and separate out 
different groups means that a deficit model of the public can be used simultaneously with 
more complex models of publics. Thus, for example, we saw scientists in group discussions 
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attributing knowledge or agency to certain public groups while affirming a deficit model of 
the general public (p. 104), or Dana Centre participants drawing on the deficit model to 
describe an external general public while assuming an internal public which is informed and 
active (p. 212-221). These points serve, I would suggest, to emphasise further the 
complexity of these discourses, and their context-dependence. 'The public' is not a static 
concept, or even a repertoire of two or three fixed discourses, but shifting and open to 
modification. 
Limitations and key points of significance 
The study as a whole thus points us to the power of the deficit model and to the 
complexity, in talk, of discourses of 'the public'. However, before I move on to briefly 
highlighting the aspects of this study which I think are particularly significant, it seems 
important to consider some of the limiting factors on this research. What are its weaknesses 
and how might these affect how it can be generalised? I consider two key points below. 
Group discussions and 'forced' vocalisation 
The use of interviews for eliciting talk about particular issues is standard practice in social 
research. Nonetheless, as Silverman (2001; 2005) has pointed out, their extensive use can 
be problematic: they are artificial situations and may impose particular frameworks on the 
individuals involved. He suggests making use of naturally-occurring data - such as mine 
from the Dana Centre - wherever possible. While I believe that, for this study, I could not 
rely on natural data (as I point out in chapter 3, discourses of the public are infrequent), 
Silverman's critique remains. In particular my discussion groups heightened the artificiality 
of the situation by directing talk onto genera/topics around communication and the public: 
while I feel this was necessary in the light of a literature focussed on contextualised 
accounts of publics, this kind of talk is especially 'unnatural'. The discussions forced my 
interviewees to consider and voice opinions on unfamiliar and discursively inaccessible 
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issues, perhaps for the first time. How far can they represent genuine discourses from 
scientific cultures? 
My results mirror those from other studies - in particular that discourses of the public are 
shifting and used for rhetorical purposes - and my study is also strengthened by my 
emphasis that my interest is in talk, notreal' beliefs or opinions. These factors convince me 
that my findings can be used to indicate more broadly the ways in which those within 
scientific cultures talk about the public, with, of course, the proviso that such talk, in the 
pure form that I examine, is likely to occur rarely. In future, however, I would consider 
more thoroughly the pros and cons of 'generalised' interviews such as mine against those 
contextualised around a topic (such as, for example, Michael and Birke 1994a; 1994b). Such 
contextualised talk can still be analysed to find general patterns of discourse, and removes 
some of the problems of forcing talk from interviewees which is unreal or unnatural to 
them. For this study, it seems important to remember that the data from my group 
discussions is specific to a particular artificial context, and that my analysis of it can only be 
a 'modest witness' (see Wynne 2006b) pointing to broader themes. 
The Dana Centre as a case study 
Fieldnotes from my wider ethnographic fieldwork at informal dialogue events indicate that 
Dana Centre events are broadly representative of the movement as a whole. Questions 
must inevitably remain, however, as to how far my analysis - conducted on an extremely 
detailed level - can be extended. Would my findings of high facilitator control, for example, 
be present in other events with different institutional backgrounds? Is conflict over the floor 
as inevitable a feature of dialogue at other sites as I have found it to be at the Dana 
Centre? 
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This critique is further heightened by the relatively fast pace of change within the Dana 
Centre (see McCallie et al in press). The four events that I have examined in detail took 
place almost two years ago; since then, the structure of many Dana Centre events has 
changed in response to internal evaluation and staff discussion. The'panel events' I have 
primarily studied are now limited to a few events a month, and an increasing number of 
new, more complex formats - such as 'workshops' or theatre-based events - are being used 
(see Dana Centre 2007; McCallie et al in press). While some of my critique may no longer 
be valid for the Dana Centre, however, it seems likely that they will still apply to many other 
sites, which lag behind the "innovative" Dana Centre and which frequently make use of panel 
formats. 
Genera I isabil ity from a particular case is always a difficult issue which ultimately must limit 
the claims made for the research. In this study it seems appropriate to acknowledge that 
this data is just one example, at a particular point in time, of a broader movement: the 
claims I make as to the extension of my findings more widely are therefore suggestions, 
which require more thorough testing. 
Both of these points emphasise the need for'humility' in my findings (cf. Law 2004): my 
data and analysis are situated in particular contexts and may not necessarily extend to 
others. Having acknowledged this, however, there are still several points of particular 
significance that I would like to highlight. These are areas that I have discussed at length 
already but want to point out as -I believe - of special importance for literature or practice. 
" Complexity: The diversity and context-dependence of models of 'the public' in 
scientists' talk is one of my key findings and one which has not been thoroughly 
characterised in the literature before. The presence of reflective, complex models of 
publics has significance not only in countering accusations of 'sociological naivety' but 
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for the practice of communication and dialogue: scientists, it appears, do not have to 
draw upon the deficit model. 
0 Contradiction: My analysis of dialogue processes has identified a variety of framings 
and modes of interaction which are at times opposed to one another. This not only 
provides evidence, on the micro-level, of the 'tensions' that Alan Irwin describes 
(2006), but gives us some sense of the problems involved in participating in these 
events: their flexibility and uncertain nature, I have argued, can be difficult for those 
involved. 
0 Complicity: The finding that PUS models of dialogue and deficit models of publics 
may be co-produced by all present, rather than only imposed by those in powerful 
positions, is, I believe, a key one. It mirrors Kerr et al's 2007 findings, though on a 
rather more detailed level, and is suggestive of both the complexity of current 
'dialogue' and the difficulties inherent in reshaping it as a more equitable process. 
0 Conflict: I have argued that Dana Centre events can be understood as sites of 
conflict and struggle around access to the floor, and that power is continually 
challenged and asserted within this struggle. Conflict on this level within dialogue has 
not been reported before, and I would suggest my analysis is significant both in 
indicating a site for the negotiation of power (which could be analysed alongside the 
more obvious site of confrontation in talk), and in suggesting that, currently, dialogue 
processes are spaces for conflict rather than cooperation between participants. 
Future research and other implications 
Within this chapter I have returned to my research questions; discussed the coherence of 
my study as a whole; noted some of the limitations of the research; and summarised what I 
believe are the main points of significance. As I close I would like to consider what my 
findings suggest for future research and practice. 
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I have already, in chapter 9, described one framework for further research: the models that 
I derived and discussed there are currently theoretical and require testing (indeed, I 
mentioned some of the points that I felt it would be valuable to investigate; p. 277-278). My 
vision of informal dialogue, and the specific models for it that I constructed, are perhaps the 
most obvious place for future investigation: the 'meal' and 'marketplace' models need to be 
examined in practice before being used more widely, and these processes are also, as I 
note in chapter 9, likely to yield valuable data on interactions between sciences and publics. 
In many ways the most obvious next step for this research, then, is an action research 
project which carries out a dialogue (a 'meal' or a 'marketplace') and which aims to test the 
dialogue model, promote the social learning I describe, and analyse the interactions that 
take place. Such a project would also draw on my findings of scientists' discourses of the 
public in that it would seek to encourage the use of, and analyse the presence or absence 
of, the more complex discourses that I found in scientists' interview talk. 
I would also suggest that the issue of conflict versus cooperation in dialogue processes is 
one that would bear further investigation. My analysis has indicated conflict around access 
to the floor in dialogue events; mine and that of others (Kerr et al 2007) has suggested that 
there is not enough conflict around science as primary knowledge source. Llewellyn's work 
(2005; 2006; see discussion on p. 239-241) has shown that cooperation around use of the 
floor in similar events is possible. Both theoretically and empirically I feel that we are left 
with certain questions. How do these two levels, or sites, of conflict relate to one another? 
Can or should we conceive of informal dialogue as conflict-free, or is it - as Kerr et al imply 
- necessary? Empirically, I would suggest that an analysis of conflict (and cooperation) in 
sites other than Dana would be useful: a study of a further informal dialogue - or even a 
formal process - would test my findings from Dana, indicating how far they can be 
extended, and show how common different forms of conflict are. 
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I have analysed a site of the practice of dialogue; not surprisingly, then, I believe my work 
also has implications and uses for practitioners of public engagement. While much of my 
analysis can be read as a critique of current dialogue processes, it can also be used - as I 
suggest in chapter 9- in more constructive ways to suggest productive alternatives. Where 
I have shown a hegemony of scientific worldviews, for example, organisers could 
consciously seek to include a more diverse range of voices in their events; or where power 
seems too rigorously exercised in the person of the facilitator this role could be altered or 
removed. The models for informal dialogue I create in chapter 9- while as yet untested - 
might also be of use to practitioners in informing new kinds of events. 
Perhaps most importantly, I have demonstrated the sheer complexity of dialogue processes, 
and the various and contested frames and power relations that are evident in them. 
Equitable dialogue, it appears, does not come naturally: work must be done to bring it 
about beyond simply placing those from ostensibly different cultures in the same space. 
Organisers need to be clear about what they are attempting to do in their 'dialogue' events, 
and - if it is to promote symmetrical mutual learning of the kind I have described - to be 
aware that this will be a difficult process and one where many assumptions - from all 
participants - of current dialogue must be unlearnt. Indeed, the manifold meanings of 
dialogue should give all involved in public engagement - researchers, practitioners, 
evaluators, participants - cause for reflection. While the "entertainment' framework for 
informal dialogue does have value (chapter 8), it leaves us with an important question: is 
this all that we want informal public dialogue with science to be? 
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ROSALIND Pray you no more of this, 'tis like the howling 
of Irish wolves against the moon. 
AS YOU LIKE IT, Act V Scene II 
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1: Transcription system 
Based on Jefferson's transcript notation (see Atkinson and Heritage 1999; Roberts 2006; 
Silverman 2001). 
(. ) Pause in speech of less than one second 
() Pause in speech of about a second 
(4) Pause in speech of four seconds 
Elongation of a particular sound - for example, 'oka:: y' 
(. hh) Audible inbreath (number of h's indicates length) 
(hh) Audible outbreath 
[ Overlapping speech 
] Overlapping speech ends (not always used) 
= Latched speech (no gap between two lines of transcript) 
? or ! Rising intonation (suggests a question or emphasis) 
or , Falling tone. If immediately followed by text the speaker has not 
paused but continues straight into their next sentence. 
word Heavy emphasis 
° Particularly quiet speech 
(word) Text in brackets indicates a best guess at unclear speech 
(???? ) Question marks in brackets indicate inaudible speech 
(word) Bracketed italicised text describes laughter, movement, and other 
non-verbal communication. It may also contain transcriber's 
comments. 
word... Speech trails out 
word ... word Some speech omitted 
I Interviewer 
F Facilitator (used in transcriptions of Dana Centre events) 
A Audience member (used in transcriptions of Dana Centre events) 
f Indicates the speaker is female 
m Indicates the speaker is male 
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2: Project summary given to scientists involved in group discussions (on request) 
Project title: Scientists and the public: Studies in belief and dialogue 
Abstract: Since the public understanding of science became an area of study in its own 
right, the beliefs and understandings of the public about science have been intensively 
studied. However, little attention has been paid to scientists' understandings of the public. 
This study seeks to remedy this by looking at the beliefs and assumptions scientists hold 
about'the public'. It will also look at how these beliefs are worked out in practice, 
specifically in the forum of the increasingly popular 'dialogue' science events. An analysis of 
such events (taking place in two key locations, the Science and Natural History Museums in 
London) is planned, which will look at the effects on both the scientists and members of the 
public who participate. 
Particular attention will be paid to the way that different domains ('science' and 'public') 
interact within individuals and within diverse groups, as well as to the power of individual 
interactions and relationships in affecting this. There will also be a focus on how the beliefs 
under study are constructed, negotiated and changed in the different situations analysed. It 
is acknowledged that the binary opposition of 'scientists' and 'the public' used in the 
questions below is simplistic and this opposition will also be an area of study. 
Research questions: 
The beliefs of scientists: 
" What beliefs do scientists hold about the public? 
" How do these beliefs affect their thinking about science communication? 
The process of dialogue: 
" What happens when scientists meet and interact with members of the public in a 
dialogue event? 
0 Are scientists' beliefs about the public and science communication altered by taking part 
in dialogue events? 
" Are the beliefs of members of the public about science and scientists altered by taking 
part in dialogue events? 
Methodology: The methodology is qualitative and takes a directed ethnographic form. 
While taking a broadly ethnographic approach, the specificity of the research questions 
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mean that it is necessary for the methodology to be more focussed than in traditional 
ethnographic studies. The methods to be used are: 
" Semi-structured group interviews with scientists who have not participated in dialogue 
events; 
" Participant observation of dialogue events at two different centres; 
0 Group or individual interviews with scientists who have taken part in dialogue events; 
" Group interviews with members of the public who have taken part in dialogue events. 
All speech will be transcribed and analysed using a grounded theory approach and discourse 
analysis. 
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3: Grou discussions schedule 
Interview Schedule 
****************REMEMBER TO SWITCH RECORDER ON! *************** 
Questions Research aims 
Introduction: 
Hi, as you know my name's Sarah, and I'm a PhD student in the Science Communication Group 
at Imperial. Thanks for taking the time to come and help me this afternoon. What I'm interested 
in is really just your experiences, opinions and ideas about science communication - there are no 
right or wrong answers and it doesn't matter if you haven't thought about these things much 
before. I'd like to run this session as a discussion group, so feel free to agree or disagree with 
things that have been said or to think out loud. 
I want to be as clear as possible about everything you say, so will probably ask you to clarify or 
expand on what you've said a lot. Please bear with me if I seem to be asking stupid questions - 
things that seem like common sense to you, working in science, may well be new to me! 
As you know we're being recorded, but that's just so that I have a record of what we say. 
Anything I use will be made anonymous. I hope that's okay with everyone? 
I'll introduce a couple of questions to get us started, and then we're going to look at three main 
discussion points. The main topics to talk about are on these bits of card - if you could talk 
through those, giving your different ideas, that would be great. I'll probably chip in at times to 
ask extra questions but mostly you'll be on your own. If you could be careful for only one person 
to talk at a time, though, that would be great - otherwise you don't tend to get much sense out 
of the recording! 
Go round the group saying your name, career stage and Ice-breaker. 
what you're working on. 
Could you tell me a bit about any experience you've had of Intro (easy question to get 
science/technology communication activities? discussion started). 
INTERVIEW TIME AND DATE: 
LAB GROUP AND PLACE: 
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Imagine you have been asked to do some form of 
science communication for the public. What would 
your ideal be? 
What kind of thing would you want to do if you were asked 
to do a public communication event about your work? - 
what kind of information would you want to convey? 
How important do you think communication to the public is 
in your field? 
Why do you think scientists should communicate to the 
public? 
Do you think the public can ever really understand your 
research? 
Beliefs on science communication, 
including its purposes and 
whether effective communication 
can ever take place. 
***REMEMBER TO ASK FOR DETAILS! - WHY/HOW/WHAT WAS THAT LIKE? *** 
What do you think characterises the public in their relations 
with science? 
How would you describe the public in terms of their 
relations with science? 
How capable do you think the public is in dealing with 
scientific issues? 
How do you feel the public deals with science in the media? 
Do you think the public are interested in science and 
engineering? 
Do you think the public has anything interesting to 
contribute to people working in science about their work? 
How do you think the public can contribute to discussion on 
the moral and ethical dimensions of science? 
Beliefs about the public. 
***REMEMBER TO ASK FOR DETAILS! - WHY/HOW/WHAT WAS THAT LIKE? *** 
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How do you respond as an individual when science is in the I Articulation of dual membership 
news? 
How is that different to how you think the public respond? 
Do you think of yourself as part of the public? (We've been 
talking about scientists and the public as though they are in 
two completely separate boxes. Do you think that's true? ) 
Are there times when you identify with the general public? 
Do you imagine the public as containing scientists? 
of science and the public. 
***REMEMBER TO ASK FOR DETAILS! - WHY/HOW/WHAT WAS THAT LIKE? *** 
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4: Informal dialogue events attended 
Event and venue Date and time 
'Royal Institution Headline Debate', Royal Institution London 13th October 2004 
(evening) 
'Is man just another great ape? ', Darwin Centre, Natural History 19th October 2004 
Museum London (evening) 
'The BA X-Change', Dana Centre London 26th October 2004 
(evening) 
'Naked Science: The state of identity', Dana Centre London 27th October 2004 
(evening) 
'Wildlife photographer of the year, Darwin Centre, Natural History 29th October 2004 
Museum London (afternoon) 
'Renewable Energy, Darwin Centre, Natural History Museum 31St October 2004 
London (afternoon) 
'Catching up with our climate: Waiting for change', Dana Centre 2nd November 2004 
London (evening) 
'Uncracking the secrets of ocean ice', Darwin Centre, Natural 3Id November 2004 
History Museum London (afternoon) 
'In the headlines', Darwin Centre, Natural History Museum London 4th November 2004 
(afternoon) 
'Smoking or non-smoking? ', Dana Centre London 10th November 2004 
(evening) 
Nanotechnology debate, Institute of Contemporary Arts London 23rd November 2004 
(evening) 
'Great British Inventions', Dana Centre London 24th November 2004 
(evening) 
'BA with Spiked: Plagues of the future', Dana Centre London 8th December 2004 
(studio space) 
'SuperNatural History: Ball Lightning', Darwin Centre, Natural 
History Museum London 
'Binge drinking: Epidemic or bit of fun? ', Dana Centre London 
'Naked Science: Where is the UK in the nano-world? ', Dana Centre 
London 
(evening) 
25th February 2005 
(afternoon) 
10th March 2005 
(evening) 
17th March 2005 
(evening) 
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'Technology, Society and the Senses', Royal Institution London 28th June 2005 
(evening) 
'Segregating Medicine', Dana Centre London 5th October 2005 
(evening) 
'Tackling disease together', Darwin Centre, Natural History 27th October 2005 
Museum London (evening) 
'Drugs and the brain: Recreation or therapy? ', Dana Centre 3rd November 2005 
London (evening) 
'Drugs and the brain: Pills to make you normal', Dana Centre 10th November 2005 
London (evening) 
'Einstein's greatest theory', Dana Centre London 22nd November 2005 
(evening) 
'Weightless Buildings', Cafe Scientifique Photographer's Gallery 17th January 2006 
London (evening) 
'Bio-Bling', Dana Centre, London 18th January 2006 
(evening) 
'Here Be Dragons', Darwin Centre, Natural History Museum 26th January 2006 
London (evening) 
'The Dana Pub Guide to Energy', Dana Centre London 2nd February 2006 
(evening) 
"Are we eating away the rainforests? ', Darwin Centre, Natural 23rd February 2006 
History Museum London (evening) 
"Fixing your genes - the challenge of gene therapy', Cafe 14th March 2006 
Scientifique Oxford (evening) 
'Climate Change: Natural Evidence? ', Darwin Centre, Natural 30th March 2006 
History Museum London (evening) 
'DECIDE: Better Brains', Dana Centre London 25th April 2006 
(evening) 
'Chernobyl and the nuclear debate', Dana Centre London 26th April 2006 
(evening) 
"Saviour Siblings and Designer Babies', Cafe Scientifique 20th June 2006 
Photographer's Gallery London (evening) 
'sciencehorizons: Mind and Body' at Science Oxford, Oxford 1 0th March 2007 
(morning/afternoon) 
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5: Project summary given to Dana Centre team 
Research Aims and Methods: Dana Centre 2005-2006 
Six events to be studied. Exact events are the but likely to be: Segregating Medicine (5th 
October), Wellcome Trust dialogue (3rd November), one of the Antenna buildings events 
(November), one of the Einstein events (end of November), and two others in 2006. 
The research aims to analyse and understand a type of 'dialogue event', and to investigate 
whether change takes place in individuals as a result of taking part in such events. (For 
further detail see the research questions below. ) It is anticipated that a discussion of the 
concepts and practices of dialogue within the events will also result from analysis. 
Methods should be as follows. Conditions necessary for a particular aspect of research to 
take place are in italics: 
1. Analysis of language use and interactions throughout the event. A full transcription to 
be taken from video of the event, and this to be analysed in conjunction with field notes 
taken at the event using grounded theory-based coding and discourse analysis (DA). 
Researcher to be present at event, able to take full field notes, and have 
access to video of the event. 
2. Analysis of audience interviews. These brief interviews are to take place in the intervals 
of the events. It is anticipated that they will last about five minutes each, and that two 
or three will be carried out for each event. The interviews will be recorded, transcribed, 
and analysed using coding and DA. Questions are likely to include: 
Have you attended before? 
Has anything surprised you? 
Have you changed your mind about anything? 
Researcher to have access to audience and permission to conduct interviews 
during intervals. Intervals to allow sufficient time for this. 
3. Analysis of speaker interviews. Scientists/engineers on the speaker panel to be 
interviewed after the event, as a group. These interviews will last for 20-30 minutes, 
and will be recorded and analysed as before. Questions will be designed to elicit the 
speakers' previous experience in science communication, their thoughts on taking part 
in the event, and any changes in opinion that have occurred. 
Panel to know in advance that research is taking place at the event. 
Researcher to have access to the scientists on the panel after the event, 
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preferably immediately after the close of the event in a half hour group 
interview. 
Research ethics: given that the majority of the research is low-profile participant 
observation and the events are freely open to the public, I do not think it is ethically 
necessary to tell the audience that the research is taking place. The research will, however, 
be openly done and if questioned the researcher will explain the research and its purposes. 
Those audience members interviewed will, of course, be asked for their permission. The 
speaker panel should be informed in advance and agreement to the post-event interview 
sought. 
Research questions related to this analysis (areas of investigation) 
1. What happens when scientists meet and interact with members of the public in a 
dialogue event? 
0 How is science constructed in these events? - By the scientists/by the public? 
0 How is the public (in the form of an audience or as a debating partner) constructed 
during the event; in particular by the scientists but also by the general public present? 
" How are scientific language and narratives used during the event? 
" What interactions take place, and what features are they marked by? 
" How do scientists/the public frame the issues discussed? 
" What discourses are drawn on? 
" How do the beliefs of scientists about the public reveal themselves? 
" How do the beliefs of the public about science and scientists reveal themselves? 
" What is the perceived purpose of these events? 
2. Are scientists' beliefs about the public and science communication altered by taking part 
in dialogue events? 
0 What changes occur in the beliefs of scientists and why? 
0 How do these affect their sense of identity and self and their understanding of their 
dual membership of science and the public? 
3. Are the beliefs of members of the public about science and scientists altered by taking 
part in dialogue events? 
" What do members of the public believe about science and scientists after taking part in 
a dialogue event? 
0 Is there anything unusual (given the literature on this area) about the way that they 
now describe and interact with the concept of science? 
- 305 - 
6: Informal dialogue audience interview schedule 
Dialogue event data collection: audience member questions (to be asked 
individually or in groups), 02/01/2006 
Who I am 
I want to get people's experiences and opinions 
Do you mind if I record? 
How are you finding the evening? Are you enjoying it? Ice-breaker intro questions 
Have you attended any events like this before? - 
What? Where? 
Do you have a scientific background at all? 
Has anything surprised you? Is any change taking 
Were you expecting this kind of format? place? 
What, if anything, in the event has been new to you? 
Do you think you're changing your mind about 
anything so far? 
Do you think the scientist(s) on the panel is 
representative of what most scientists would say or 
do? - Do you think they're a typical scientist? 
Overall, how would you describe your experience so General experience of 
far this evening? event 
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7: Informal dialogue sneaker interview schedule 
Dialogue event data collection: panel member questions (to be asked 
individually or in groups), 02/02/2006 
Who I am 
I want to get your experiences and opinions (of this evening and other sci-comm) 
Do you mind if I record? 
Have you taken part in any other events like this? General background 
Have you done any other kinds of science 
communication? 
Can you tell me a bit about your experience tonight? - Experience of the evening 
Did you enjoy it? / Was it what you expected? / Did and any change that has 
anything surprise you? / Was the audience what you occurred 
expected? 
Did you hear anything that was new to you? 
Do you think the event has made you change your 
mind about anything? 
Did you think the audience tonight was representative 
of the general public? - How did you think they 
responded to the debate? 
Did anything the audience say/argue during the event 
surprise you? 
In what way, if in any, has taking part in this event changed 
the way you view the public's understanding of this subject? 
Did people come and talk to you in the 
intervals/afterwards? What did they say? 
What would your ideal way of doing science Beliefs about science 
communication be? Why? communication 
What do you think the purposes of doing science 
communication are? 
What do you think characterises the public in their Beliefs about the public 
relations with science? - How do you think people 
respond to science generally? - Are they interested? 
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Do you think the public has anything to contribute to 
scientists and their work? 
How do you respond as an individual when science is Dual role in science and the 
in the news? - Do you think that's different to how public 
the public respond? 
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